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i 
A B S T R A C T 
THE POUTICAL IDEAS OF SIR HENRY MAINE 
CHAPTER ONE i s concerned to describe the prevailing conditions i n 
19th century England as. a context viithin which Maine's work may be 
seen. I n general terms this provides an understanding of the econ-
omic, social and p o l i t i c a l circumstances, and more especially an 
understanding of the intellectual background. Here an outline i s pre-
sented of the major developments i n both jurisprudence and p o l i t i c a l 
thought. 
CHAPTER Tl/TO deals vdth the object and structure of Maine's thesis. 
His position i n regard to the major theories of jurisprudence is de-
fined and the significance of his attack on the concept of Natural 
Law i s explored, Maine's Historical Method and the p o l i t i c a l impli-
cations of his position are then examined. 
I n CHAPTER THREE the directions of Maine's historical investigations are 
charted and the logical status of his most outstanding thesis, the Patri-
archal Theory, i s c l a r i f i e d . The dynamic aspect of the theory is dis-
closed by tracing MaSi&e's description of the origin, early character and 
evolution of society. 
i i 
ABSTRACr/Sir Henry Maine 
CHAPTER FOUR deals with the general characteristics of conservative 
p o l i t i c a l thought as a prelude to the discussion of those features 
peculiar to orthodox conservatism. After indicating the immediate 
historical background of Popular Government, the major themes of Maine's 
p o l i t i c a l treatise are then discussed under the headings Totalitarianism 
and Constitutionalism. The a f f i n i t y of Maine's ideas with the tradition 
of Analytical Conservatism i s then noted. The discussion of conservative 
principles reveals further evidence of Maine's sympathy with this trad-
i t i o n . 
CHAPTER FIVE concerns the relationship between the p o l i t i c a l and hisr 
toricad aspects of Maine's wrk. The foundations underlying this con-
nection are then exposed. Note is also taken of contemporary assess-
ments of Maine's contribution and the major criticism to which i t has 
been subjected. 
CHAPTER SIX concludes with a description of the character of Maine's 
thought and an assessment of i t s value. 
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C H A P T E R ONE 
CHAPTER ONE 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
THE IMPOKFANCE OF MAINE'S LEGAL STUDIES 
Henry Maine was primarily a legal historian. Consequently, 
any assessment of his contribution to p o l i t i c a l ideas must take into 
account the wider aspects of his thought. The advantages to be gained 
from such an approach are two fold. I n the f i r s t place, consideration 
of his legal thought reveals the background against which'many of his 
more specifically p o l i t i c a l ideas may be highlighted. Dr. Roach said, 
'^ Maine saw Popular Government as an extension of his l i f e long study of 
the history of early i n s t i t u t i o n and the ideas which i t contains need to 
be referred back to the theories developed i n his four earlier books. 
In the second place, the p o l i t i c a l influence of Maine's ideas 
has, i n part, been f e l t through his influence upon legal thought. K.B. 
Sraellie has said, 'Maine's effect on p o l i t i c a l thought was chiefly i n -
direct, through his enormous influence upon jurisprudence. His j u r i s t i c 
ideas had p o l i t i c a l implications; his' historical search for the conditions 
that had caused the differences between stationary and progressive socie-
ties called obviously for contemporary a p p l i c a t i o n . T h a t Maine should 
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have influenced p o l i t i c a l philosophy through his investigations into 
the realm of law is not surprising, since, as Sir Ernest Barker main-
tains, jurisprudence i s but one of the avenues of approach to the study 
of p o l i t i c a l theory. He noted, when relating the two disciplines: 
"The connexion between jurisprudence and p o l i t i c a l theory is close and 
obvious. I f one is concerned with justice, and the other with morality -
i f one deals with the external rules which direct actions i n the ordered 
community and the other with the ideas that l i e behind rules and the ideal 
which lies behind order - both are at any rate concerned vath r elations 
one to another of men who are liv i n g i n communities."3 But perhaps the 
importance of jurisprudence to Maine's thought can best be established 
by noting that i t was here that he gave the clearest exposition and ap-
plication of his 'Historical and Comparative Method'. This method was 
his greatest contribution to 19th century English thoughtjlit :creat3d-a 
reorientation of mid-Victorian legal and p o l i t i c a l philosophy. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The actual form taken by the thesis may now be briefly out-
lined i n order to provide the guide lines with which the themes developed 
i n the follo^iring pages may be more ":readily traced. The opening chapter 
is concerned with Maine's statement of intent; the particular objectives 
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vrhich he had i n view. I n effect, these objectives amounted to a new 
discussion of legal institutions, involving the techniques of historical 
analysis. But before such an enterprise could be embarked upon, Maine 
f e l t that i t would be necessary to clear the ground for the purpose of 
demonstrating the desirability of such an approach, A rigorous examin-
ation of the most widely accepted legal theories of his day thus con-
stituted the basis of the f i r s t five chapters of Ancient Law, Here is 
developed his position i n regard to the analytical jurisprudence of 
the English Utilitarians , and the doctrine of Natural Law, particularly 
i n the radical interpretation given by the disciples of Rousseau, Des-
pite certain sympathies with the role which both these systems had played 
i n legal thought, Maine considered that they were inadequate as legal 
theories. Only by applying the methods of histoiy to the study of law 
could a valid scheme of jurisprudence be accomplished. To understand 
comteniporary events, i t was essential that reference be made to their 
origins and subsequent development. 
Having examined Maine's discussion of methodological d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
the thesis continues i n the second chapter with the f i r s t f r u i t s of the new 
method of inquiry. Here his major positive contributions are e:qx)unded 
and analysed. Briefly,the object of his argument, i n the remainder of Arj-
cient Law, was to describe the most outstanding features of ancient society. 
as suggested by the evidence of early law and pilmitive records, and 
to compare these findings with the most important characteristics of 
the progressive societies of the modern world. From the juxaposition 
of this material, Maine f e l t that i t was possible to draw certain con-
clusions regarding the nature of social change. The most well-known 
generalisation, vrtiich he made i n this respect, was that Western pro-
gressive society had experienced a movement from a civil i s a t i o n re-
stricted within the confines of patriarchal power - a condition sum-
marised by the name of status - to a condition i n which the primaiy 
characteristics were those of contract and individuality. 
Following this treatment of Maine's application of his histor-
i c a l method is a discussion of his politicsil treatise. Popular Government. 
This i s , i n turn, prefaced an introduction to the immediate p o l i t i c a l 
circumstances i n which i t was written, as these were of no l i t t l e import-
ance i n determining the character of the work. Some regard has also been 
paid to the particular tradition of thought to which Popular Government 
may be ascribed. 
Anticipating the sociological investigations of mass organisation 
i n the 20th century and, i n particular, Ortega y Gasset's Revolt of the 
Masses, Maine outlined the dangers of totalitarian dictatorship, emphasizing 
especially the dangers i n ^ l i c i t i n the appeal of nationalism and the claims 
of the extreme democrats. Against contemporary doctrines, Maine, i n true 
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Aristotelian fashion, opposed the established institutions of the 
ffllddleway; i n this case, the established institutions of the British 
Parliamentary system. Only i f this balanced form of government con-
tinued > could material progress even be contemplated. 
The legal and p o l i t i c a l features of Maine's thought having 
thus been analysed, an atten^t i s made to consider the nature of the 
relationship between them. The Historical Method, originally shaped 
i n the realm of jurisprudence, forms the essential l i n k . This, to-
gether with the ideas underlying the whole of Maine's thesis are elu-
cidated, examined and compared v/ith some of the more io^ortant alter-
-nativei. ideas current i n the 19th century. As a f i n a l reflection upon. 
Maine's work, some criticism of the various appreciations of his posi-
tion has been offered with a view to the further illumination of his 
p o l i t i c a l thought. 
THE HISTOKECAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF MAINE'S WORK. 
Such then, i s the manner i n which the p o l i t i c a l ideas of .. 
Sir Henry Maine have been approached. But an analysis of his publi-
cations alone would be incomplete and somewhat a r t i f i c i a l . The iiihole 
climate of thought has changed since the Victorian era and, consequently, 
to attempt to assess his contribution to knowledge without considering 
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i t s peculiar context would be to ignore much material that co\ild be 
of great value for understanding his work. I t i s tantamount, indeed, 
to the observation of the l i f e of animals i n the zoo with the hope of 
making generalisations about their behaviour i n their native habitat. 
Just as animals can only be understood nAien approached from an ecolog-
i c a l standpoint, so a competent understanding of Henry Maine must be 
approached by seeing him i n the changing conditions of the 19th century, 
A brief discussion of this background constitutes the immediate object-
ive of the remainder of the present introduction. 
According to J. Bowie, "Three great events thus determined the 
social framework and p o l i t i c a l problems of the 19th centuiy. F i r s t , the 
development of a world econony, centered on Western Europe and North 
America. Secondly, the Western liber a l revolution which emancipated a 
professional and managerial class and gave free rein to capital enter-
prise. Thirdly, the rise of a p o l i t i c a l l y conscious proletariat, urban-
ized and industrial."* I n sympathy with such sentiments, David Thomson 
i n summary of his survey of the conditions i n England, held that "The 
generation of Englishmen between 1815 and 1850 suffered from the conbined 
aftezmath of two great social and p o l i t i c a l revolutions, the American and 
French; of two great social and economic upheavals, the agrarian and i n -
dustrial revolutions; of t?ro great foreign wars, the French Revolutionazy 
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and Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) o The American and French Revolutions 
set i n motion a indole tide of new forces and ideas i n p o l i t i c s , and 
these seeped gradually into her national l i f e after 1815. The agrarian 
and industrial revolutions, already well advanced before 1815, trans-
formed the face and l i f e of the nation and brought immense prosperity 
and misery combined. The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars cut 
right across the effects of both these other events, speeding industri-
alisation but retarding social and p o l i t i c a l reforms, crushing Englsind's 
chief continental r i v a l while they liberalised her own po l i t i c s , and 
establishing Britain as the peer of great imperial dynasties such as the 
Habsburgs of Austria and the Romanovs of R u s s i a , T h e character of the 
period may be seen, then, as one of violent change. Age old institutions, 
customs, values, faiths, whole traditions of thought, were a l l subjected 
to reappraisal i n the l i g h t of new conditions. The great social forces 
did not simply provide a backcloth to the nineteenth centuiy stage, but they 
were essentially involved with the very directing of the drama. 
The most.palpable developments apparent i n society were the 
material changes which were taking place. Perhaps i t i s Whitehead who 
has h i t upon the basic factor creating the impetus of both the industrial 
and agricultural revolutions. The mainspring, he suggests, was the r e a l i -
zation of technology - the application of scientific discovery to a 
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practical end. I t s impact was enhanced the fact that the process 
of discovery assumed rapid proportions. There was not the application 
of just one great invention but of many. Indeed, Whitehead maintained 
that "The greatest invention of the nineteenth century was the invention 
of the method of invention."6 But i t i s the social and economic pro-
blems fostered by technology, rather than the actual innovations themr 
selves, which i s the immediate subject of our discussion. For without 
claiming that the material world determines the thought of an era, i t 
cannot be doubted that i t i s a v i t a l factor i n occasioning the preoc-
cupation of thinking men. 
Economic Circumstances. 
Although there were serious economic depressions throughout the 
19th centuxy, those, for example, occurzl'hg after the Napoleonic Wars and 
i n the late 1870's, the century taken as a whole was a period of great 
economic expansion. British industries not only enjoyed a monopoly of 
their home markets, but i n i t i a l l y , had few competitors i n overseas out-
l e t s . By virtue of the rapid growth i n foreign investments and the 
export of both capital and consumer goods, both encouraged by the policy 
of laissez-faire, Britsdn was to assume an a l l important role i n inter-
national trade. Not only was she seen as the 'workshop'of the world', 
but also as the 'ivorld banker'. As Court said, "... the British 
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became temporarily the point of balance i n the world's economic activ-
ities."'?' 
But success overseas should not blind us to the tremendous 
economic activity i n the home market. Prosperity came from an increasing 
demand, from that demand being made effective by an increase i n the sup-
ply of money, from the relaxation of the law regarding the formation of com-
panies (the Limited L i a b i l i t y Act of 1855), and, presumably, from the mul-
t i p l i e r effect resulting from various welfare measures i n which the govern-
ment was engaged. But although these were some of the factors acting i n 
a favourable direction upon the economy, one must agree with Court i n main-
taining that "The level of economic activity i n Great Britain during the 
middle period of the 19th century i s certainly unintelligible without ref-
erence to the railways."^ Thomas Tooke estiinated that during 184? and 
1848 probably not less than one million persons were i n some way connected 
with railway construction. And for the years 1846-1850 the number was 
probably about 600,000f a number which was roughly equal to the t o t a l pop-
ulation engaged i n the factories of the United Kingdom at that time. 
The favourable economic conditions also helped the agricultural 
side of the econongr. I t i s true that there had been a depression i n the 
1830's, but after t h i s , despite the removal of the Com Laws i n 1846, a 
new era of agricultural prosperity was entered. I t was the period which 
has come to be knovm by the t i t l e of James Caird's book High Faming. 
*Thiis .is an average number for these years. 
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Here reference i s made to the increasing use of scientific method i n 
agriculturej new methods of drainage and ploughing, new a r t i f i c i a l 
f e r t i l i z e r s , and the use of manufactured food-stuffs. This greater 
efficiency, combined with the increasing purchasing power of the grow-
ing population,meant that u n t i l 1873} ^ en farming became subjected to 
international competition, British fanning enjoyed favourable conditions. 
Indeed, "British farming became, for the kind of products on which i t 
was based, a leader i n the world. 
Part of the feverish economic activity i n agricvilture and 
industry resulted i n a fundamental change i n the nature of society i t -
self. I n the generation after Waterloo the balance of English economic 
and social l i f e changed from being predominently agricultural to pre-
dominently industrial. Even so, i n 1851, agriculture remained the largest 
single employer of the nation's labour force, u t i l i s i n g 1,904,687 men -
one quarter of the grown men, according to the census of that date. The 
next twenty years, however, saw a phenomenal rise i n industrial employ-
ment, particularly i n the heavy industries, machine contruction, textiles 
and railway operations. "Modem Britain,-, industrialized, mechanized, and 
urbanized, was coming into being. "•'•^  
Social Circumstances. 
Two inqportant features of this change from an agrarian to an 
industrial economy are: f i r s t l y , the rapid increase i n the size 
of population; secondly, the changes i n the distribution of that 
population vrtiich largely resulted from the movement from the country* 
side to the new industrial towns. The magnitude of the population 
increase can be seen i n the census figures for the period. The pop-
ulation of England and. Wales had included perhaps 7 l/2 million people 
i n 1780. BY the census of 1821 i t was up to 12 3A million. Between 
that year and 1871 i t was to rise to 22 3/4, million. Thomson claims 
that the increase between 1851-1871 alone was not less than 5 million. 
The reference to this population growth is not without sig-
nificance: i t i s an indication of the rise of the industrial state. 
I n combating the persistent anti-capitalist HQrth of the creation of a 
proletariat by the capitalist for his. own e v i l end, F.A. Hayek has 
shown that i t was only by virtue of the benefits of the Industrial Revol-
ution that an increase i n the size of population was capable of being 
supported. Previous3y, men had only been able to survive and to raise 
a family i f they had owned the tools of their particular profession; but, 
under the capitalist system, where the manufacturer ovmed the means of 
production, the benefits accruing from this type of industrial organi-
sation enabled the survival of vihat had, i n the past, been a doomed sec-
ti o n of the community. Ha^ek said, "Numbers, which had been practically 
stationary for many centuries began to increase rapidly. The proletariat 
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which capitalism can be said to have 'created' was thus not a pro-
pozi;ion of the population which w>uld have existed ;irithout i t and 
which i t had degraded to a lower levelj i t was an additional popu-
lation which was enabled to grow up by the new opportunities of em-
ployment which capitaliaia provided."^ 
But the second feature of the 19th century population -
i t s distribution - i s equally, i f not more ing)ortant, than i t s i n -
creasing size. Court suggests that "As the population grew, i t 
became more mobile. This was extremely important for economic develop-
ment . . o her / f S r i t a i n ' s J ^ growth i n economic stature owed most to 
an enormous internal migration. This was i n effect the colonisation 
of an old country. I t appeared particularly i n the emergence of n&tr 
regions of economic importance and i n the building, of toivn l i f e upon 
a new scale."•'•^ The 19th centuiy, then, was a great age of tovm and 
c i t y development. The size of the industrial centres of Manchester, 
Liverpool, Leeds, Birmingham, etc. increased rapidly, both by virtue 
of the f e r t i l i t y of the toivn populations themselves and by their absorb-
ing the overflow of the rural regions. Although the countryside was 
not depopulated - the rural population i n 1911 i n England and Wales was 
greater than i t had been i n 1841 - the distribution of the population 
within the nation assumed an urban rather than a rural character. 
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Inevitably, i n such a rapidly changing social system, serious 
problems were encountered. Among these were the problems of public 
health and sanitation. The customs and practices of the rural areas i n 
this respect may always have been undesirable, but to continue them i n 
an urban community threatened the safety of a l l . Consequently, despite 
the dreadful conditions which undoubtedly did exist i n urban communities, 
efforts were being made toviards transforming the towns into healthier 
places i n v;hich to reside, 
A further problem was presented by the question of poor r e l i e f . 
Various measures had been taken i n the 18th century, the Speenhamland 
and the Gilbert system, for example, but the parochial responsibility 
these involved proved inadequate. Existing systems of r e l i e f were unfair 
since " I t meant that the burden of poor r e l i e f was spread veiy unevenly 
and unjustly, and led to the habit of taking villagers into the factories 
i n good times but expelling them again to the villages i n bad times, so 
as to save the burden of pauperism from f a l l i n g on the towns."^3 These 
d i f f i c u l t i e s were partly removed by placing the odium of Poor Law Relief 
under the centralised Board of Guardians. I t was not u n t i l 1934, however, 
when the Unemployment Act of that year established a board under the Central 
Ministry of Labour, that a satisfactory system of unemployment benefits 
was devised. 
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Besides the problems of social benefits and sanitation, the 
development of industry provoked the need for industrial regulation. 
Conditions i n manufacturing and mining were no worse than they had ever 
been. I n fact, i t has been suggested, that conditions i n the factories 
were a considerable improvement over the old cottage workshops. However, 
the greater numbers now employed i n appalling conditions attracted the 
attention of a number of philanthropists. The most well-knovm reformer 
of industrial employment being Shaftesbury. He was concerned with the 
long hours employees were expected to work, the practice of employing 
young children, the employment of women i n coal mining and many other 
questionable practices. A l l of which, though common i n the past, na^ 
stimulated a violent outciy from certain members of the public. 
A brief description has been given of a few of the problems 
arising from the process of industrialisation and tarn growth. Not only 
does i t f i l l out the picture of 19th century l i f e , but i t shows why the 
government found i t increasingly necessary to intervene i n economic and 
social ac t i v i t i e s . I t w i l l be useful, at this juncture, to examine the 
response made by that section of the population most immediately involved: 
the working class. The reaction of this group i n terms of trade unionism 
and the occasional rioting w i l l serve to complete the picture of the socio-
economic scene. 
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Whilst there i s a great deal of truth i n N. Sykes' comment 
that "... although the traditional way of expressing grievances was 
p o l i t i c a l , the real grievances were economic"!*; unrest was ocassionally 
caused by purely social factors. Such a position is bourne out by F.C. 
Mather, TIAIO claims, "There were some a»eas where conditions of employ-
ment and residence so brutalised the population as to produce a tradition 
of lawlessness vfcich burst forth into open r i o t even in-prosperous times."•'•^ 
Normally, though, dissatisfaction with social conditions was e^qsressed at 
times of economic distress. 
Rioting occurred i n the immediate post-war period on a number of 
occasions: the Spa Fields r i o t of 1816, the protest of 'Peterloo', and 
the sporadic outbursts i n the period preceding the First Reform Act being 
the most striking examples. Later disturbances included the 'Last La-
bourers Revolt' and the severe riots in Bristol of 1831. Such general 
unrest tended to die down somewhat i n the Chartist period, and then, when 
outbreaks did occur, i t was of a more restrained character than i n either 
the 18th century or the earlier decades of the 19th century. "The late 
t h i r t i e s and.forties of the 19th century were marked by no orgies of de-
vastation comparable v/ith the Gordon Riots of 1780 . . , or even Tiith the 
Bristol Riots, which had occurred as recently as 1831."16 
Like Thomson, Mather held that the introduction of the police 
force was more effective than the military had been i n preventing the 
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outbreak of disorder. But even v;hen rioting did occur, he noted that 
i n i t there was less looting and incendiarism. He continued, "In the 
main i t must be ascribed to the fact that the English industrial work-
ing class was on the vihole better housed, better fed, better educated) 
and far less degraded than i n preceding y e a r s . B u t , although the 
rio t i n g was less severe i n this period, outbreaks occurred:ovdng to the 
combination of a series of vmfavourable trends: the depression of real 
wages, cyclical unen^loyment, bad harvests and the depression of the 
handicraft industries. The most well-known disturbances of the time 
were the Plug-Plot and Rebecca Riots of 1842-1843. Howevei*, "The threat 
to English society i n the Chartist period did not i n fact arise from the 
strength of the resistance which the rioters were capable of offering 
to the forces of the Crovm, but from the tendency of disturbances to occur 
almost simultaneously i n different places."•'•^ Spontaneous tumult was 
the real threat to society rather than organised sedition. Despite their 
frequent d r i l l i n g and training and the fact that they possessed some arms, 
the Chartists themselves never really planned an immediate and general 
insurrection. They were more concerned with the organisation of 'tum-
ultous demonstration. I t is significant that the most severe rioting 
was during the period vihen the Chartists' hold on the vrorking class was 
slipping i n 1839-1840 and 1848. But the spectre of potential revolution 
Tflrtiich they created was to haunt the more reactionary figures i n British 
p o l i t i c s for a greater part of the century. 
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The weakening of the Chartist movement i n the period after 
1839 was a result of the diversion of middle class support towards 
the Anti-Corn Law League, the artisans* return to peaceful agitation 
and the d r i f t i n g of sections of the working class into trade unionism. 
Trade unions had been legalised i n 1824, but early experiments were 
largely unsuccessful; the most notable f a i l u r e , of course, being Owen's 
Grand National Consolidated Trades Union i n 1834. I n the 1850's, trade 
union activity became popular once more i n the form of the new model 
unions.. But these were, i n effect, merely benevolent societies for 
ski l l e d craftsmen': the unskilled sectors of the community wera not 
effectively organised t i n t i l the formation of rddely based industrial 
unions i n the closing decades of the century. 
The removal of the more articulate members of the working 
class from direct p o l i t i c a l action groups, together with increasing 
social benefits and the favourable economic conditions T,vhich prevailed 
u n t i l the 1870's, led to a decrease i n social disturbances. Industrial 
strikes continued, particularly during the Great Depression, but the 
actual fear of revolution over a sustained period of time was nowhere 
near as great as i t had been'oneh during ..the era. of Chartism. 
P o l i t i c a l Circumstances. 
Having indicated, the outstanding characteristics of the social 
and economic conditions surrounding Maine's l i f e , i t vdU be appropriate 
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to turn to an examination of the p o l i t i c a l climate which these new 
conditions created. The p o l i t i c a l atmosphere i n the immediate after-
math of the Napoleonic Wars, i t has been suggested, was charged with 
the fears of revolution and disorder. The main threat to the estab-
lishment'came from the disturbances which the post-war depression i n 
the economy engendered; but the fears also stemmed from the p o l i t i c a l 
events of the time, events such as the assassination of Prims Minister 
Spencer Perceval i n 1812 and the Cato Street Conspiracy of 1820. Indeed, 
not only vrere Roman Catholic Emancipation and the 1832 Reform Act i t s e l f 
passed i n an atmosphere of intimidation, but the whole period up to the 
mid-centuiy was f e l t by many to be on the verge of open rebellion. 
Society seemed doomed to f a l l into the gzlp of Jacobins. Even i f Lord 
Melbourne's l e t t e r to CJueen Victoria i n 1842, describing the p o l i t i c a l 
situation i n thia country as ". . . certainly very near, i f not actually 
a rebellion . . ,"^ ^ now seems rather alannist; there i s , nevertheless, 
an^ >le evidence that England faced a serious problem of disorder i n the 
decades between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the mid-century. 
I t i s hardly surprising that the upper classes tended to exag-
gerate the dangers. The response of the Duke of Wellington, for example, 
to the 1832 Refom Act was, "... the revolution i s made, that i s to say 
power istransferred from one class of society, the gentlemen of England 
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professing the f a i t h of the Church of England, to another class of 
society, the shopkeepers being dissenters from the church, many of 
them being Socinians, others atheists."^ ® The result of this new 
hand upon the rein of potrer, he thought, would be a holocaust of 
bloodshed and violence, and so i t vras with some surprise that he was 
able to say two years later that he hoped that the change might con-
tinue to be gradual, •"and that i t may be effected without c i v i l war 
and may occasion as l i t t l e sudden destruction of individual interests 
and property as possible,"^ The memory of events i n France was s t i l l 
a powerful force i n the higher echelons of society, and Wellington 
was certainly not alone i n his fear that the Reform Act had removed the 
keystone of the British Constitution and opened the way to perpetual 
change and i n s t a b i l i t y . Many "... did not see the immediate situation 
i n the early t h i r t i e s as a stage i n a quiet sh i f t of p o l i t i c a l pmer 
but rather as the prelude to a repetition i n a familiar English setting 
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of the melodramatic horrors of the French Revolution." 
The Whigs and Radicals, of course, saw no such dangers i n 
these p o l i t i c a l readjustments. They considered them to be a triumph 
against sinister interest and the inefficiency of government by an 
exclusive aristocratic clique. The extension of the franchise to i n -
clude the middle class not only recognised their growing numbers, but 
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i t enabled their s k i l l s as the eg) tains of industry to be employed 
for the greater benefit of the majority. Thus, i n the name of ef-
ficiency and the claim to be merely adjusting the governmental machine 
to the new social conditions, the liberals and their associates con-
tinued to work for further reforms. Their success can be gauged from 
G»P. Gooch's comment that from "... the First Reform B i l l to the World 
War the domestic p o l i t i c a l history of Great Britain was above a l l the 
realization of Liberal principles."^^ 
After the failure of the Chartist movement i n 1848, the year 
i n which revolutions swept through the European concert of nations, the 
i n s t a b i l i t y and fears of social insurrection,which had characterised the 
English p o l i t i c a l scene throughout the major part of the centuiy, f i n a l l y 
abated. They were replaced by improving standards of l i v i n g , an atmos-
phere of feverish .industrialism and a popular impression of "progress". 
ForLthe brief period from the early 1850's to the 1870's, Britain was 
able to enjoy to the f u l l these years of the 'Great Peace', and to take 
f u l l advantage of the favourable conditions at home and abroad. I n par-
ticul a r these years were important i n enabling p o l i t i c a l and social 
reforms to respond to the changing structure of society. 
The continual interplay between p o l i t i c a l and social change 
had a particularly important effect upon the nature and role of the 
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government. At the beginning of the century the functions of the 
central administration were extremely circumscribed, i n effect 
being limited to the formation of national policy i n the international, 
commercial and f i s c a l ivorlds, and the general maintenance of law and 
order vdthin the country as a whole. Much of the day to day adminis-
tra t i o n of society remained i n the hands of local government and those 
"maids of a l l vrork" the Justices of the Peace. Vfith the gronTing demands 
of a rapidly changing world, however, i n respect of essential welfare 
legislation, legal reform and p o l i t i c a l innovation> a. new kind of state 
was rapidly coming into existence. The days of the 'policeman' state 
were numbered. Not only did the machinery of the neT^  state d i f f e r rad-
i c a l l y from that of the old, but as i t was no longer set apart from the 
v i t a l activities of the community,because i t had, i n fact, assumed the 
role of the 'manager' of society, the v/hole character of the p o l i t i c a l 
process came to be seen i n a new l i g h t . Politics i n England had given -
way to administration: the administration not only of a highly complex 
industrial society, but of the greatest entire that the world had ever 
seen. 
I n the interest of efficiency and uniformity, the functions of 
government were increasingly drawn within the province of the central body. 
Existing departments were extended to assume the functions previously 
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performed by local organisations, or i n some cases, vfhere new problems 
had feoms into being, either new government departments or independent 
authorities were created. I t was thus that the Victorian era saw the 
emergence of a vast and complex bureaucratic machine and the relative 
decline of the functioning of the individual i n public service. 
I n control of this new machinery of state was a much more inte-
grated Cabinet. After 1867, the end of the 'golden age of Parliament', 
the Cabinet was able to exercise a dominant control over the sphere 
of p o l i t i c a l activity. Itedrew i t s strength not only from the tighten-
ing of the party system, and the growth of personality leadership, but 
also from the advantages of information and knowledge which i t enjoyed as 
the very focal point of the bureaucracy. No longer was i t a loose asso-
ciation of the Queen's ministers, i t had become the central nerve point 
i n the organisation of the body p o l i t i c . 
The decline of the limited,aristocratic concept of politics 
i n the 19th century, however, cannot be comprehended vdthout noting the 
development of the.nmass p o l i t i c a l party. The main impetus for party 
organisation v/as a result of the registration clause i n the First Reform 
Act of 1832; registration societies formed the very basis of the extra 
Parliamentary associations. Although some moves were made towards a 
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greater rationalisation of the party system, i t was not u n t i l the 
Second Reform Act of 1867 that the modem party structure really 
came into being. Block voting, central organisation, annual con-
ferences, party programmes, p o l i t i c a l crusades and recognised party 
leaders a l l rapidly became part of the p o l i t i c a l scene. Organisation 
was f e l t to be the touch-stone of the day, not only i n gaining Parlia-
mentary support for the Cabinet, but i n gaining support for the govern-
ment i n the country. A similar paradox to that which Mich^les observed 
i n the hierarchical.organisation of socialist-democratic parties can 
be seen i n the emergence of mass po l i t i c a l parties i n England. The 
parties, although claiming the attributes of democratic organisation, 
rapidly became more formalised, r i g i d and hierarchical i n their struc-
ture. The change, then, from a situation i n which one can speak of a 
'party system' only i n a very loose way, to that i n which the essentials 
of the modern structure had been established, occurred i n a remarkably 
short period of time. I t vras this rapidity which led many observers to 
feel that the Cabinet and party system was but a temporary halt on the 
road to direct democracy and the rule of a ^ngle demagogue. 
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Britain was not concerned i n any continental disputes during the 
major part of the period because of her isolationist foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, some reference must be made to the European scene since 
i t was of no l i t t l e import i n shaping p o l i t i c a l opinion i n this country. 
The main p o l i t i c a l forces to be found there were those of liberalism, 
nationalism, imperialism and a general movement i n favour of democracy. 
Of apparently secondary importance at this time were the communist, 
socialist and anarchist organisations which preserved the spectre of 
violent revolution throughout the 19th century. Maine saw, however, 
that any one of these popular movements i n i t s extreme form could 
prove to be the spark which, i n the tinder-box world of mass society, 
would burn established forms of government to the ground. His obser-
vation of their influence i n world politics forms an important insight 
into his fears regarding the growing strength of mass p o l i t i c a l move-
ments i n England. 
I n so far as a general pattern can be seen i n the p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e of European nations, i t i s clearly that expressed by Thomson, 
namely that the period between 1815 and 1850 ". '. . saw the growth of 
l i b e r a l and democratic movements i n Europe partly under stimulus of 
Britain's example ..." whilst the period between 1851 and 1874 
"... saw the defeat of most of these movements and the reversion to 
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more dictatorial and anti-democratic regimes ." This too was the 
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pattern which Maine discemed, and vtiLch he wamed against i n Popular 
Government. Exan^jles of the failure of democracy were legion. Mass 
manipulation, rigged elections, the abuse of the referendum and plebis-
cite -were common features of the time. Perhaps the most notable example 
being that bf the Third French Enpire - the dictatorial regime of Louis 
Napoleon. The democratic revolution, i t seemed, was doomed to end i n 
the creation of a military dictator to extricate the nation from the 
turmoil of anarchy. Everywhere the appeal of this new kind of autocrat 
seemed endemic among the masses. One cannot doubt that Maine's fears 
regarding English liberty were not a l i t t l e affected by emotion dis-
played on the death of Napoleon I l l ' s son - the Imperial Prince. 
Even where the experiment i n democracy seemed to some degree 
successful, such as i n fl\7itzerland, there were certain characteristics 
vAiich seemed rather disquieting. The masses revealed themselves as 
extremely conservative, making any form of progressive legislation veiy 
d i f f i c u l t . Consequently, there was an evemidening gap between social 
conditions and socially desirable legislation. Likewise, i n the United 
States of America, the greatest example of the democratic e^^eriment, 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the nature of government were apparent. Not only was 
there the increasing uniformity of social l i f e and the seeming importance 
of appealing to the common denominator i n politics «ihich de Tocqueville 
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had noted, but i t was a farther instance of a democracy lAich was 
unable to maintain internal order. The occurrence of the C i v i l War 
resulted i n a defeat for the southern states and the destruction of 
the image of democratic s t a b i l i t y . 
I n s t a b i l i t y , hov/ever, was not exclusively a feature of demo-
cratic society. The revolutions irtiich occurred throughout Europe i n 
1830 and 1848 (and i n France again i n 1870) took place i n countries 
vAiich were far from realizing the principles of democracy or l i b e r a l -
ism. Neither was conflict and revolutionary zeal enclosed viithin the 
confines of particular countries. The struggles to achieve national 
identity i n both Germany and I t a l y accounted for the main military 
confrontations after 1815 u n t i l the outbreak of the First World War. 
Throughout the 19th century, then, v/hether the general pattern of 
development was towards democracy or authoritarianism, i t was a period 
i n which internal and external i n s t a b i l i t y found a prominent role. 
THE INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND TO MAINE'S IDEAS. 
The point has now been reached v^ere a discussion of the 
intellectual background to Maine's work may be of some value. This 
forms the most important section of argr introduction to his investi-
gations, since the climate of thought must, to a great extent, govern i 
the intellectual interests of any period. I n this case, two objectives 
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have been kept i n view. The f i r s t of these has been to present a 
sketch of the atmosphere of the intellectual world as a whole. The 
second has been to bring into sharp r e l i e f the general character of 
the two principle subjects to which Maine made a contribution, namely, 
legal and p o l i t i c a l theoiy. Clearly, only the briefest outline can 
be attempted, but i t w i l l be of some value i n assessing Ancient Law 
and Popular Crovernment to bear this background i n mind. 
General Background. 
Perhaps one of the most outstanding features of the 19th 
century world i s i t s great variety of creeds and movements proclaiming 
immutable truths. The faiths which they held were not necessarily new, 
indeed, many doctrines were of ancient lineage, but a l l were propagated " 
with something l i k e a religious fervour. Despite their great variety, 
we may agree with Whitehead, who informs us that i n broad outline the 
faiths of this period were derived from three sources: "... one source 
was the romantic movement, showing i t s e l f i n religious revival, i n art, 
and i n p o l i t i c a l aspiration; another source was the gathering advance 
'of science which opened up avenues of thought} the third source was the 
advance i n technology which completely changed the conditions of human 
life."25 
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I f the variety of creeds succeeds i n being the most immediate 
feature to strike one about 19th century thought, then judging by the 
persistence of the belief, i t i s closely followed by the impression of 
confidence which the age i s purported to exude. Such an impression 
regarding the Victorian intellectual world as a whole i s , however, quite 
false. Even where views were asserted i n a dogmatic fashion, this was 
often out of fear rather than confidence. 
The' main source of material for the view that the Victorian 
age was one of confidence was drawn from the corpus of ideas known by 
the label of positivism. This was a style of thought which Noel Annan 
claiined was the most consistently powerful movement i n England for over 
two centuries. One of i t s characteristics was i t s f a i t h i n science as 
the panacea for a l l i l l s . I t was by science alone that man's destinies 
could be realized. As Gooch said, "The rapid progress of scientific 
discoveiy, above a l l the proof of the evolution of l i f e forms, profoundly 
influenced the philosophy of the Victorian age. For a time i t seemed as 
i f the riddles of the universe had at last been solved. . ."^ 6 Certainly, 
the achievements of science cannot be ignored; the great advances i n pure 
science had been quickly utilised i n the rapidly expanding f i e l d of tech-
nology and this had led to great changes i n the nature of society. 
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An offshoot of this f a i t h i n science, though of such import-
ance that i t warrants a separate discussion, was the positivist belief 
i n the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of progress. This was a doctrine vrtiich had been 
developed i n the 18th century, but during the rapid material 'inqirove-
ments' witnessed by the 19th century, i t became even more firmly estab-
lished. Not only did the changing material conditions of society give 
apparent support to the popular belief i n progress, the theory of evol-
ution was claimed as an al l y . Although there is no necessary connection 
between progress and evolution, the general tendency among Victorian 
positivists, on the academic and popular levels, was to enlist Darwin's 
support i n their hope for unlimited perfectability. 
Believing i n absolute truth and immutable laws, the positivists 
were convinced that these could be secured i n a l l spheres of knowledge 
by the application of Newtonian methodology. This, they f e l t , had been 
successful i n many f i e l d s , but the results derived from the social sciences 
had been far from satisfactory. Compared with the physical sciences, i t s 
generalisations were too vague and tentative. For many, however, history 
seemed to overcome these problems, since the data with which i t dealt 
seemed to be of a tangible nature: i t dealt i n 'facts' of a similar nature 
to those employed i n the older sciences. "History had suddenly become 
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a much more impressive study and had acquired a nm status." I t had 
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become both the record of man's progress and the means by which future 
advantage could be reaped. Probably the best example of this particular 
appreciation of history ( i f such a discipline can s t i l l be called his-
tory) i s the work done by the arch-positivist AugustsICoite. This use 
of history i n subservience to sociology was an important li n k i n the 
direction of a universal social theory. 
I f positivism was the main source of confidence i n the last 
century, then i t i s to certain sections of the li t e r a r y world that one 
must turn to discover i t s fears and apprehensions. Here the rapid changes 
i n society represented, not the symptoms of a 'brave new vrorld' vAiich was 
to cro^vn a l l of man's achievements, but rather a squalid, uniform, sense-
less, material world devoid of the richness of mediaeval experience. The 
optimistic assertions regarding the future of.man were eschewed as being 
at the very least debatable. What was more to the point was that the 
traditional framework of thought was unquestionably breaking down. Thomas 
Arnold i n 1838, for instance, reflecting on the character of contemporary 
thought, claimed that moral and intellectual questions which had been setr-
tled for centuries passed were suddenly being brought once more into open 
discussion. Such a feeling of dissatisfaction was widespread about this 
time and may be seen i n the work of men such as M i l , Sterling and Maurice. 
Yet the reaction which the questioning of accepted theories evoked was 
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not that of positive scepticism, at least not u n t i l the 1860's, 
rather i t was one of negative scepticism, where "judgement i s 
suspended between alternative conclusions, one of which is con-
sidered true; or the affirmation of a belief (they) only half 
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believed - and half doubted," I t was the continuation of the 
old belief i n some eternal, discoverable law or truth. Until the 
1860's, men simply f e l t confused, but the possibility of finding 
new security was merely a question of time. Such views were ex-
pressed even by some positivistsJ Frederic Harrison claimed, "We 
are on the threshold of a great time, even i f our time is not 
great i t s e l f . " ^ 9 i n this he was simply re-echoing what Carlyle 
had said half a century before. "The old has passed away, but, alas, 
the New appears not i n i t s stead; the Time is s t i l l i n pangs of 
tr a v a i l with the New."30 would seem that the pregnancy miscarried, 
however, since a great proportion of li t e r a r y men passed from the 
realms of negative scepticism to the position where they believed 
confusion and uncertainty to be inevitable. 
The iinpact of Darwinianlsm was, i n great part, responsible 
for this movement of thought towards scepticism, since i t seemed to 
have undermined many established positions. But this was only one of 
the forces impelling men i n such a direction. To understand why many 
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of the new theories were unacceptable to particular sections of society, 
we must remember that John Morley's coiaments upon the ' f i f t i e s and 
'sixties apply equally to the greater part of the Victorian era. He 
said, " I t was an age of science, new knowledge, searching criticism, 
follovred by multiplied doubts and shaken beliefs."^^ The attempts to 
resolve the problems dominating men's minds merely confused them even 
further. The sheer increase i n the volume of knowledge oven^elmed 
many Victorians and l e f t them baffled by i t s complexity and implications. 
I n such an atmosphere, combining elements of both anxiety and confident 
assurance, only two courses of action remained open: for the modest man, 
doubt; for the presumptuous man, dogmatism. I t i s to this l a t t e r feature 
of the period that we must now turn our attention. 
I n the intellectual hiatus which was caused by the absence of 
certainty, the opportunities for the powerful ego were boundless. Not 
only was the barrier of orthodoxy removed, but beeause of the general 
atmosphere of wavering beliefs, support was readily given to any new 
prophet proclaiming knowledge of the promised land. There was a general 
feeling that "even error, eloquently advocated with the honest conviction 
that i t i s tr u t h , i s better than truth coldly believed i n and languidly 
proclaimed. "^ 2 But to assume that dogmatism vras simply the response of 
the egotists to favourable market conditions v/oiild be too crude an 
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interpretation, since as Houghton maintained, "... even the prophets 
themselves were often plauged with doubt, and their dogmatism was as 
natural as i t was rhetorical."33 i n an age of conflicting theories of 
t r u t h , J.S. M i l l held that the w i l l to believe gave rise to a "rather 
more demonstrative attitude of belief" than people thought necessary 
"when their personal conviction was more complete." Dogmatism, then, 
whether i n i t s l i t e r a r y or scientific manifestation, was i n many cases 
the symptom of an inward fear of being mistaken i n one's beliefs. I t 
was a false confidence bl^ed from uncertainty. 
The State of Legal Theory. 
Against the rich variety of social and intellectual change -
indeed change i n almost every aspect of l i f e - the legal and p o l i t i c a l 
movements of our period must now be interpreted. The legal sphere w i l l 
be examined f i r s t . I n jurisprudence, as i n other realms of thought, the 
19th century witnessed a rapid proliferation i n the n\imber of approaches 
to the discipline. W.G. Friedmann has noted the major schools, "The 
principal legal movements which developed during the 19th century are 
the transcendental idealism of the German metaphysicians (which i s , how-
ever, largely, rooted i n 18th century thought); analytical positivism, 
utilitarianism, historical jurisprudence, Marxist materialism and towards 
the end of the century, a new legal idealism. "•^'^  
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Upon the English scene, the two movements of the greatest moment 
are analytical positivism and the historical school of jurisprudence: the 
former reflecting the sc i e n t i f i c , materialist atmosphere of contemporary 
England; the l a t t e r , i t s romantic, mystical sentiments, although claiming 
science as i t s mantle i n the post-Darwinian era. 
Analytical jurisprudence, under the influence of Bentham and 
Austin, was the greatest and most powerful school of English law during 
the major part of. our period. Attempting to apply Newtonian techniques 
to the chaotic state of English law, the Benthamites insisted that certain 
principles must guide a l l reforms. Dicey suggested that these principles 
might be summarised under three major headings and two corollaries. The 
f i r s t of these was that legislation constitutes a science. Legislative 
innovation must no longer follow the method of building upon precedent, 
custom or usage, since this merely created a hotch-potch of law devoid of 
any rational, minifying principle. Speaking of Bentham, Dicey said, "Legis-
lat i o n , i n short, he proclaimed is a science based on the characteristics 
of human nature, and the art of law making. . ."^ ^ The particular principle 
which Bentham believed should be used as the basis of any scheme of legal 
revision was, of course, his principle of u t i l i t y . This idea constitutes 
Dicey's second heading. The t h i r d major principle i n the u t i l i t a r i a n ap-
proach was not logically essential to their schema, but followW from 
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their belief that each individual knew what was his own best interest. 
I t was the principle of laissez-faire construed i n i t s widest sense. 
I n the economic and p o l i t i c a l fields a l l restrictions hindering free 
movement must be removed unless i t could be shown conclusively that i t 
was i n the interest of the greater part of society. Following from this 
position are the two corollaries which Dicey noted: a belief that the 
area of freedom of contract should be extended; and the principle that 
one man should count for one and no more than one. Given these so-called 
scientific principles - principles which must be self-evident truths to 
a l l men - the material was now available for contracting a perfectly-
rational code of law which would prove adequate, not merely for contenqj-
oraiy English society, but with minor modifications for a l l societies at 
a l l times. 
Though this system of thought had been powerful, particularly 
i n the era surrounding the Great Reform Act, i t s power was beginning to 
wane by mid-century. Partially responsible for this decline was the 
increasing popularity of the historical school of jurisprudence. Although 
this school reached i t s most developed form i n the 19th ggntuiy, i t s roots 
extend much further into the past. J.E.G. de Montmerency has traced i t s 
origin to the 15th and l6th centuries. Refering to the historical orien-
tation which he saw legal thought undergoing, he claimed, "Mornay's book 
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moreover, shews that this new outlook came with the New Learning; 
that the historical method i n the study of law is indeed one, and not 
the least of the f r u i t s of the Renaissance . . ."^ 7 Be that as i t may 
the f r u i t remained to be-gathered, and this achievement was mainly the 
accomplisjiment of Giovanni Vico, who published his great work Scienza 
Nuova i n 1725* Inspired by Bacon's treatment of the natural world, 
he applied a similar method to human history. For Vico, "The facts of 
known history,. . ." are to be ". . .deferred'tto their primitive origins, 
divorced from which they have seemed hitherto to possess neither a com-
mon basis, nor continuity nor coherence."^^ The similarity of this dis-
position to that of Maine w i l l shortly become apparent, but i t i s 
unnecessary to ivait u n t i l the 19th century to discover a mind similar 
to that of Vico. He was not entirely alone i n the 18th century i n the 
development of th i s new method of social analysis, the De 1'Esprit des 
Lois' of Montesquieu encroached upon similar ground. Normally this 
work i s noted for i t s innovations i n comparative jurisprudence - again 
themes which Maine was to exploit - but also, i t gave in^jetus to the 
historical approach. And so, i n the 18th century, despite the predom-
inance of rationalism, the ground was being prepared for the revolt 
against a p r i o r i reasoning which legal theory was to experience i n the 
19th century. 
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The most immediate impetus towards historical research 
came from Germany, i n the form of an analysis of Roman history by 
Niebuhr. According to Norman Sykes, "The studies of Niebuhr marked 
the dawn of the movement of historical criticism vMch has rewrit-
ten the story of European development."^^ True to the continuing 
belief i n the universality of method, the new techniques used by Niebuhr 
were quickly applied to other branches of learning, one of which was law. 
The new legal historians were concerned not with the technicalities of 
legal systems, but with the evolution, or development of whole systems 
of law. The undertaking of such an enormous task resulted i n the i n -
quiries of the la^ivyers overlapping into other areas of study: into soc-
iology, smthropology, and philology. To trace this influence, however, 
i s beyond the scope of the present treatise where we must eontent ouir-
selves with an examination of the purely legal side of their work. 
I t i s understandable since the revival of historical studies 
found i t s f i r s t expression i n Germany that the German lavjyers should 
have l a i d the foundations of legal history. The movement was ini t i a t e d 
by Eichorn, iwhose teachings vrere developed and elaborated by Savigny, 
the most famous of Germany's legal theorists. An outline of Savigny's 
ideas w i l l provide us with the main features of the yihole school. 
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I n many respects the basis of Savigny's work i s very similar 
to that of Burke and was, l i k e his, a reaction to the dry rationalism 
of the Enlightenment. I t evoked the concept of national s p i r i t and a 
certain mysticism vdth regard to the state, customs and authority. 
Within the romantic image which Savigny portrays, at least three major 
concepts emerge. The f i r s t of these suggests that law is the unconscious 
creation of the particular genius of a nation - i t s Volkgeist, Law i s 
"... b u i l t solely by inheritance, transmitted by the continuous and 
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imperceptible succession of generations . . ," and because of t h i s , 
legislation must be subordinated to the customs and traditions of the 
country. Any attempt to codify a nation's heritage would be f a t a l , pet-
r i f i n g the existing and preventing future grOTvth i n response to the 
changing circumstances of society. The interpretation of the spontaneous 
evolution of the popular conscience, Savigny assigned to a select, highly 
trained, group of lawyers. The activity of this e l i t e was neceaaary, so 
he maintained, because of the ever increasing complexity of law i n the 
contemporary vjorld. But he insisted this same body was merely the instru-
ment of the Volkgeist: i t was not the autonomous author of some legal 
code. His ffihal principle was but an extension of his notion that law 
was the external manifestation of the national s p i r i t . I t was that lav/a 
are not universally valid. By virtue of his nationalism and relativism. 
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Savigny vias at variance with the rationalist school which had been 
such a force throughout Europe. But i t would be vn-ong to construe 
his approach as that of a reactionary sympathizer. I t i s true that 
he stressed the importance of established usage and custom, but he 
was equally anxious to remove any anachronisms which existed vri.thin 
the legal system. Once the changing conditions of society had ren-
dered certain branches of.the legal structure inappropriate, then 
they must be pruned aviay to enable the growth of new law more i n ac-
cord with the requirements of the emerging s p i r i t of the time. 
Savigny's partictilar use of history to determine the origin 
of custom and tradition i n a nation, i s but one of the ways i n vMch 
law and history may be combined. ^i?hilst i t is generally accepted 
that Maine owes a great deal to this particular approach, certain 
writers, including Friedmann, feel that he also has a f f i n i t i e s \iith 
those ^ o propounded a philosophy of history. This school did more 
than simply trace the evolution of law, i t developed a legal philosophy 
from a philosophy of histoiy. Not content vdth what mainly amounted 
to description, they offered explanations. This style of legal ap-
preciation is apparent i n the vrritings of Montesquieu, Vico, Marx and 
Hegel. 
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Maine, i t i s apparent then, was greatly influenced by the 
continental j u r i s t s . Indeed, Friedmann has said of him, "His great 
contribution to legal theory l i e s i n the combination of what i s best 
i n both Montesquieu and Savigny's theories without the dangers involved 
i n both. Maine's theory avoids the danger of an excessive disintegration 
of theoretical laws of evolution inherent i n Montesquieu's comparative 
and factual approach to the development of legal institutions; but is 
equally free from the abstract and unreal romanticism vMch vitiates 
much of Savigny's theory about the evolution of law."*^ But despite 
these foreign influences, his sympathies with the English analytical 
j u r i s t s must not be forgotten or underestimated. For Maine recognised, 
as so many commentators upon 19th century legal theory do not, that 
there could be no question of conflict betvreen his analysis of law and 
that of the positivists, since for the major part of their vrork they 
were discussing different topics: on the one hand, law's historical 
origins; and on the other, i t s philosophical significance. This i s a 
theme which i t has been found necessary to develop i n the main body of 
this thesis. 
Current P o l i t i c a l Ideas. 
Such then is a brief indication of the most important legal 
schools forming a background to Maine's own legal studies. I t ncm remains 
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for a similar account of the p o l i t i c a l environment to be presented. 
Any discussion of p o l i t i c a l thought i n this period i s confronted with 
the same problem which faced the examination of legal theory, namely, 
the great mul t i p l i c i t y of ideas. As Wilfred Harrison has said, "The 
attempt to provide an account of English p o l i t i c a l thought i n this 
period thus presents some problems of arrangement. One cannot satis-
f a c t o r i l y organize the great variety involved under any such simple 
set of labels as 'Conservative', 'Liberal', and 'Socialist': these 
categories overlap, and each one of them would i t s e l f have to contain 
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considerable varieties of views of very different kinds." But since 
as a very broad account of p o l i t i c a l thought i n this era must be presented, 
i t i s to these general categories that vra must turn, bearing i n mind, 
however, Harrison's warning about the use of such blanket terms. 
Liberalism, as Bullock and Shock maintain., enjoyed a popularity 
unrivalled i n the history of English ideas. Despite t h i s , however, i t 
i s a very d i f f i c u l t movement to attempt to characterise by any slogan or 
principle since i t s content is of a nebulous nature, continually adapting 
i t s e l f to nei.v demands and requirements. Given this evolving, almost 
organic l i f e , the best way i n which some indication of liberalism may be 
conveyed i s to observe i t s more permanent features, together with some 
of the more important changes which have occurredwithin the tradition. 
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Particular attention w i l l be paid t o the 19th century as t h i s pro-
vides the immediate background to Maine's work and because the changes 
which occurred i n t h i s period can almost be regarded as a ne;r s t a r t i n g 
point f o r English liberalism. 
Born i n reaction t o authoritarianism i n r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s , 
the most constant theme of l i b e r a l thought has been i t s defence of i n d i v i d -
u a l freedom against the intrusions of government. The instruments used i n 
defence of t h i s position have been varied. I n the 18th century, individuals 
had been secure behind the protection of natural law and the social contract; 
w h i l s t i n the 19th century, though never abandoning natural law con?)letely, 
they looked to the myth of the natural harmony of interests as providing 
the chief means of guaranteeing individual l i b e r t y . This, however, proved 
to be of l i t t l e value against the more ambitious interpretations of u t i l -
i t a r i anism i n which the in t e r e s t of the majority was seen as coincident 
with the interest of a l l . 
Amongst the other permanent aspects of liberalism i s the b e l i e f 
that progress i s the product of the free interplay of social forces. Irene 
C o l l i n s , f o r example, suggests of l i b e r a l s that "IVhatever twists and turns 
were demanded of them by the circumstances, they held at heart a simple 
f a i t h : a b e l i e f that progress, leading to f i n a l perfection, could be 
achieved by means of free i n s t i t u t i o n s . " 
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The l a s t of the major principles iThich might be mentioned i s 
the Rule of Lavr. At f i r s t glance^ the emphasis upon the importance of 
law might seem to be inconsistent \d.th the doctrine of laissez-faire, 
but such an impression would be quite erroneous. The l i b e r a l b e l i e f 
i n the overriding authority of the Rule of Law cannot c o n f l i c t with the 
concept of freedom since they believed i n freedom under the law and not 
i n any anarchical idea of freedom independent of law. The very idea 
that there could be a genuine c o n f l i c t between them i s clear l y an error, 
f o r asLippnann said, " . . . a l l freedom, a l l r i g h t s , a l l property are 
sustained by some kind of Law. So the question can never arise whether 
there should be law here and no law there, but only what lavr shall pre? 
v a i l everywhere."** This almost mystical idea of the Rule of Law has 
certain a f f i n i t i e s w ith the notion of Natural Law. I t ensured that no 
person could be deprived of property or liberjby unless proved g u i l t y 
of i n f r i n g i n g , a f t e r a f a i r t r i a l , the duly constituted law of the 
country; and perhaps most important, that a l l men are equal before 
the law, including those w i t h i n the governing body i t s e l f . 
These general beli e f s i n the sanctity of the in d i v i d u a l , gradual-
ism, progress, Rule of Law etc., formed, i n the varying interpretations 
t o which they were subjected, the basic l i b e r a l creed: the principles 
upon which the good society was to be achieved. I n the 19th century, 
t h i s general disposition found eacpression i n specific demands. Collins 
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suggests the following: "The individual can best achieve his ovm 
welfare through the welfare of a l l . No i n d i v i d u a l can know what i s 
the welfare of a l l , so some p o l i t i c a l system must be devised which 
allows the voice of each individual to be heard.. Essential features 
of such a p o l i t i c a l system are: a fr e e l y elected parliament, t o de-
l i b e r a t e upon the lav/s; a ministry dependent on that parliament to 
carry out the laws; a judicature e n t i r e l y independent of other branches 
of government, t o deal with offenders against the lavraj freedom of 
speech, freedom of r e l i g i o n , freedom from a r b i t r a r y arrest, freedom f o r 
th(9 i n d i v i d u a l t o enter any trade or profession according to his a b i l i t y , 
freedom f o r the i n d i v i d u a l to accumulate property and possess i t i n 
safety. I n t h i s way the individual can f i n d his f u l l e s t expression and 
w i l l be able to grow i n that essential goodness which leads to perfection."*5 
I t has been suggested that there was a significant reorientation . 
i n the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n during the 19th century and i t w i l l now be of 
value t o observe t h i s change i n emphasis. But before proceeding, i t must 
be stressed that the change was not simply the replacing of certain ideas 
by a series of new ones. Rather i t vxas the gradual adoption of concepts 
which were then integrated i n t o the t r a d i t i o n ; whilst older notions, which 
were becoming anachronistic, were allotved to f a l l into the background. 
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One of the impoHant changes occurring i n the 19th century 
concerned the basis from which individual freedom was defended. I t 
was the substitution of socially recognised rights f o r the IBth cen-
t u r y concept of natural r i g h t . The anarchical tendencies inherent i n 
the founding of rig h t s i n nature proved unsuited to the sympathies of 
the middle classes who constituted the main body of l i b e r a l supporters. 
Consequently, l i b e r a l s moved towards the concept of c i v i l rights where-
by i n d i v i d u a l claims became r i g h t s vhen recognised by the state; outside 
t h i s area no r i g h t s existed, only expectations. 
A second change i s " . . . the emphasis on the individual 
rather than the people."*^ The idea of the people as anything more 
than the aggregate of individuals comprising society had never found 
much support i n English liberalism. But i n England, as on the continent, 
there was an increasing emphasis on the i n d i v i d i i a l rather than on the 
majority w i l l . The classical statement of t h i s new liberalism being, 
of course, J.S. M i l l ' s On Liberty. The w i l l of the sovereign had to 
be reconciled with the r i g h t s of the individual. 
These new positions cannot be regarded, i n any sense, as 
f i n a l statements of the l i b e r a l doctrine. Indeed, such vims have 
been described as t r a n s i t o r y stopgaps i n the progress towards a form 
of collectivism of a s o c i a l i s t kind. The conditions of the times; 
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depression i n the seventies, the social reports of men.like Booth and 
Rowntree, and the breakdown of the classical model economy, owing t o 
the r i s e of tru s t s and monopolies, led to new thinking i n l i b e r a l c i r -
cles. The abstract individual and his negative freedom v/hich M i l l had 
depicted was replaced by the more appropriate individual of Green's 
philosophy. He was a man who required the positive assistance of the 
state i f his r i g h t s vfere to be secured. The emphasis of the new posi-
t i o n was placed on the whole community. "Instead of st a r t i n g from a 
central i n d i v i d u a l , t o whom the social system i s supposed to be adjusted, 
the i d e a l i s t starts from a central social system, i n which the individual 
must f i n d his appointed o r b i t of duty,"*''' Ind i v i d u a l rights and values 
are s t i l l t o be respected; indeed. Green hoped that the circumstances f o r 
i n d i v i d u a l moral development would be greatly improved. But since these 
were inseparable from the community i t s e l f , then, the social body must be 
the centre of in t e r e s t . I t was by adjusting the ODnditions of society 
that the opportunity f o r the in d i v i d u a l could be secured. Without govern-
ment intervention i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l i t y could be crushed beneath 
the wheels of the new i n d u s t r i a l society. 
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n appeared to be a f a r remove from the t r a d -
i t i o n a l l i b e r a l position. The result was a s p l i t w i t h i n t h e i r ranks. The 
'old l i b e r a l s ' , of whom Roach claims Maine to be one of the most powerful 
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exponents, held on t o t h e i r b e l i e f i n the values of laissez-faire and 
the doctrines of l i b e r a l i s m ^ i c h had been formed i n the 18th century. 
They refused t o recognise the new circumstances i n which they moved. 
Many of these l i b e r a l s d r i f t e d i n t o the ranks of the Conservative Party, 
although, paradoxically, they were f a r to the r i g h t of the main body of 
i t s members. Laissez-faire then, became, as every'progressive doctrine 
must, once i t s principles have been realized, a reactionary dogma. On 
the other hand, the new l i b e r a l position seemed f o r many t o f i n d i t s log-
i c a l development only i n some form of socialism. M i l l himself had claimed 
i n his autobiography that he was a s o c i a l i s t . There was, i n f a c t , a 
drain of support from l i b e r a l i s m t o socialism. Thus the image of l i b e r a l -
ism i n the closing decades of the l a s t century vreis one of gradual d i s i n t e -
gration. 
The conservative, t r a d i t i o n plays such an important role i n 
understanding Maine's p o l i t i c a l thought that i t can be more pr o f i t a b l y 
dealt with i n the chapter on Popular Government. I t i s worth remembering, 
however, that conservatism suffered the same tensions which we noted i n 
li b e r a l i s m . This can be seen i n the d i f f e r i n g emphases apparent i n prac-
t i c a l p o l i t i c s rather than i n theoretical discourse. Resignations from 
the Cabinet and general resentment w i t h i n the party against the various 
innovations made by D i s r a e l i are symptomatic of 'old Tory' elements 
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inherent i n Conservatism. On the other hand, the phenomenon of the 
Fourth Party i n the 1880's represented the more progressive sections, 
which were advocating reforms based on radical principles and a n t i -
cipating p o l i t i c a l demands rather Ithan waiting f o r them to mature. 
Both the main movements i n English p o l i t i c s were thus faced with the 
same problem of overcoming natural i n e r t i a i n order to keep abreast 
of social requirements on the one hand, v^hile restraining radical tend-
encies on the other, so that some continuity i n t h e i r respective traditions 
might be maintained. 
?/hilst members of the main tra d i t i o n s of thought were attempt-
ing t o accommodate themselves t o changing circumstances, the more radical 
members of society vfere t r y i n g t o increase the velocity of social change 
i n order that certain goals might be secured. Many of the objectives of 
these groups have nov: been realized, but i t cannot be said that they have 
contributed any profound or detailed ideas t o p o l i t i c a l thought^ As Derry 
has said, "The Radical t r a d i t i o n i s as much an a f f a i r of agitation and 
organisation as of p o l i t i c a l theory."*^ Perhaps the greatest d i f f i c u l t y 
concerning the discussion of radicalism i s to define the area covered 
by t h i s term. At one extreme, i n the form of radicalism represented by 
William Cobbett, i t merges i n t o the area usually associated with conserv-
ative romanticism; vfhilst at the other, i t becomes confused v/ith the 
various strands of English socialism. 
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One of the important features of radicalism - s t i l l deep 
i n the shadow of 18th century Jacobinism - vjas i t s f a i t h i n democracy. 
Only through universal suffrage could the goals of l i b e r t y , equality 
and f r a t e r n i t y be secured. This conflicted with the predominant 
l i b e r a l b e l i e f i n some form of hierarchy t o ensure order, s t a b i l i t y 
and freedom from the tyranny of majority r u l e . To secure the ends 
of democracy many radicals f e l t that i t was essential t o destroy the 
monarchical system of government and create a republic i n i t s stead. 
The removal of the formal i n s t i t u t i o n of the old world would prove 
i n e f f e c t i v e , however, i f the t r a d i t i o n a l hierarchy was t o survive by 
v i r t u e of i t s wealth. To overcome such p o s s i b i l i t i e s , heavy duties 
and steeply graduated income tax were advocated. 
Another development following from the achievement of a major-
i t y government would be the implementation of state education* ^Thilst 
many l i b e r a l s f e l t that t h i s was a f i e l d best l e f t t o private i n i t i a t i v e , 
the radicals i n s i s t e d that compulsory primary education was necessary t o 
secure equal opportunity f o r every member of society. I t i s interesting 
t o note that the arguments used t o defend t h i s position were not simply 
those of extreme u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , but frequently involved the idea of 
natural r i g h t s . As Professor Ritchie said, "Recent experience has, how^ 
ever, convinced me that the theoiy ^ o f Natural Rights_7 i s s t i l l i n a 
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sense, a l i v e , or at least capable of mischief. Though disclaimed by 
almost a l l our more careful writers on p o l i t i c s and ethics, i t yet 
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remains a commonplace of newspaper and the platform , . ," ' Such a 
conviction echoes the opinions expressed at an e a r l i e r date by Maine. 
Perhaps the best summaiy of radical b e l i e f can be found i n 
the 'six points' of the People!s Charter of 1838. " I t called f o r u n i -
versal male (not female) suffrage; equal electoral', d i s t r i c t s ; removal 
of property qualifications for members of Parliament; payment of members 
of Parliament; secret b a l l o t ; and annual general elections."^^ 
To complete the p o l i t i c a l background to Popular Government, i t 
i s now appropriate that our attention be turned t o the nature of socialism 
during t h i s period. For, " I f M i l l offered the most in^jortant contribution 
t o p o l i t i c a l thinking i n the f i r s t h alf of the reign, the most s t r i k i n g 
feature of the second h a l f was the r i s e of socialism. "^•'• 
The origins of English socialism can be traced beyond the Diggers 
and Levellers of the time of the C i v i l War, but to trace the whole develop-
mient of the t r a d i t i o n does not constitute our present purpose. I t wdll be 
s u f f i c i e n t simply t o indicate the growth of s o c i a l i s t thought i n the 19th 
century. 
The f i r s t figure of importance, although i t i s probably true 
that he simply gave expression and popularity to the opinions of William 
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Gpdwin. viras the successful i n d u s t r i a l i s t , Robert Owen. His main 
contribution to the s o c i a l i s t t r a d i t i o n lay i n his stressing the im-
portance of environment i n creating a good society. A policy of 
lai s s e z - f a i r e degraded both vrorker and employer a l i k e ; i t was v/aste-
f u l , i n e f f i c i e n t and inhuman. By social engineering the vicious ap-
p l i c a t i o n of laxjs of supply and demand could be :.Teplaced by the bene-
f i c i e n t operation of the lavis of harmony and co-operation, A new sys-
tem of exchange founded on the' labour theoiy of value vrould ensure an 
e f f i c i e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n of goods by basing price on the cost of production, 
and by removing the p r o f i t of the middleman. . The means of production i n 
Oiven's Utopia vrere t o be c o l l e c t i v e l y owned t o ensure that the .evils 
associated with the p r o f i t motive were excluded. I n such an i d y l l i c 
association, the emergence of complete, contented human beings, devoid 
of a l l vices, would be but a matter of time. 
Owen, despite the d u l l r e p e t i t i v e nature of his theoretical 
work was perhaps the most i n f l u e n c i a l s o c i a l i s t of his time. But he 
was not alone i n the expression of such vievra. Many of the more extreme 
u t i l i t a r i a n s , Thomson, Grey and Brey, found t h e i r way in t o the s o c i a l i s t 
ranl<s. They had arrived at socialism as a result of an emphasis upon 
equality, rather than security, i n the interpretation of the principle 
of u t i l i t y . There vras, however, among some of these men, Brey i n particu-
l a r , a class a t t i t u d e which was t o t a l l y absent i n Owen. Oaen wanted to 
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secure his communist society by means of middle class values: he was 
completely against the ideas of clasa war, strikes and violence. He 
believed that the transformation of the world could be brought about 
by education. Brey saw the p o l i t i c a l n a i v i t y of such views and advo-
cated class s o l i d a r i t y and violence to capture the means of production 
f o r the community. I n many areas, the English so c i a l i s t s anticipated 
Marx, although they did not enjoy his h i s t o r i c a l understanding. 
The permeation of ivorking class opinion by soc i a l i s t ideas 
continued throughout our period. They were promulgated by Kingsley, 
Maurice, Ruskin and Morris, Marx and Engels, even though residing i n 
England,had l i t t l e d irect impact upon the native working-class movements, 
although two organisations e^qjounding Marxist views were founded. They 
were the Democratic Federation founded i n 1881, which l a t e r became the 
Social Democratic Federation, and a splinter group which, i n 1884, became 
the separate Social i s t League. I t was, however, i n the same year that 
a more important body than either of these purely Marxist organisations 
was established, namely the Fabian Society, I t was the members of t h i s 
society viho gave s o c i a l i s t ideas a f i r m place i n English p o l i t i c s . 
According to Wilfred Harrison, "The avowed task of t h i s g roup 
vras to bring s o c i a l i s t theory up to date, t o free i t from notions of 
unavoidable class struggle and revolution, and t o base i t not on Utopian 
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or anarchist ideas, but on the recognition that modern government was 
very compatable indeed w i t h social reforms."^^ This constitutional 
approach t o reform v^ as fundamental to the influence which the Fabians 
were able to exert i n B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s , since i t was quite clear that 
the majority of men were opposed to any form of violent revolution. As 
Webb pit i t , ". . . Socialists as we l l as I n d i v i d u a l i s t s , realise that 
important organic changes can only be ( l ) democratic and thus acceptable 
t o a majority of the people and prepared f o r i n the minds of a l l ; (2) 
gradual, and thus causing no dislocation, hov/ever rapid may be the rate 
of progress; (3) not regarded as immoral by the mass of the people, and 
thus not subjectively demoralising to them; and (4) i n t h i s country at 
any r a t e , consitututional and peaceful. "^^ To remedy the evils of cap-
i t a l i s t production and the unearned increments from land and c a p i t a l , a 
system of social ownership was advocated. I n place of the anarchy of 
l a i s s e z - f a i r e , the Fabians proposed the .adoption of a planned economy. 
Socialists T,vere simply to take over the control of the c a p i t a l i s t machine. 
They were not to destroy i t , but use i t f o r the interest of the community 
rather than for private gain. 
Finally,two further assumptions vrtiich underlay the Fabian position 
must be mentioned: the b e l i e f i n science, and the b e l i e f i n the centralised 
state. Accepting the evolutionary themes of the time, the Fabians were 
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convinced that the advent of socialism was inevitable. I t was to be 
the product of social evolution. Not only did science forecast the 
a r r i v a l of socialism, i t also was c r u c i a l t o the administration of the 
new society. The Fabians neglected the real nature of p o l i t i c s - the 
process of discussion and compromise - they were more concerned with 
planning. Although they claimed they were democrats, they had more f a i t h 
i n experts than i n the common people. They thought of the state as a 
machine which must have i t s operators - an e l i t e trained i n the science 
of government. The mass of society simply had t o be organised and admin-
ist e r e d i n t h e i r own best i n t e r e s t , and a l l would be w e l l . 
Criticism of the Fabian position i s not required, but i t v d l l 
become apparent that many of the principles which Fabians adopted had been 
the subject of Maine's censure long before they had received t h i s l a t e r 
systematic exposition. 
With t h i s b r i e f mention of one of the most important forms of 
rationalism i n English p o l i t i c a l thought, our general introduction t o 
Maine's work may be concluded. I t remains nov; f o r a detailed examination 
of his position to be undertaken against t h i s background which we have 
sketched. 
R E F E R E N C E S 
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C H A P T E R TWO 
CHAPTER TWO 
J U R I S P R U D E N C E 
THE OBJECT OF MAINE'S STUDI 
Maine's professed intentions i n Ancient Law were immediately 
stated i n his preface as follows: 
The chief object of the following pages i s to indicate 
some of the earliest ideas of mankind, as t h ^ are re-
flected i n Ancient Law, and to point out the relation 
of those ideas to modern thought.^ 
He proceeded to emphasize the importance of Roman law i n such an analysis 
since i t embraced both ancient and modern notions of law, but he was care-
f u l to make i t quite clear that he was i n no sense offering a study of,the 
evolution of Roman legal theory. Roman law simply provided a useful model 
for correlating primitive concepts with their f i r s t appearance i n modem 
form - a convenient system for tracing the evolution of ideas. 
The examination of man's earliest social organisation and i t s sub-
sequent evolution, was, Maine believed, the only means by which a comprehen-
sive understanding of progressive civ i l i s a t i o n could be secured. However, 
such an undertaking, even when one considered the small number of societies 
which could be called 'progressive', was beyond the capabilities of a single 
individual. Consequently, Maine f e l t that the most profitable area of re-
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search lay i n the investigation of ancient society. The justification 
for this belief i s of a two fold nature. I n the f i r s t place, by expos-
ing the character of primeval'society, the subsequent investigations 
into later periods could be seen within a more meaningful framework -
a framework vAiich not only informed the understanding, but directed i n -
quires into the most significant areas. But Maine was not mereiy con-
cerned with building the foundations upon which the history of c i v i l i -
sation could ba contracted. His second, and perhaps more important 
reason for this belief, was that the simple generalisations made i n the 
ear]y stages of man's social experience could be seen as the essence of 
their modern counterparts, and as such were cjpable of providing a key 
with vriiich the frightening complexity of contemporary civilisation could 
be made more meaningful. The comparison of ancient and modern concepts • 
was thus ani^^analjrbical method, an instrument of sociological investigation, 
which would enable a greater awareness of the here and now. 
The character of contemporary jurisprudence, and the continued 
reliance on Natural Lav? i n particular, provided further encouragement i n 
directing'the location of Maine's research. The assumption of a 'state 
of nature' remained an obstacle to scientific jurisprudence: whether 
accepted as a historical or philosophical fact, i t detracted attention 
from the detailed historical analysis of society. Not only did this resvilt 
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i n an inadequate understanding of jurisprudence, but i n i t s modern 
interpretation. Natural Law provided a dangerous basis for legis-
l a t l o n t f t Only by presenting the picture of man's ancient social or-
ganisation, as suggested by empirical evidence, could the inappro-
priateness, and hence the dangers,-of using the concept of nature as 
a basis of jurisprudence be exposed. -
The following quotations from Maine may be used to emphasize 
this limited nature of his legal investigations. I n his discussion of 
the 'Early History of Property', he wrote: 
The influence of Courts of Law and of their pro-
cedure upon Property has been most extensive, but 
the subject i s too large for the dimensions of this 
treatise, and would carry Us farther down the course 
of legal histoiy than is consistent ^ vith i t s scheme.^ 
And again i n the discussion of the 'Early Histoiy of Contract', he 
noted: 
The vast influence of the specific jurisprudence 
of Coritriact produced by the Romans upon the cor-
responding d epartment of modern'law belongs rat-
her "to the histoiy of mature jurisprudence than 
to a treatise l i k e the present.3 
r 
The major part of the analysis i n Maine's historical inquiries 
was concentrated upon the presentation of the details of man's earliest 
social l i f e . But i t must be repeated that this was regarded as the i f i r s t 
step towards a scientific appreciation of contenqjorary ci v i l i s a t i o n . 
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References to this ulterior objective can be seen throughout Ancient 
Law. Frequent comparisons are made between the original and current 
ideas on specific issues such as contract or w i l l . Clearly these 
are meant to be indicative of the value of the kind of analysis he was 
advocating for society as a v/hole. Besides t h i s , hovrever, his intro-
ductory chapters aire designed to undermine the alternative explanations 
of the evolution of modern society, v/hether i n the guise of u t i l i t a r -
ianism or Natural Law, with the object of clearing the ground for the 
reception of his own historical account. The study of the past was thus 
i n no sense an ©scapa from the complexities of the modern world, as far 
as Maine was concerned, the past was the only material i n which a true 
image of the present could be reflectedo 
THE STRUCTUBE OF MAINE'S ARGUMENT 
The actual structure of the argument i s perfectly compatible 
with the object of the work. This begins with an introduction to the 
character of primitive law. F i r s t l y , he describes a condition of society 
where law has not achieved any form of permanent expression. The only 
known law i s the ex post facto judgement of the ruler*, law i s 'in the 
a i r ' , a mere 'habit', as yet to reach even the plane of custom. This idea 
that divinely inspired judgement precedes the customary law stage was 
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something quite new and illustrated Maine's divergence from his German 
masters. He maintained that time and the succession of the aristocracy 
to the pre-eminent position i n society, led to this second stage i n the 
evolution of law. This was the only true period of unwritten or customary 
law; a system dependent upon the knov/ledge and learning of a class of 
guardian aristocrats. The impact of the art of writing, however, ushered 
i n the opening of the t h i r d and crucial stage - the period of codification. 
Maine suggested that, although the evidence showed a l l societies to pass 
through such a process, the actual moment, relative to social development, 
was of v i t a l importance. I f i t s institution was late in a community's 
grov/th, then there was a very real danger that the customs had been corrupted 
by irrational superstitions. He held: 
. . . unhappily there is a law of development which 
ever threatens to operate"upon unwritten usage. The 
customs are of course obeyed'by"multitudes who are 
incapable" of Understandihjg the "true ground' of "their 
expediency, ahd whb are therefore l e f t inevitably'to 
invent superstitious""reasons "for their permanence. 
A process then commences which'may" be'shortly "des-
cribed by' saying"that usage which i s reasonable gen-
erates usage which i s unreasonable.* 
The civilisations of the East are the great examples of a rela-
t i v e l y late stage i n the realization of a legal code. The delay meant that 
i r r a t i o n a l i t i e s and superstitions, which had eventually surrounded reason-
able practices, were now given permanent expression i n the legal code i t -
self, since this usually amounted to a rationalisation of existing law. 
The consequence of this action had been ossifying, i t produced v/hat Maine 
referred to as a 'stationary' c i v i l i s a t i o n . Although there had been some 
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change, there had been no progress - that specialization and increasing 
complexity of ideas which characterised the western world. As he said, 
"There has been material c i v i l i s a t i o n , but, instead of civilisation ex-
panding the law, the law has limited the c i v i l i s a t i o n . 
Fortunately for the progress of Roman civi l i s a t i o n , i t s code 
was secured remarkably early i n the process of development and so avoided 
a l l these dangers. Indeed, Maine does not suggest that without the early 
realization of a codified system of law, the Romans, like the Hindoos, 
would have been 'condemned' to a 'feeble and perverted' civ i l i s a t i o n ; he 
does, however, insist that their code exempted them from the very possib-
i l i t y of such a calamity. Such i s the importance of the.codes, then, that 
Maine sees them as detemining a society's whole future course of develop-
ment. 
In the few societies which escaped these numerous snares along 
the path of progress, the activity of harmonizing the structure of the 
legal system with the continual generation of social necessities, became 
self-conscious. Whereas customary usage had been imperceptibly accommod-
ated to new circumstances, their registration i n permanent form i n the 
written Code, necessitated a process of overt response and interpretation. 
I n the era prior to codification, Maine recognisad three stages 
of development: those of Fiction, Equity and Legislation, but he conceded 
that the stages were not mutually exclusive. Certain legal systems might 
have escaped the influence of any one of them. He insisted, however, that 
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the historical order i n which these agencies had appeared had never 
been other than he had indicated. 
A few brief remarks upon fictions and legislation sufficed, 
but the discussion of equity was prolonged since i t was the medium 
through which the Greek concept of 'Nature' had been introduced into 
Roman legal thought. Maine's attitude towards both the ancient and 
modem interpretations of Natural Law theory i s very illuminating and 
is examined f u l l y below. I t is perhaps enough, at this point, simply 
to indicate the importance which Maine attached to this concept. 
The ground thus prepared, Maine proceeded to examine a l l the 
major branches of law as reflected i n primitive communities. Beginning 
with the Law. of Persons, he discussed Succession, Property, Contract, 
Delict and Crime. I n each case, the major part of the analysis was con-
cerned with describing the various developments of a concept, from i t s 
basic form to the point i n Roman Law that i t achieved i t s "modern" char-
acteristics. 
MAINE'S ANALYSIS OF CQmjPORAHT THEORT 
This general schema provides the framework i n which the import-
ant contribution to knowledge made by Maine be seen. But before ojit-
l i n i n g his own position, i t w i l l be helpful to determine his disposition 
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towards the contemporary systems of jurisprudence as expressed i n 
Ancient Law. These might best be subsumed under two headings: 
'positive, non-historical social analysis' and 'Natural Law'. 
Utilitarianism. 
The work of Bentham and Austin might be taken as represent-
ative of the f i r s t category, since their system of thought was prom-
inent i n jurisprudence for most of the 19th century. Maine said of 
the prevalent mode of investigation: 
The favourite occupation of active minds at the 
present, and"the one which answers to the specu-
latlbris of our forefathers on the origin of the 
social state, i s the analysis of society as'it 
exists and moves before bur eyes; but, through 
omitting to c a l l i n the assistaihce of history, 
this analysis too often degenerates into an idle 
exercise of curiosity, arid is especially apt to 
incapacitate the iriqUirer froia comprehending states 
of society which differ considerably from'that"to' 
which he i s accustomed. The mistake of judging the 
men of other periods by the morality of our own day 
has i t s parallel i n the mistake of supposing that 
every v^eel and" bolt i n the modern sbcial machine', 
had i t s counterpart i n more rudimentary societies. 
Not only does this show where Maine considered the inadequacies of con-
temporary inquiries lay, but i t gives a valuable insight into his own 
understanding of historical investigation. He recognised the danger, for 
example, of reading present concepts back into past situations, and con-
sequently, of making generalisations of a too ambitious nature. 
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Even so, Maine had great respect for the u t i l i t a r i a n ex-
planation i n jurisprudence. I t approached the problem of under-
standing law and society from a 'scientific' point of view. I t ex-
amined the evidence and accordingly made i t s generalisations. But, 
because analytical jurisprudence was concerned solely with present 
society, Maine f e l t that an important area of relevant facts was being 
neglected, the vdiole history of previous civilisation. Consequently, 
any generalisations from the analytical lawyers could only be true of 
existing societies, and even here, he saw that the use of history might 
have modified their conclusions. He agreed with much of their analysis, 
including the breakdown of a law into a class of actions, governed by 
the concepts of command, obligation and sanction. Indeed, he maintained 
that: 
The results of this separation of"ingredients t a l l y 
exactly with the facts of mature jurisprudence; and 
by a l i t t l e straining of language, they msy be made 
to correspond i n form with a l l law, of a l l kinds, at 
a l l epochs.7 
Nevertheless, he believed that the further we penetrate into primitive 
society, the less readily i s the u t i l i t a r i a n thesis applicable. I n the 
earliest societies, law, as noted, is s t i l l 'in the a i r ' , and has no con-
cept of generality, command or even of sanction i n the Austinian sense. 
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Maine's position regarding the analytical jurists seems to have been 
that, whilst accepting their work as a valid Interpretation of the 
nature and operation of comtemporary jurisprudence, i t sustained only 
a verbal truth as a universal historical theoiy. 
To retain the Austinian analysis, vihilst adding to i t a der-
scription of how that society has evolved, is logically quite consistent. 
The Bentham-Austin analysis was primarily concerned with examining the 
usage of law - how the established system ftmctioned. For them, history 
was an irrelevance, they were concerned solely with the present. Austin 
required an understanding of the law asa-ooeans to rationalising i t into 
a coherent whole: Bentham, as a means to greater legislative efficiency. 
Maine, too, was concerned with understanding the legal system, but rather 
than simply examining the logical presuppositions of society and i t s legal 
structure, he preferred to approach the problem with the assistance of his-
tory. He f e l t that a comprehensive understanding of the present entailed 
the examination of i t s historical antecedents. Although the two systems 
were not to t a l l y exclusive they can best be recognised as providing solu-
tions to two different questions. The question the u t i l i t a r i a n s were con-
cerned with was the nature of a l l scientific interrogatives, namely, how 
the legal system worked. For Maine, the question was jrt i ^ the system had 
taken the particular form i t had. 
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Natural Law. 
The second scheme of thought which constituted the popular 
understanding of jurisprudence was based upon the concept of Natural 
Law. Maine attached such importance to this aspect of thought that i t 
w i l l be useful to follow the whole of his examination of this issue. 
His analysis f a l l s into two broad parts: the u t i l i s a t i o n of the idea 
of 'natura' i n ancient Roman theory and the modern interpretation of 
the English and French contractualists. 
Maine began the examination of the Roman notion by describing 
the generation of 'Jus Gentium' or law common to a l l nations. 7Iith the 
increasing intercourse of Rome with other polities, disputes arose be-
tween aliens and Roman citizens. Roman Quiritarian Law was quite incom-
petent to deal with such cases, as i t v/as applicable only to the citizen 
class. Consequently, rather than allow disputes to be settled by s t r i f e 
and so threaten the security of s ociety, a system was devised of selecting 
the rules of lavr comnon to the various institutions which prevailed among 
the I t a l i a n tribes. I n this vray a common law was developed which applied 
to a l l cases involving non-Roman citizens. There was to begin xvith, Maine 
suggested, l i t t l e respect for this make-shift system of law. But a l l this 
v/as transformed, indeed revolutionised, by the introduction of the Stoic 
philosophy of nature. I t changed the character of "Jus Gentium' from that of 
a mere expedient into an ideal standard of jurisprudence. Eventually,.by means 
-70-
of the Praetor's Edict, the complete fusion of the two notions was 
achieved. As Maine said, "The Jus Naturals, or Law of Nature, i s 
simply the Jus Gentium or Law of Nations seen i n the light of a pe-
cullar theory." 
The manner i n which the welding together of these two ideas 
took place seems to have been quite fortuitous. After showing the 
origin of the Greek concept of nature as being the notion of a single 
principle underlying and indeed unifying the whole physical world, 
Maine suggested that this came to be applied to the moral universe. 
That i s , a l l actions were considered as resolvable into some kind of 
primary law or general principle, which underlay a l l the superficialities 
of ordinary l i f e . To live according to this principle, the principle of 
nature, became the main tenet of the Stoic philosophy which made such an 
impact upon Roman thought. 
Under the pressure of this new climate of opinion, i t was not 
long before that process of "levelling" continued by the Praetors i n the 
sphere of Equity, became indentified with the simple l i f e advocated by 
the new morality. The function of the Praetor was seen in a different 
l i g h t - i t was now viewed as the recovei^ of the lost Code of Nature. 
This approach provided a great stimulus to the improvement of 
legal theory. The ideas of universality and harmony, the basic precepts 
of Nature, became the ideals of the legal system. Excessive formality. 
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involved language and multiplied cermonials were swept away i n this 
pursuit of s i n ^ l i c i t y , symmetry and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . Maine concluded 
that: 
I know no reason why the law of the Romans should be 
superior to the law of the Hindoos, unless the theory 
of Natural Law had given i t a type of excellence d i f -
ferent from the usual one. I n this one exceptional 
instance simplicity and symmetry were kept before the 
eyes of a society whose influence on mankind was des-
tined to be prodigious from other causes, as the char-
acteristics of an ideal and absolutely perfect law.' 
But, although the ideal of Natural Law provided v i t a l guidance 
i n the pursuit of improvement - a function, Maine suggested, performed by 
the principle of u t i l i t y i n the modern world - he saw that i t did not ex-
h i b i t any philosophical precision. I t was, he said, "one of those 'mixed 
modes of thought'W"^^, confusing the past with the present. Theoretically 
the dictates of Natural Law were derived from a logically implied state 
of nature, although i n practice such a procedure was ignored by the j u r i s -
consults. They continued, as had been their practice before the philosoph-
i c a l concept of nature had been grafted onto their activities, to concern, 
themselves with the adjustment of law to the changing conditions of society. 
Natural Law for a l l practical purposes, was something 
belonging to the present, something entwined with ex-
isting institutions, something which could be disin-
guished from them by a competent observer. The test 
which separated the ordinances of Nature from the gross 
ingredients with which they were mihgled'was a sense of 
sin?)licity and harmony; yet i t was not on account of 
their simplicity ahd harmony that these finer elements 
were primarily respected, but on the score of their de-
scent from the aboriginal reign of Nature.^ 
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The perceptive analysis of the Roman method of realizing the 
principles of nature i s important i n an appreciation of Maine's sympathy 
with the process. As i t operated, Roman Natural Law was essentially anti-
rationalistic. The philosophy of nature simply provided a sanction for a 
process of levelling and rationalisation ishich was already taking place 
throughout the ancient world. I t was true that improvements came to be 
couched i n terms of the principles of nature, but they were of a very d i f -
ferent character from the prescriptions derived from an ideological system. 
The actual principles of 'simplicity and harmony', like their modern counter-
part the u t i l i t y principle, merely suggested a general justification 
for change. I t did not imply any specific action or the pursuit of a 
scheme. The framework i t provided simply presented a structure upon which 
the empirical task of building the law i n response to the demands of a 
progressive society could proceed i n an orderly manner. 
Despite reservations regarding the theoretical pretensions of 
the Roman interpretation of Natural Law, Maine was sympathetic with their 
practical application of this concept. His disposition towards every aspect 
of i t s modern appreciation, however, was of a much more hostile character. 
The following quotation not only links his ancient and modern analyses, but 
also foreshadows his disenchantment with modern rationalism. Speaking of 
the Roman 'Jus Naturals', he said. 
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I t i s important too to observe that this model 
system, unlike many of those which have mocked 
men's hopes i n later days, was not entirely the 
product of imraagination. I t was never thought 
of as founded on quite untested principles. The 
notion was that i t underlay existing law and must 
be looked for"through i t . I t s functions were i n 
short remedial, not revolutionary or anarchical. 
And thiis, unfortunately, is the exact point at 
which the modern vie?; of a Law of Nature has often 
ceased to resemble the ancient.12 
Thus, although the idea of a Natural Law had retained i t s importance i n 
the history of thought, the more influential modern interpretation of that 
theoiy was something quite different from that posaeasiad by the Romans. 
Theorizing upon a natural state of man constituted a common fac-
tor among p o l i t i c a l vrriters i n the 17th and 18th centuries. The object of 
this analysis f e l l broadly Into two categories: one, basically explanatory; 
the other, mainly prescriptive. Out of the many writers suitably classified 
under -such t i t l e s , Maine took the English contractualists, Hobbes and Locke, 
as representative of the explanatory group; Rousseau, as the major figure 
i n the prescriptive section. 
Maine considered that the English writers had realized the true 
nature of the problem involved i n understanding jurisprudence and p o l i t i c a l 
society. They had recognised i t as a question of appreciating the evolu-
t i o n of contemporary concepts from their original source. But, rather than 
enjoin i n the labour of examining complex historical data, these writers 
f e l l back . .on some ingenious conjecture which (plausibly interpreted) 
-74-
w i l l seem to reconcile everything. . ."13 The 'conjecture' to which 
Maine wasrefeirilng was the idea of ^-priEdtive State of Nature - an 
idea derived,consciously or vinconsciously, from Roman Law. Although 
Hobbes and Locke differed on the actual nature of the pre-social state 
and the details regarding the social contract by which man took his 
great step forward into c i v i l society, they were agreed that such an 
account was the only manner i n ^ vhich cognition of the t o t a l i t y of their 
p o l i t i c a l e^^ierience was possible. 
Rousseau's concern with the State of Nature, hov;ever, was not 
simply to f a c i l i t a t e an' understanding of contemporary society, he f e l t 
that i t was an ideal to guide p o l i t i c a l action. The present civilisation 
represented the degeneracy of mankind and as such ju s t i f i e d i t s ovm con-
demnation. I t was the Christian thesis of the f a l l of man transformed 
into the language of humanism; the 'Civitas Dei', the goal of salvation, 
became an ideal to be realized as an earthly heaven - the goal of p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e . 
Even so, a l l these p o l i t i c a l writers, regardless of their d i f -
ferent purposes, concentrated their analyses on the primitive state of 
mankind, rather than searching for the prescriptions or explanations of 
Natural Law among existing institutions. Basically, i t was s t i l l the 
Roman theory of 'natura' but, "... the theory i s , as i t were, turned 
upside down. I t i s not the Law of Nature, but the State of Nature which 
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i s novT the primary subject of contemplation."^^ The concept of nature 
provided the modern world with both a guide to action and an explanation 
of the present, as i t had done for the Romans; but now, much greater 
precision was ascribed to i t and to this extent, the two positions had 
l i t t l e i n common. 
Now that some indication has been given of the modern function 
performed by Natural Law, i t is important that some reference be made to 
the logical status of the concept. I t is of no l i t t l e consequence to de-
termine whether Maine considered the idea to be a historical or a philo-
sophical truth. Indeed the whole value of his analysis rests upon the 
status he attached to 'nature'. A prima facie examination of his position 
would suggest a certain amount of confusion at this point. Not only do 
many of his statements appear inconsistent, or even contradictory,'but 
he readily confessed his d i f f i c u l t i e s i n respect of determining the con-
tractualists' intentions. For example, Maine admitted the profelem of 
deciding the classification of the code of law which the Publicists derived 
from the necessary conditions of a State of Nature, 
I n studying these writers, the great d i f f i c u l t y i s 
always to discover whether they are discussing law 
or morality - whether the state of International re-
lations they describe i s actual or ideal - whether 
they lay down that which i s , or that which, i n their 
opinion, ought to.be.15 
But the most frank statement of Maine's d i f f i c u l t i e s i n this f i e l d occur 
not i n Ancient Law but i n Popular Ctovemment, when discussing Rousseau's 
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Social Contract Theozy. He wrote: 
?he "Contract Social", which sets forth the p o l i -
t i c a l theory on which I am engaged, appears at 
f i r s t sight to give a historical account of the 
emergericiB of mankind from a State of Nature. But 
whether i t i s meant that mankind did emerge i n this 
way, whether the writer believes that only a hap-
pil y circumstanced part of the human race had this 
experience, or whether he thinks that Nature, a 
beneficient legislatress, intended a l l men to have 
i t , but that her objects were defeated, i t is quite 
impossible to say with any confidence.* The language 
of Rousseau sometimes suggests that he meant his pic-
ture of early^ social transformations to be regarded 
as imaginary; but nevertheless the account given of' 
them is so precise, detailed and Iggically b u i l t up, 
that i t i s quite inconceivable its'author should not 
have intended to express realities. 
I n his footnote to this passage, Maine suggested that the reason for 
Rousseau's very great influence upon modern thought was because his f o l -
lowers believed , , his account of natural and of early p o l i t i c a l soc-
iety was l i t e r a l l y true." 
But though he saw that d i f f i c u l t i e s were involved i n this topic, 
Maine's position vfas consistent throughout: a proper appreciation of his 
attitude resolves a l l the major anomalies. He f e l t that the new emphasis 
upon the original state of man i n Natural Law had been generated i n England, 
f i r s t by Hobbes and continued i n the vrork of John Locke. The thesis of 
a contractTisJ. source of law and society was a particularly attractive ar-
gument to use against the divine parentage of Imperative Law i n an age when 
* my i t a l i c s 
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the old order of community was crumbling away to reveal the individual 
as the new unit of p o l i t i c a l and legal responsibility. Indeed, the new 
theory provided a recognition of the new order of society. I n the place 
of the mediaeval notion of hierarchy and station, of privilege and duty, 
of family and property; ideas appropriate to the rights and duties of 
individual men had more appeal. 
The speculative theories of Hobbes and Locke provided an accept-
able account of the new conditions. But Maine suggested that, although 
th^y were conceived as a p r i o r i explanations, the theories were understood 
to be invested with historical validity. As he said: 
I n another stage of thought, they would have been 
satisfied to leave their theory i n the condition 
of ail ingenious hypothesis or a convenient verbal 
formula. But that was an age \uder the dominion 
of legal superstitions. The State of Nature had 
been talked about t i l l i t had ceased to be regarded 
as paradoxical, and hence i t seemed easy to give a 
fallacious reality and definiteness to the contract-
ual origin of Law by insisting on the Social Compact 
as historical fact,17 
Maine considered that this extension of the theory had been an 
error and i t was an error which was not-confined to England. I t s 'most 
systematic form' was to be found i n Rousseau's Social Contract. Possibly 
the disposition of 18th century French thinkers to regard history simply 
as ' the i l l u s t r a t i o n of certain general propositions, either assumed or 
believed to be proved a p r i o r i , led Rousseau to accept more readily the 
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historical v a l i d i t y of the English argument. Maine's belief that 
Rousseau considered the Social Compact to be a historical fact has 
been noted i n the quotation from Popular Govemment. He had, how-
ever, arrived at this position i n his f i r s t work. Ancient Law. The 
evidence was particularly clear, for example, when he noted Rousseau's 
belief that the 'veracity and good faith' of the ancient Persians were 
• t r a i t s of primitive innocence which have been gradually obliterated 
by c i v i l i s a t i o n ' . ^ ^ 
Regarding the logical position of the State of Nature, then, 
Maine saw the theory as being i n essence a philosophical account, but 
that the circumstances of the intellectual climate had transformed i t 
into a historical description. Clearly, however, there can be no doubt 
that he was perfectly aware of the distinction betvreen a historical 
theory, based upon empirical data, and a logical or metaphysical theory, 
which transcended actual events. 
MAINE'S ATTACK ON NATURAL LAW 
Some time has been spent i n an effort to c l a r i ^ Maine's position 
on this question, since i t is of no l i t t l e importance i n .; evaluating his 
attack on the prevalent theories of jurisprudence. I f he had considered 
the Social Contract theory as purely a philosophical account of the origin 
and nature of society, then one might agree with Sir Ernest Barker that 
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Maine's attack, upon i t , from a historical position, was to commit ..a serious 
logical error.-^^ But i t has been damonstrated that, although philo-
sophical i n conception, some authors of the Social Compact believed 
i t to be historically true. Consequently, Maine vras j u s t i f i e d i n attack-
ing the thesis i n this form as being invalid. By suggesting that society 
had originated by men joining together i n a contractual agreement, a rela-
t i v e l y late legal development, the Natural Law theorists had committed an 
error which Maine found throughout the branches of social discourse, namely 
reading history backwards. 
These sketches of the plight of human beings i n the 
f i r s t ages of the world are effected by f i r s t sup-
posing mankind to be divested of a great part of the 
circumstances by which they are now surrounded, and 
by then aissuming that, i n the conditions thus imagined, 
they would'presisrve the same sentiments iand prejudices 
by which they are now actuated,—^although, i n fact, 
these sentiments may have been created and engendered 
by those very circumstances of which, by the hypothesis, 
they are to be stripped,20 
Maine believed-th^n, that i n i t s most systematic form. Natural 
Law theory was widely accepted as a historical account of society. But he 
also recognised that i t was not held exclusively as such. In i t s non-his-tor-
ical-. interpretation the spectre of nature impeded the reception of the 
historical method. The following quotation is but one of many to the same 
effect. 
But though the philosophy founded on the hypothesis 
of a state of nature has fallen low i n general esteem, 
i n so far as i t is looked upon under i t s coarser and 
more palpable aspects, i t does not follow that i n i t s 
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subtler disguises i t has lost plausibility, popu-
l a r i t y , "or power. I believe, as I have said, that 
i t i s s t i l l the great antagonist of the Historical 
Method; and whenever (religious objections apart) 
any mind is seen to resist or contemn that mode of 
investigation, i t w i l l generally be found under the 
influence of a prejudice or vicious bias traceable 
to conscious or unconscious reliance on a non-his-
toric, ..natural, condition of society or the i n d i -
vidual. 
Underlying this disposition, Maine recognised the philosophical 
assumption of the State of Nature. His major historical criticism of the 
theory was completely ineffective against this particular interpretation. 
The presentation of empirical evidence could never refute philosophical 
understanding. The only manner i n which the inconveniences i n this sphere 
could be removed was by demonstrating, not the theory's invalidity, but i t s 
inappropriateness - i t s irrelevance i n the face of nevf empirical data. In 
effect, Maine was making the same distinction made by Willey that ". . .a 
belief can be metaphysically 'true' ( i n the sense of 'coherent' or 'consis-
tent') and yet be empirically false, that i s , not i n correspondence with 
what we c a l l a 'state of affairs'.n^^ 
Once i t s 'empirical f a l s i t y ' had been shown and the true 'state 
of affairs' regarding the evolution of society had been made manifest, then 
even the t a c i t acceptance of the philosophical account of the emergence of 
society would be untenable. I t would be subjected to the same contempt 
with which Maine dismissed the Natural Law discussion of the modern w i l l , 
iiriien he said« 
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Nobbdy, I imagine, would affect to maintain 
such a doctrine, when once i t was ascertained 
that a l l these characteristics had their o r i -
gins within historical memory, . ,^ 
Maine's attack upon Natural Law ii^ether accepted as a philosophical or 
historical theory can be seen as perfectly justifiable. He dismissed i t s 
historical pretensions with historical data, and i t s philosophical accoiint 
of society simply by demonstrating that i t did not accord with the accepted 
evidence - i t s logical truth remained unimpaired, but as a meaningful ex-
planation, i t was irrelevant. 
This long and protracted analysis of Natural Law must be seen 
i n relation to the prevailing atmosphere of the 19th century. I t has been 
shown that Maine's historical analysis of society was compatable with the 
rationalism of the Austin-Bentham sckool. But the mechanical account of 
the functioning of man's social institutions was f e l t by many to be inade-
quate and,indeed,incomplete. The scientific heritage of Newton, although 
s t i l l a powerful force, had provided a new r i v a l , or perhaps more correctly, 
had been extended to i t s logical limits and given the appearance of being 
a new kind of explanation. The,emphasis of inquiry was s t i l l scientific, 
but the positivist methods of the scientists had been introduced into a new 
area of investigation. The new orientation, best represented- perhaps by 
Charles Dairwin, was tov^ards an evolutionary analysis. As we have seen, 
there was no necessary conflict between these two positions, nevertheless, 
i n many cases, the more comprehensive later standpoint tended to l i e 
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uneasily with the old. A new kind of truth was demanded or, at!.least, 
a more meaningful presentation of the old explanations. I n addition to 
understanding how things worked, the important question was: why were 
they of the particular form they exhibited? The answer expected was not 
to be i n the language or terminology of the ultimate question of Being: 
this age of materialism was not seeking the metaphysical assurances of 
the Scholastic tradition; the solution demanded was i n terms of a scien-
t i f i c history, the presentation of empirical truth. 
The main concern of Ancient Law was to provide such an empirical 
description of the growth of modem civ i l i s a t i o n . The Historical Method 
was offered as aneivcaridsatisfactory mode of social investigation. But, 
as i t has been shown, Maine believed that the theory of Natural Law re-
mained an obstacle to this particular method: hence, his sustained attack. 
But as the theory of Natural Law had performed two functions i n the history 
of ideas, the provision of a meaningful account of society and the found-
ation of a certain kind of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , Maine found i t necessary to 
f i l l the vacuum he had created with two explanations of his own. 
MAINE'S HISTORICAL METHOD 
The new account of society w i l l be dealt with f i r s t since this 
was Maine's primary objective i n Ancient Law. The actual substance contained 
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i n the explanation may best be retained for consideration in. detail 
i n the following chapter. At this juncture, i t w i l l be sufficient to 
consider some of the ideas surrounding the Historical Method, To at-
tempt to understand society as the realization of a particular prin-
ciple,, such as 'nature' or ' u t i l i t y ' , was of l i t t l e value i n accounting 
for a l l the anomalies which modern communities exhibited. Only one mode 
of appreciation could give sufficient I'easons for a l l the peculiarities 
of a system - and that was by the Historical Method, Maine's comment 
on the Roman classification of property into »Rec Mancipi' and 'Rec Nec 
Mancipi' i s indicative of his position i n relation to non-historical ex-
planations of society. He said: 
The lawyiars of a l l systems have spared no pains 
i n striving to refer these classifications to 
some i n t e l l i g i b l e principle;" but the reasons of 
the severance must ever be"vainly sought"for i n 
the philosophy of law:" they belong not to i t s 
philosophy but to i t s history,2* 
This failure to u t i l i s e the Historical Method is sufficient i n 
i t s e l f to explain the inadequacies of contemporaiy jurisprudence. Not to 
take account of the character of law, as i t made i t s f i r s t appearance, was 
a mistake ", , , analogous to the error of one who, i n investigating the 
laws of the material universe, should commence by contemplating the exist-
ing physical world as a whole, instead of beginning with the particles which 
25 
are i t s simplest ingredients," ' Certainly Maine saw no reason why such 
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a 'scientific solecism' should be tolerated i n jurisprudence any-
more than i n the other areas of thought. A knoivledge of history 
was, i n fact, particularly useful for an understanding of j u r i s -
prudence, since the early nature of jur a l conceptions contained,po-
t e n t i a l l y , a l l the forms i n which law subsequently established i t s e l f . 
This was made particularly clear i n Maine's address to the University 
of Calcutta, when he assessed the impact of scientific method in.the 
study of history. 
I n regard to the influence of the new methods on 
History, the only observation I w i l l make is that 
their effect has been to change, so to speak, i t s 
perspective . Many portions of i t which "had but 
small apparent value are exhalted into high esteem, 
just as a stone may be of'greater interest to a 
geologist than a mountain, a wised than a flower to 
a botanist, a fibre than a whole organism to a 
physiologist, because they place beyond question 
a natural law or ill u s t r a t e i t with extraordinary 
clearness. One unquestionable effect of the ten-
dency to regard history as a science of observation 
is to add'greatly to the value of ancient, as com-r 
pared with' modern history', and'not 6'rily' to "that of" 
the wond(9rf\illy •precise-'hi3toryc6f ''©reoce''and Rome, 
but to that of the semi-poetical history of ancient 
India. Ancient history has for scientific purposes 
the great advantage over modern, that i t i s inoofflr 
parably simpler - simpler because younger. The actions 
of men, their motives and the movement of "society are 
a l l i n f i n i t e l y less complex than i n the modern world, 
and bettier f i t t e d , therefore, to serve as materials 
for a f i r s t generalisationi^o 
Maine's investigations were-then, of an Aristotelian character. 
But, Although he makes continual reference to the importance of primitive 
concepts i n relation to modern thought, he cannot be accused of thinking 
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that the motives which generated certain practices and ideas necessarily 
have a close connection with those vdiich sustain them i n the present, 
, , the warning can never be too often repeated, 
that the grand source of mistake i n questions of 
jurisprudence i s the impression that those reasons 
which actuate us at the present moment, i n the main-
tenahcia of ah exiisting i n s t i t u t i o n have necessarily 
anything i n common vdth the sentiment i n vriiich the 
in s t i t u t i o n originated.27 
Maine's historical method of analysis was firmly rooted i n 
'empiricism'. Generalisations and laws of development must be provoked 
by the nature of the evidence alone. Too often, he f e l t history was ap-
proached with some notion independent of the historical material - such 
as, a theory of progress or evolution - vrtiich was then used to determine 
the selection of appropriate 'facts'. He, himself, made few dogmatic 
assertions regarding laws of society; there could be no self-confident 
assertions about i n e v i t a b i l i t y i n the historicist manner. Instead he was 
content to observe and classify. I n this way, developmental laws could 
be discerned but they tended to be of a very low level of generalisation, 
for example, his thesis of the growth of early law from judgements to 
codification and his famous generalisation regarding the movement of society 
from status to contract. But, as for theories of the inev i t a b i l i t y of pro-
gress, Maine saw no evidence to support such claims. Rather, he saw pro-
gress as something of an enigma; the normal condition of mankind being one 
of abject stationariness. I t i s thus with a careful, detailed scrutiny of 
the historical material that Maine suggests an understanding of the present 
world may be achieved. 
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MAINE'S POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The approach to p o l i t i c a l activity may now be outlined. 
Although Maine does not develop the p o l i t i c a l implication of his 
argument to the f u l l i n Ancient Lavf, there i s a great deal of evi-
dence to suggest that the themes taken up i n Popular Government had 
already occurred to him. Despite the suggestion of some writers that 
there i s a significant break i n continuity between Ancient Law and Pop-
ular Grovermneht: that one exhibits a confident li b e r a l thesis; the 
other, a frightened reactionary theme, the two books may be seen as 
forming a coherent whole. I n effect, they are both responses to the 
breakdovm i n the theory of Natural Law. The p o l i t i c a l ideas expressed 
in.Ancienb Law, therefore, must be examined i f the f u l l ramifications 
of his criticism of social theories based on 'nature' are to be traced. 
For the most part, however, the views expounded simply reflect the hos-
t i l e criticism of modern rationalism, and i n particular of Natural Law, 
which have been noted above, and f a i l to develop his own position i n re-
gard to the nature of p o l i t i c a l activity. 
To f u l l y appreciate Maine's fears i n respect of p o l i t i c a l change, 
i t i s important to recognise the great role played by ideas i n the history, 
of mankind. He believed that there was a close interplay of cause and 
effect between society and ideas and vice versa. 
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Whilst 'ideas' were certainly the product of historical c i r -
cumstances, being generated by the demands met by a progressive society, 
they could have either a beneficial or disastrous, influence on c i v i l i -
sation. The early influence oi the Law of Nature had certainly been 
favourable - i t could almost be claimed as. the main impetus of a l l pro-
gressive societies. By keeping the ideal of 'sijiiplicity and harmony' 
before the minds of the j u r i s t s , i t enabled society to escape from the 
trammels of ancient law and proceed along the path of progress. Such is 
the importance Maine attached to Natural Lavr that he said, ". . . i t is not 
easy to say what turn the history of thought, and therefore, of the human 
race, would have taken, i f the belief i n a law natural had not become uni-
versal i n the ancient world,"?? References to this relationship between 
thought and action are very numerous. For example, i n discussing Roman 
Equity (which was the Roman instrument for realizing the ordinances of 
nature), he claimed: . . St is the root of several conceptions ^?hich 
have exercised profound influence on human thought, and through humaui 
thought have seriously affected the destinies of mankind."^^ One of these 
conceptions v/as certainly the recognition of the individual. I n fact, 
Maine claimed that the greatest function of Natural Law vras , , i n 
enfranchising the individual from the authority of archaic society,"30 
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I n a similarveiryhe-stressed the v i t a l role v^ich the ' f i c t i o n ' of 
consanguinity played i n fostering the grovrth of family groups int o 
cohesive societies. "The conclusion then which i s suggested by the 
evidence i s , not that a l l early societies were formed by descent from 
the same ancestor, but that a l l of them which had any permanance or 
s o l i d i t y either were so descended or assumed* that they were."-^! And 
as a f i n a l example, i n discussing Roman conveyance, Maine suggested 
that i t was a proceeding to which ". . .we may unhesitatingly assign 
the parentage of tvro great i n s t i t u t i o n s without which modern society 
can scarcely be supposed capable of holding together, the Contract and 
the vail"32 
But besides t h i s favourable influence i n releasing the progress 
of society, ideas could also prevent a l l but l i m i t e d change: such an 
occurrence, as noted i n the discussion of the codes, had happened i n Hindoo 
society. Superstition and religious dogmas had prevented the gradual ameli-
oration of tlie l e g a l system. Certaifa changes had been made, but there had 
been no experience of progress. This Maine believed, was the condition of 
a l l but a few societies - stationary and unchanging. 
I t was with reference to t h i s dangerous aspect of thought that 
Maine was concerned w i t h the modern interpretation of Natural Law. He 
f e l t that the danger stemmed from the moderns losing the key t o the o r i -
* ray i t a l i c s 
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g l n a l Roman appreciation of the concept. The Roman j u r i s t s , i t has 
been suggested^ had attempted to realize t h e i r ideals by r e c t i f y i n g 
the anomalies i n existing i n s t i t u t i o n s and practices. Rousseau and 
his disciples determined t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s by the exclusive contem-
p l a t i o n of an i d e a l , non-historic state of nature. 
The danger vri.th Rousseau's interpretation lay i n his a t t i -
tude towards change. Ety ignoring the r e a l i t i e s of existing conditions -
f o r Maine the essential roots of a meaningful approach to reform - there 
was a clear tendency for prescriptive state of nature theories to become 
the source of revolutionary thought. The t r a d i t i o n a l values and beliefs 
of society were threatened by the pursuit of an ideological utopia and the 
consequences of t h e i r dovmfall, Maine saw as including a return to a con-
d i t i o n of savage barbarity. 
Maine knew that i n the higher i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s the whole 
idea of the State of Nature had been recognised f o r i t s true worth and 
that speculation was now not about the v a l i d i t y of the theory, but about 
how such an error could have had such a pervasive influence. But i t s 
force was not yet spent: i t s retention by looser thinkers continued t o 
Impede the acceptence of the H i s t o r i c a l Method. I n conjunction with cer-
t a i n social and p o l i t i c a l tendencies, i t continued to be a powerful force 
i n popular p o l i t i c a l movements. I t was at t h i s lower i n t e l l e c t u a l l e v e l 
that such ideas, by beeaalBf part of the general body of thought could 
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exsrt a most subversive influence. The impact of ideas had rarely 
been d i r e c t . Rather, hints and impressions, infused i n t o the mental 
atmosphere of an age, were the determining factors of c i v i l i s a t i o n . 
They shaped the very framework of the a r t i c u l a t e mind. Exhibiting 
a sociological viev/ of law, Maine believed that the well-being of a 
normal, progressive society depended upon the r a p i d i t y with which 
the gap between i t s mental progress and social organisation was closed. 
But i n a society corrupted by the theories of Rousseau, the attempts to 
realize these ideas could jeopardize the whole future progress of that 
society by destroying the existing social f a b r i c . 
Fears regarding the dangers inherent i n the r a t i o n a l i s t ap-
proach to p o l i t i c s , and contempt f o r t h e i r explanation of society, thus 
provide the context w i t h i n which the more detailed analysis of Maine's 
own p o s i t i o n can be developed. 
R E F E R E N C E S 
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C H A P T E R T H R E E 
CHAPTER THREE 
T H E P A T R I A R C H A L T H E O R Y 
THE DIRECTION OF MAINE'S INVESTIGATIONS 
I n the f i r s t f i v e chapters of Ancient Law, Maine prepared 
the ground f o r the reception of a new approach t o the study of society. 
The rest of the work was concerned with an examination of early Roman 
law i n r e l a t i o n t o t h i s . He was t o employ t h i s method of analysis i n 
each of his other l e g a l t r e a t i s e s , trimming and expanding the ideas sug-
gested i n his o r i g i n a l work by reference t o other systems of primitive 
law. To eoiistruot an adequate framework f o r miderstanding his conception 
of early law and society, therefore, i t i s necessary t o take i n t o account 
the whole system of his leg a l thought. 
Maine claimed that the h i s t o r i c a l analysis of law revealed 
cer t a i n epochs irtiich marked the beginning of d i s t i n c t trains of legal 
ideas and d i s t i n c t courses of practice. Such periods often introduced 
new and modified ideas which subsequently became of great inq}ortance. 
He suggested the following as major exan^les of t h i s kind of occurrence: 
the adoption of Natural Law i n Roman legal theory; the influence en^joyed 
by Canon Law i n the mediaeval world; and the formation of the feudal 
structtire of society. Each of these offered a new understanding of law 
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based on pxlnciples quite independent of the established ones. A l -
though no single idea has come to permeate every aspect of the modern 
structure of law, some have proved dominant i n specific branches. To 
comprehend the contemporary complex of law completely, i t i s then neces-
sary t o trace the growth of law from i t s o r i g i n , noting i t s various trans-
mutations under the isspaict of new ideas. The o r i g i n a l source of a l l legal 
ideas, Maine believed, was the patriarchal fami]y, and i t was with t h i s 
i n s t i t u t i o n that he commenced his analysis. 
THE NATURE OF THE PATRIARCHAL THEORT. 
Recognition of the evidence f o r the early existence of the 
patr i a r c h a l family, Maine was anxious t o stress, was not new but had a 
very ,old and respected lineage. I t s f i r s t expression had been given i n 
the laws and history of the ancient Hebrews. Evidence also existed i n 
the w r i t i n g s of classical Greece: both Plato and A r i s t o t l e , i n w r i t i n g 
of contemporary barbaric societies, had provided valuable information of 
the patriarchal structure. Also, i f the Homeric myths of cyclopean 
families are taken as representations of non-Greek societies, as Maine 
suggested they might, then here too was further corrobarative evidence. 
With the gradual breakdown of family orientated association i n 
the progressive c i v i l i s a t i o n s , the patriarchal understanding of society 
f e l l i n t o desuetude and was replaced by natural law explanations. The 
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theory was retained only i n religious teachings vrhere i t remained an 
i n t e g r a l part of the doctrine. I t s association with r e l i g i o n , however, 
did l i t t l e t o secure i t s widespread acceptance. I t was eschewed i n the 
sceptical atmosphere of the 18th century, being considered i n serious 
academic c i r c l e s as l i t t l e more than a theological n^rth, and -on a more 
popular l e v e l , because of i t s Semitic origins. The patriarchal theory, 
then, was abandoned by the 19th century. Tet Maine found that i t alone 
provided the key t o a s c i e n t i f i c understanding of early law, his i n v e s t i -
gations showing s i g n i f i c a n t evidence supporting t h i s essentially scrip-
t u r a l t hesis. Indeed, by using the accounts of contemporary observers, 
p r i m i t i v e records, and the ancient laws of societies belonging exclusively 
t o the Indo-European stock, he amassed such a quantity of favourable 
material that i t was d i f f i c u l t , t o lay dovm that any particular society 
had not, at one time, been organised on the pattern of a patriarchal comr-
munity. 
Before examining the Patriarchal Theory, the l o g i c a l status 
i t enjoyed must f i r s t be determined. I n approaching his object of r e l a t i n g 
the e a r l i e s t ideas of mankind t o t h e i r modern equivalents, Maine found him-
s e l f confronted by the barriers t o an h i s t o r i c a l understanding which the 
natural law theories presented. His f i r s t task i n Ancient Law had been to 
expose the inadequacies of such explanations, substituting i n t h e i r place 
the claims of the Patriarchal Theory. This, he suggested, i n contrast t o 
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the other accounts, might be considered "a r e a l h i s t o r i c a l theory that 
i s a theory giving an account upon r a t i o n a l evidence of pri m i t i v e or very 
ancient social order".^ Maine recognised that a l l theories regarding the 
o r i g i n a l formation., of c i v i l society were to a degree conjectural i n 
that they went beyond the evidence. But the patriarchal exposition most 
closely accorded with the apparent facts, although no actual working sys-
tem of patriarchalism was known. Whilst admitting that he could not hope 
to gain results v^ich " i n point of interest or trustworthiness, are to be 
placed on a l e v e l with those which for example have been accomplished i n 
Comparative Philology, "^ he claimed that i n i t s ovm viay- the evidence for 
believing a l l early society t o be patriarchal i n character was " . . . very 
much of the same kind and strength as that which convinces the comparative 
p h i l o l o g i s t that a number of Mtorda i n d i f f e r e n t Aryan languages had a common 
ancestral mother tongue."^ I n essence then, the Patriarchal Theory may be 
regarded as a h i s t o r i c a l means of providing a framevrork vrithin which a social 
system of a pa r t i c u l a r type could be described and comprehended. 
Confident that the H i s t o r i c a l Method had proved f r u i t f u l i n the 
analysis of early Roman Law, Maine extended his enquiries to other sources 
of the Indo-European culture. This led t o an intensive examination of the 
Brehon Laws of Ireland and the Hindoo Codes, but also with some reference 
to Greek, Russian, Teutonic and Slavonian sources. He developed a system 
* ray i t a l i c s 
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of cross reference, enabling points only suggested i n one system to be 
c l a r i f i e d by reference t o e x p l i c i t characteristics of a society at a 
d i f f e r e n t period of growth. For example, the mystery surrounding the 
o r i g i n of the Roman concept of Equity, vrtiich was to play such a v i t a l 
r o l e i n shaping c i v i l i s a t i o n , was resolved by comparison with, the develop-
ment of Hindoo Law i n t h i s f i e l d . Maine considered that comparison re-
vealed the emergence of Equity as the means of detennining the questions 
of inheritance upon the dissolutions of the practice of ancestor worship 
which had formerly regulated the devolutionb 
More than t h i s , however, because of the survival i n India of 
a r e l a t i v e l y p rimitive society, Maine believed that the h i s t o r i c a l and 
comparative methods of analysis could actually be conpoxmded. He said: 
. . . when we gain something l i k e an adequate idea 
of the vastness and variety of the phenomena of hu-
man society, when i n pa r t i c u l a r we have learned not 
t o exclude from our view of the eiarth and man those 
great and unexplored retgions which we vaguely term 
the East, we f i n d i t to be not wholly a conceit or 
a paradox to say that the d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
Present and the Past disappears. Sometimes the Past 
i s the Present; much more often i t i s removed from 
i t by varying distances, which, howevier. cannot be 
estimated or expressed chronological l y o * 
Recognition of t h i s fact brought the manifold advantage of actual obser-
vation t o the study of man's early social l i f e . Factors which had never 
been recorded, although exerting a great influence upon the character of 
society. Could be gleaned from contemporary 'survivals' and used to aid 
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the h i s t o r i c a l analysis of various cultures. This was by no means 
reading the present i n t o the past, but simply using observation t o 
indicate f r u i t f u l areas of inquiry i n purely h i s t o r i c a l investigations. 
Throughout these studies, the Patriarchal Theory proved invaluable 
as a t o o l of analysis; f o r the various societies of the Aryan race seemed 
to e x h i b i t a common patriarchal structure. But Maine's object i n these 
studies must not be Msconstrued; he was not simply postulating a hypothesis 
and then seeking t o t e s t his theory. To suggest, as J.H. Morgan does i n 
his introduction t o Ancignt_Lajii^that an atteippt t o substantiate the P a t r i -
archal Theory was "the central feature of Maine's speculations" and that 
even "the topics of the other chapters are largely selected with a vievf t o 
supplying confirmation of the theory"5^ i s quite misleading. Not only does 
t h i s c o n f l i c t w i t h Maine's professed i n t e n t , but since the chapters on Con-
t r a c t , Delict and Crime have l i t t l e concern with supporting that theory, 
there seems t o be no apparent reason f o r Maine to have dealt with them. 
Morgan himself recognised t h i s deficiency i n his in t e r p r e t a t i o n , when he 
confessed t h a t "the chapter on Contract, although i t contains some of Maine's 
most suggestive w r i t i n g , and the chapter on Delict and Crime, have a less 
d i r e c t bearing on the main thesis. . ."^ Contrary to Morgan's position 
that the chapter topics were determined by the need to v e r i f y the Patriarchal 
Theory, i t would seem highly l i k e l y that they would have been j u s t the same 
without t h i s programme. I f Maine was t o determine the nature of primitive 
-99-
concepts of lav/, then, quite obviously, he had to examine each of the 
major branches of law i n t u r n , and t h i s alone accounts for the form 
which his book displays. But t h i s i s not to suggest that the Patriarchal 
Theoiy did not provide Maine vdth his basic framework of analysis. Per-
haps an analogy regarding the nature of ploughing v a i l c l a r i f y t h i s im-
portant point. The object of ploughing i s to prepare the earth f o r c u l -
t i v a t i o n , i t i s not an attempt, i n normal circumstances, t o demonstrate 
the q u a l i t y of the plough i t s e l f . But, cl e a r l y , the fact that the object 
i s not t o 'prove' the plough i n no way detracts from i t s importance, pro-
vided i t performs i t s function adequately. I f i t does the job v/ell, then 
one might conclude that i t i s a good plough; but t h i s v;ould be determined 
solely by i t s u t i l i t y i n securing ones real purpose; So with the P a t r i -
archal Theory, i t vras fundamental t o Maine's task of re l a t i n g primitive 
and modern ideas. Because i t was able to so explain phenomena, i t was i n 
a vfay confirmed, but t h i s was almost coincidental to liaine's major purpose. 
THE ORIGIN, CHARACTER AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIETT 
A f u l l understanding of the Patriarchal Theory may best be secured 
by discussing i t w i t h i n three broad categories: f i r s t l y , as an account of 
the o r i g i n of c i v i l society; secondly,i..as an explanation of the character 
of p r i m i t i v e or very ancient social order; and t h i r d l y , as an illumination 
of the process of gradvial dissolution vihich some primitive societies have 
undergone. 
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I n Ancient Law Maine was primarily concerned w i t h the second 
function of the Patriarchal Theory, namely, as an instrument f o r under-
standing the early i n s t i t u t i o n s of man i n society. As he said i n Early 
Law and Custom, " I t was not part of my object to determine the absolute 
o r i g i n of society."7 But, he did suggest that the evidence seemed to show 
that the most ra t i o n a l account of the o r i g i n of society was to assume that 
the family, instead of fragmenting when the children became old enough t o 
form separate groups of t h e i r own, which i s the practice i n the modern 
world, held together and expanded i n t o a larger kinship association. To 
which he added: 
. . . i f we consider the weight of the argument and 
evidence t o be i n favour of the commencement of hu-
man society i n Patriarchal (or Cyclopean) families, 
we shall think i t hot incredible but highly probable 
that certain" communities which have survived to hisr?.' 
t o r i c a l times have grown Without interruption out of 
t h e i r o r i g i n a l condition. "In most of the Greek ' 
states aihd i n Rome," I wrote i n Ancient Law (128), 
"there long remained the vestiges of an ascending ser-
ies of groups out of which the State was at f i r s t con-
s t i t u t e d . The Family, House, and Tribe of the Romans 
may be taken as the type of them, and t h ^ are so de-
scribed t o us that wia can scarcely help conceiving them 
as ai series of concentric circles which have expanded 
from the same point. The elementary group i s the Fajnily, 
"connected" by common subjection t o the highest male 
ascendant. The aggregation of Families form's the Gens 
or House. The aggregation of Houses makesLthe'Tribe. 
The aggregation of Tribes constitutes the Commonwealth."^ 
Although Maine f e l t that kinship could, i n t h i s way, be seen as 
the prime mover i n the formation of society, he recognised that i n Ancient 
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Law the theory had been l e f t incomplete. Indeed, i t was the fundamental 
question which remained unanswered, the question as to ". . . what were 
the motives which o r i g i n a l l y prompted men to hold together i n the family 
union?" But to such a question Maine believed "Jurisprudence, unassisted 
by other sciences, i s not competent to give a reply."9 Clearly t h i s l e f t 
the thesis i n a somewhat unsatisfactory position. But i n a l a t e r work 
(Early Law and Custom), Maine was able t o realize his anticipation of help 
from the other sciences. To resolve the problem, he called upon the sup-
port of "the greatest name i n the science of our day" namely that of 
Charles Darwin. His investigations, Maine observed, had led him to adopt 
a view of eai?ly man indistinguishable from the patriarchal model. Not only 
did Darwin suggest that promiscuous intercourse, i n a state of nature was 
"extremely improbable" and " . . . that primeval men aboriginally l i v e d i n 
small communities, each with as many wives as he could support or obtain,"10 
but he added that certain psychological drives could account fo r the cohesion 
of the family u n i t . The major i n s t i n c t s involved v;ere those common t o the 
higher animals: sexual jealousy, and the basic expression of paternal care. 
Similar conclusions had been achieved by continental enquirers in t o early 
society, p a r t i c u l a r l y Letourneau and Le Bon, both of whom had the advantage 
of b i o l o g i c a l t r a i n i n g . Consequently, Maine f e l t a certain j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
i n claiming that " . . . sexual jealousy indulged through power might serve 
as a d e f i n i t i o n of the Patriarchal Family."^^ These psychological forces 
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then, are at the foundation of man's entry i n t o c i v i l society; but, 
once the association had gained any recognition, they were reinforced 
by, law, custom and r e l i g i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y that of ancestor-worship. 
Nevertheless, the Patriarchal Theory held no monopoly i n 
accounting f o r the o r i g i n of c i v i l society. Ever since i t s restate-
ment by Maine i n 1861, i t had been subjected t o heavy c r i t i c i s m by 
two other pioneer anthropologists Morgan and McLennan. These two 
wr i t e r s offered theories, a l b e i t c o n f l i c t i n g ones, based on the matri-
archal model. These explanations had been prompted by the study of 
contemporary savage communities i n North America and Australia. Their 
acco\ints of the formulation of society completely revised the picture 
presented by Maine. They believed that o r i g i n a l l y primitive man had 
been associated i n unorganised promiscuous hordes, from which, after a 
series of developmental stages, the patriarchal family emerged. This 
clash between the two systems, regarding the formation of society, was 
fundamental and had repercussions on the appreciation of early society 
i t s e l f . 
To refute the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Maine's thesis, Morgan and 
McLennan produced material f o r which the Patriarchal Theory f a i l e d t o 
account. There c e r t a i n l y was some archeological evidence and patterns 
of social organisation among pr i m i t i v e man, regarding irtiich Maine sug-
gested i t would be gratuitous t o assume that they had ever experienced 
a period of patriarchal organisation. But t h i s did not mean that he was 
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prepared to relinquish his theory i n favour of those of his r i v a l s , he 
was simply recognising i t s l i m i t a t i o n s . I n actual f a c t , the c o n f l i c t 
between the patriarchal and i t s r i v a l thesis was, to some degree, unreal. 
Maine, at l e a s t , had l i m i t e d his explanation to a particular group, the 
Indo-European c i v i l i s a t i o n , whilst Morgan and McLennan were making over-
confident generalisations from t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t races. The c o n f l i c t , 
then, resulted from the false position i n which the matriarchal theorists 
had placed themselves. As Maine said: 
. . . while the Patriarchal Theory and the counter-
theoiy of which I have been speaking each explain 
reasonably w e l l a certain number of ancient social 
phenomena, both are open to considerable objection 
as universal theories of the genesis of society.12 
Now i n attempting t o demonstrate the respective merits and de-
merits of the patriarchal and matriarchal theories, Maine drew together 
a l l the s i g n i f i c a n t points of discussion, providing important insights into 
his understanding of the cohesive factors i n the family structure. The 
f i r s t point which he stressed was that the patriarchal family was based 
on the concept of power - the notion of the strong man. Indeed, strength 
alone, obviously an important factor i n savage society, was recognised as 
the foundation of kinship r e l a t i o n s . Adopted members, sometimes not even 
of the same race or r e l i g i o n , were absorbed i n t o the family as blood re-
l a t i o n s , and became t o t a l l y indistinguishable from true k i n , sharing a l l 
t h e i r privileges and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , even the assumption of a common 
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ancestor. Maine was able to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s procedure from his experi-
ences i n India where kinship was s t i l l formed by merely subjecting oneself 
t o the head of a family, 
Maine's second claim was that the Patriarchal Theory, as we have 
seen, recognised the importance of sexual jealousy as a cohesive element 
i n family relations. This, together with the t h i r d factor of the paternal 
i n s t i n c t , not only suggested that the family structure would be moreMikely 
t o emerge than that of the horde, but also determined that i t would probably 
take the r i g i d , complex patriarchal structure, rather than i t s looser modern 
form. 
He believed that these three forces, so fundamental to man's 
nature, although completely neglected i n the work of Morgan and McLennan, 
were able t o account f o r more than the o r i g i n of society. They also ex-
plained why those communities, vdiich had lapsed under abnormal circumstances 
from the patriarchal system, were able t o recover t h e i r o r i g i n a l structure. 
Refusing to become embroiled i n the great controversy between 
Morgan and McLennan regarding the various stages through which society had 
passed when moving from a matriarchal to a patriarchal structure, Maine 
cautiously observed that: 
. . . there i s nothing i n the recorded history of 
society t o j u s t i f y the b e l i e f t h a t , during that vast 
chapter of i t s growth which i s wholly unwritten, the 
same transformations of social constitution succeeded 
one another everywhere, uniformly I f not simultane-
ously. A strong force l y i n g deep i n human nature and 
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never at re s t , might no doubt i n the long run produce 
an uniform r e s u l t , i n ' s p i t e of the vast varieties of 
of circumstance accompanying" the stern struggle f o r 
existence, but i t i s i n the highest degree incredible 
that the" action of t h i s force would be uniform from 
beginning t o end.l3 
Not only does t h i s indicate why Maine refused to take issue -with his 
opponents on t h i s point, i t throws l i g h t upon the character of his own 
argument. I t emphasizes that he regarded consonance with the evidence 
t o be of prime importance i n making generalisations; and that w i t h i n a 
movement, achievement of i d e n t i c a l goals did not necessarily mean i d e n t i -
cal evolution. As he was to show, the role of imit a t i o n was of some 
moment i n t h i s context. Maine concluded, then, that whilst not purporting 
t o give an account of a l l societies, the Patriarchal Theory offered a more 
coherent explanation of Indo-European evidence regarding the formation of 
society than did the l a t e r matriarchal expositions. 
But although the function of explaining how society must have 
been formed was of great significance, since i t influenced the structure 
of early c i v i l i s a t i o n , Maine's pr i n c i p a l concern was t o concentrate almost 
exclusively on comprehending the nature of early communities themselves. 
Here, the realm of conjecture had been l e f t behind, and evidence abounded 
f o r making generalisations regarding the 'history of the i n s t i t u t i o n s of 
c i v i l i s e d men'. 
The larger p o l i t i c a l units of the t r i b e and the nation were 
o r i g i n a l l y extensions of the patriarchal family. When a specific geo-
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graphic area was permanently s e t t l e d , however, the kinship basis of 
association tended to be replaced by the concept of ' t e r r i t o r i a l sov-
ereignty' . This was the idea that membership of society was determined 
by man's relationship t o a particular land and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s rather 
than t o i t s inhabitants. But even so, the patriarchal family, and the 
larger aggregation, the v i l l a g e community, retained t h e i r i d e n t i t y and 
in^ortance i n society. He i l l u s t r a t e d the movement using the terms of 
an ancient Indian poetess i n the following way: 
The poetess - f o r the lines are attributed t o a 
woman - compares the invasion t o the flowing of 
the ju i c e of the'sugar-cane over a f l a t surface. 
('Mirasi Papers', p. 233) The juice c r y s t a l -
l i s e s , and"the crystals are the various v i l l a g e 
communities.^* 
Thus, vihether i n i t s f u l l y developed form of the kinship t r i b e , or even 
at the l a t e r stage of a society based on land ownership, the family unit 
provided the foundation of social a c t i v i t y i n a l l i t s aspects. 
Describing the patriarchal family, Maine wrote: 
The eldest male parent - the eldest ascendant i s 
absolutely supreme i n his household. His dominion 
extends to l i f e and death, arid i s as unqualified 
over his children and t h e i r houses as over his 
slaves; indeed the relations of sonship and serf-
dom appear to "differ i n l i t t l e beyond the higher 
capacity which the c h i l d i n blood possesses of 
becoming one day the head of the family himself. 
The flocks and herds of'the children are the flocks 
and herds of the father, and the possessions of the 
parent, which he holds i n a representative rather 
than a proprietary character, are equally divided 
at his death among his descendants i n the f i r s t 
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degree, the eldest son sometimes receiving a double 
share under the name of b i r t h r i g h t , but more gen-
e r a l l y endowed with no'hereditary advantage beyond 
an honorary precedence.^5 
I n t h i s t i g h t l y drawn, despotic, family u n i t , the i n d i v i d u a l , 
the foundation of modern society, was luiknown. Each person possessed 
his i d e n t i t y as part of the family group. Recognising t h i s f a c t , Maine 
stressed t h a t : "ilfe must be prepared to f i n d i n ancient law a l l the con-
sequences of t h i s difference. "-^ ^ 
On a general plane, the structure of early law could easily be 
accounted f o r on the patriarchal model. The main function of law was seen 
as regulating the relations among the various family groups i n society. 
This explains two points. I n the f i r s t place, why certain areas of prim-
i t i v e law are so poorly covered, f o r example, the Law of Persons. The 
subjects dealt with i n t h i s branch of law were treated as purely family 
matters and consequently the a^le concern of the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the eldest 
male ascendant. Public law had no place w i t h i n t h i s domain. I n the second 
place, i t accounts for the great d e t a i l and complexity of such areas of 
law which were dealt with i n early l e g a l practices since, i n e f f e c t , law 
was organising the relationships of sovereign communities. Just as with 
modern International Law, p r i m i t i v e law recognised the sanctity of the 
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of i t s constituent, legal u n i t s , whilst providing a l l the 
ceremony and niceties required i n transactions between such sovereign bodies. 
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'The patriarchal structure of society, then, determined the characltter of 
almost a l l the branches of early law. Because Maine had secured t h i s 
key t o le g a l understanding, his account opened the door to an in t e r p r e t -
ation r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from those thinkers who had conceived primitive 
law i n terms of the i n d i v i d u a l . Clearly, i t would be inappropriate and 
unrewarding simply t o re i t e r a t e a l l the ramifications of Maine's d i s -
coveries, but the major points must be noted. 
Perhaps one of the most si g n i f i c a n t features of patriarchal 
society y/as the nature of property ownership. Property vfas not held 
severally, but i n common by the whole family. This primitive communism 
extended not only to landed property, ;Yhich was both cultivated and en-
joyed communally; but also to the particular contributions of individual 
members of the family, special s k i l l s , gratuitous discoveries and plunder. 
A l l were shared, there was no idea of exclusive individual possession. 
Even the patriarch's ownership of the family irealth was of a representative 
rather than a personal form. 
This communal ownership of possessions placed obstacles i n the 
path of property transference; hence, the aLmost complete absence of a 
law of conveyance or contract. Transactions were d i f f i c u l t and highly 
complicated, not merely because they involved complex structures l i k e 
sovereign states, but because the wishes of a l l the co-owners had to be 
respected. I n some instances, certain portions of the family property 
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were completely inalienable i n that they formed part of the essential 
assets of that community and i t s descendants. 
The absence of testamentary succession from ancient law was 
also a result of communal ownership. As property belonged t o the family, 
which could be considered as f a r as the law was involved as a metaphy-
s i c a l e n t i t y , the death of one of the members, even the patriarch, was 
of no'consequence t o the legal position of the property. Maine suggested, 
i n e f f e c t , that the family bore the same r e l a t i o n to i t s members as did 
a company t o i t s directors, and j u s t i n the same way that the death of the 
con^)any chairman had no repercussions upon the assets held by the corpor-
a t i o n , neither did the death of the patriarch have any leg a l significance. 
I n both cases, a n&it head was selected who assumed a l l the responsibilities 
of that position and was l e g a l l y indistinguishable from i t s former occupant. 
I t followed from the fact that the 'family' owned the property, that no 
concept of determining the d i s t r i b u t i o n of possessions after death could 
be conceived, since no physical person owned any wealth. 
I t has already been remarked upon that o r i g i n a l l y , the remaining 
major branch of c i v i l law, the Law of Persons, was i l l - d e f i n e d . I t event-
u a l l y emerged wi t h the disintergration of the patriarchal structure, but 
not without the features as to i t s o r i g i n remaining vdth i t . Maine was of 
the opinion that ". . .the Family, as held together by the Patria Potestas, 
i s the nidus out of which the entire Law of Persons has germinated. 
nl7 
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Public law simply assumed the functions which had i n the past been 
performed by the patriarch. 
The major branches of lau have now been correlated with the 
pa t r i a r c h a l structure of society, but Maine's own summary of the con-
nexion i s worthy of note. 
I t should be recollected that the comparative 
barreness of c i v i l law i n archaic collections 
i s consistent with those other characteristics 
of ancient jurisprudence which have been d i s -
cussed i n t h i s t r e a t i s e . Nine-tenths of the 
c i v i l part of the law practiced by c i v i l i s e d 
societies are made up of the Law of Persons, of 
the Law of Property and of Inheritance, and of 
the Law of Contract. But i t i s p l a i n that a l l 
these provinces of jurisprudence must shrink 
w i t h i n narrower boundaries, the nearer we make 
our approaches t o the infancy of social brother-
hood. The. Law of Persons, which i s nothing else 
than the Law of Status, w i l l be r e s t r i c t e d to the 
scantiest l i m i t s as long as forms of status are 
merged i n common subjection to Paternal Power, 
as long as the Wife has no rights against her 
Husband, the son none against his Father, and the 
infant Ward none .against the Agnates v^ ho are his 
Guardians. Sim i l a r l y , the rules r e l a t i n g to Pro-
perty and Succession can never be p l e n t i f u l , "so -
long as land and goods devolve w i t h i n the family, 
and, i f d i s t r i b u t e d at a l l , are distributed inside 
i t s c i r c l e . But the greatest gap i n ancient c i v i l 
law w i l l alvj-ays be caused by the absense of Con-
t r a c t , which some archaic codes do not mention at 
a l l , v/hile others s i g n i f i c a n t l y attest the immatur-
i t y of the moral notions on which Contracts depend 
by supplying i t s place with an elaborate j u r i s p r u -
dence of Oaths.^° 
The recognition of the patriarchal structure of early soceity was para-
mount t o any coherent picture of man's e a r l i e r social condition, with i t s 
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various i n s t i t u t i o n s , customs, lav/s, ideas and beliefs. ..And so, only 
by securing a complete representation cf t h i s early organisation could 
Maine perfect his h i s t o r i c a l understanding of law. 
This brings us t o the t h i r d aspect of Maine's study of the 
Patriarchal Theory, namely the gradual dissolution of the f araily i n 
western society. This i s usually regarded as his theory of social evol-
u t i o n . Perhaps the best way of appreciating the movement i s t o compare 
Maine's picture of p r i m i t i v e society v;ith his understanding of the con-
temporary world; thus throwing the contrast i n t o sharp r e l i e f , and enabling 
the connection between them t o be given greater significance. 
The chief characteristics of primitive society have already been 
outlined, and so I t remains t o describe those of the society vhich replaced 
i t . Maine's most immediate impression of western progressive societies was 
that of t h e i r immense complexity. Specialization seemed t o be the order 
of the day, producing, i n the f i e l d of knowledge, not merely extensions of 
old branches of learning, but completely new spheres of investigation. I n 
other words, Maine saw that the major feature of the modern world vras pro-
greas: progress i n the sense of the continuing production of new ideas, 
which could be absorbed i n t o the permanent i n s t i t u t i o n s of society, i n par-
t i c u l a r i n t o i t s legal structure. This process accounted f o r the complex 
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development of law, with i t s seemingly ever-increasing number of branches. 
At the centre of these changes, Maine saw the phenomenon of the individual. 
A l l aspects of the modern world were orientated txDfwards him i n the same way 
that p r i m i t i v e society had been structured around the basic u n i t of the 
family. 
The apparent contrast,then, between the contemporary and the primr 
i t i v e conditions of man, with his lack of specialized knoivledge and the pat-
r i a r c h a l structure of his society, was very great. Consequently, the i n t e r -
mediary period during which the change from one to the other had occurred 
was of immense interest. Maine believed that the two conditions were con-
nected by a r a t i o n a l process of development. As he said: 
Our studies i n the Law of Persons seemed to show us 
the Family eaqxanding i n t o the Agnatic group of kins-
men, then the Agnatic group dissolving in t o the separ-
ate households; l a s t l y , the household supplanted by 
the i n d i v i d u a l . . .^ 9 
He f u r t h e r believed that: 
. . . the old order changes, yielding place t o the 
new, but the new does not v;holly consist of positive 
additions to the old: much of i t i s merely the old 
very s l i g h t l y modified, very s l i g h t l y displaced, and 
veiy s u p e r f i c i a l l y combined. That we have received 
a great legacy of ideas and habits from the past, 
most of us are at least b l i n d l y conscious; but no por-
t i o n of the influences acting on our nature has been 
less c a r e f u l l y obseirved, and they have never been ex-
amined from a s c i e n t i f i c point of view.20 
The various factors involved i n the breakdown of the ancient family struc-
ture must be examined i n d e t a i l i f they are to give some imdication of why 
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the modem pattern of society emerged and superceded that of the prim-
i t i v e world. 
I n Hindoo society, i t has been suggested, ancestor-worship 
arrested t h e i r movement towards a modern type of social l i f e . Origin-
a l l y , the obsequies to the deceased patriarch had to be performed by 
the eldest surviving male. The new head of the family, i t was believed, 
had special l i n k s with the family ancestors; and consequently, great 
lengths were taken t o ensure that there would be a male heir to perform 
the family r i t e s . These r i t e s were fundamental to the survival of the 
old order. The great change i n the role of ancestor-worship was the 
result of the intervention of the religious caste of the Brahmins. They 
frowned upon many of the means used t o secure male issue and so they 
couraged the principle of allowing coagnate relatives to perform the family 
r i t u a l s . A.certain degree of se l f - i n t e r e s t can be seen i n the Brahmins' 
policy as i t produced a breakdown i n the organisation of j o i n t families. 
Since various religious ceremonies had t o be performed i n every household, 
the income of the Brahmins rose proportionally v/ith the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of 
separate family u n i t s . But the important point i s that by allovdng coag-
Mktes to succeed, the Brahmins had taken ancestor-worship and transformed 
i t from an instrument of social s t a b i l i t y to one of change. Various other 
factors, however, prevented Hindoo society from moving very f a r i n t h i s 
d i r e c t i o n . 
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I n Roman society, the real departure from t r a d i t i o n a l family 
relationships was not the result of religious doctrine, nor of a capri-
cious use of the r i g h t s of testat i o n : i t followed from the demands of 
war. The separation of parts of the family over long periods of time 
seriously weakened the patriarchal t i e s . This was further encouraged 
by the Roman Emperor securing the :rewards of war to the soldiers them-
selves rather than compelling them to contribute i t to the general wealth 
of the family. I t was thus one of the side effects of imperial aspirations 
which led to the transformation of Roman c i v i l i s a t i o n . The fortunes of 
war i n i t i a t e d a new period i n which the old forms and i n s t i t u t i o n s were 
replaced by the new. 
Once the process of family breakdown had begun, however, i t 
gathered momentum, not simply from i t s om ixi^etus, but from extraneous 
forces. The most important of which was the influence of Natural Law. 
As Maine said, i t s acceptance created a new epoch i n the history of ideas. 
With the ideals of s i m p l i c i t y and harmony, the complex formulae, appro-
pri a t e t o the patriarchal system, were f i n a l l y swept away, and the individual 
allowed t o emerge. 
These two factors, although not the o r i g i n a l cause of social 
development, cert a i n l y accounted f o r i t s acceleration. The individual 
was continually concerned with breaking down the remaining ascriptive 
t i e s , and the lawyers with the pursuit of t h e i r goal of c l a r i t y . There 
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was a continual interplay between society and new ideas. Each stimulated 
the other, resulting i n d i s t i n c t movements towards a more sophisticated 
and specialized world. Referring to law i n p a r t i c u l a r , Maine said: 
I t may here by observed that we know enough of 
ancient Roman law to give some idea of the mode 
of transformation followed by lega l conceptions 
and legal phraseology i n the infancy of j u r i s p r u -
dence. The change which they undergo appears to 
be a change from the general to the special; or, 
as we might othervdse express i t , the ancient 
terms are subjected to a process of gradual special-
i s a t i o n . ^ 1 
But t h i s movement from the general to the particular was not confined 
either t o Roman law or even Roman society. I t was a process experienced 
by a l l 'progressive.' c i v i l i s a t i o n s . Characterising human relationships 
i n the modern world as essentially contractual and those of the ancient 
as determined by status, Maine was able t o arrive at his ffamous maxim 
regarding the development of society, that i s ". -. . the movement hitherto 
22 
has been a movement from Status to Contract." 
This form of social change was not, as we shall see, considered 
by Maine to be i n any v/ay a necessary condition of society. Indeed, he 
remarked on a number of occasions that 'progress', which was the usual 
appellation applied t o t h i s particular type of development, was something 
of an anomiBiLy. I n Ancient Law, for example, he noted: 
I t i s only with the progressive ^ s o c i e t i e s _ 7 that 
we are concerned, and nothing i s more remarkable 
than t h e i r extreme fewness. . . I t i s indisputable 
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that much the greatest part of mankind has never 
shown a p a r t i c l e of desire that i t s c i v i l i n s t i -
tutions should be improved since the moment when 
external completeness was f i r s t given to them by 
t h e i r embodiment i n some permanent record. 
Stationariness, or change w i t h i n narrowly circumscribed l i m i t s , can thus 
be considered the normal condition of c i v i l i s a t i o n . But, and t h i s i s Maine's 
point, i f a society ever escaped from the straight-jacket of paternalism, 
i t s development would proceed along the status t o contract axis. 
As there was only one path of social evolution, i t was possible 
fo r a society to gain guidance from the experiences of fellow t r a v e l l e r s . 
I n t h i s respect, Maine held Sir Alfred Lyall's discussion of the imitative 
process to be of great significance, ^y supplementing i t s ovm in t e r n a l 
impetus towards improvement, with ideas dravm from more advanced cultures, 
i t was possible f o r society to aviod any unnecessary detours i n i t s process 
of development. But the employment of i m i t a t i o n , Maine believed, was not 
necessarily conscious. I t occurred whenever 'modern' and 'primitive' c i v i l i - -
sations came int o contact. Witness the adoption of the English legal system 
i n India: t h i s was not an e x p l i c i t feature of B r i t i s h policy. I n attempt-
ing t o administer native Indian law e f f i c i e n t l y , English ideas were gradu-
a l l y assimilated, resulting i n a t o t a l transformation of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
codes. Maine considered that the imitative faculty held v i t a l consequences 
fo r social theory. 
The important lesson l i s that i n sociological i n v e s t i -
gation i t i s never possible t o discover more than the 
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way i n which the Type has been formed. I f . an 
i n s t i t u t i o n i s once successful, i t extends i t -
s e l f through the im i t a t i v e faculty, which i s 
stronger i n barbarous than i n c i v i l i s e d man. 
I t follows from t h i s that no universal theory, 
attempting t o account f o r a l l social forms by 
supposing an evolution from w i t h i n , can possibly 
be true.24 
Within the evolution of modern c i v i l i s a t i o n then, there was 
scope f o r v a r i a t i o n w i t h i n the patterns of advancement. There were no 
necessary stages for each and a l l societies. The character of an epoch 
was determined by the pa r t i c u l a r circumstances i n which a society found 
i t s e l f . These would be conditions created both by i n t e r n a l and external 
forces. The only categorical statement which Maine was prepared t o make 
was t h a t , l i k e the stages of early law, the epochs i n the movement from 
Status to Contract, although they might be omitted, could never be i n a 
d i f f e r e n t order. The movement vras always towards greater complexity. 
The progress of society as a whole was intimately linked with 
the character of i t s c i t i z e n s ; upon them alone rested the question of 
greater development, stagnation, or the •return t o some kind of primitivism. 
Involvement i n social change was required i f the demands of new circumstances 
were t o be accommodated. Progress had no 'der Gang der Sache selbst', i t 
was solely the creation of man's modification of the i n s t i t u t i o n s of society 
f o r what he conceived to be the better i n the l i g h t of current requirements. 
Ever present i n advanced communities, hovfever, was the p o s s i b i l i t y that the 
knife edge upon which they rested could, were too great a weight allowed to 
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f a l l upon i t , cut away the very foundations of c i v i l i s a t i o n . This danger 
Maine considered to be at i t s greatest i n the most sophisticated societies. 
Here there were no precedents f o r guidance; progress resulted solely from 
the recognition of f e l t needs. The s i t u a t i o n was aggravated by the tempt-
ation t o substitute f o r the concrete exemplars of advanced society some \ 
p r i o r i p r i n c i p l e or model utopia. This could prove disastrous. The i m i -
t a t i o n of the modern by the pri m i t i v e society was j u s t i f i e d because of the 
unil i n e a r character of progress. I t was impossible, however, to predict 
the nature of future development. Progress for the pioneers of advanced 
c i v i l i s a t i o n must be confined solely t o the technique of social introspection. 
Maine, then, was able to present a new understanding of society 
by employing the patriarchal model i n these three d i s t i n c t though clea r l y 
related ways: f i r s t l y , as an explanation of the o r i g i n of society; secondly, 
as a description of the natiu-e of early social organisation; and t h i r d l y , 
as the framework w i t h i n which the emergence of modern society could be traced. 
He was thus able to provide new and more acceptable solutions to the questions 
which his attack on Natural Law had revived. 
R E F E R E N C E S 
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C H A P T E R F O U R 
CHAPTER FOUR 
M A X N E AffD C O N S E R V A T I S M 
THE CHARACTER OF CONSERVATISU 
Maine's political'thought has usually been placed i n the 
orthodox conservative t r a d i t i o n deriving from Edmund Burke. This 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n has recently been reaffirmed by tvio eminent American 
commentators on conservative thought. Professors Peter Viereck and 
Russell Kirk. Viereck, indeed, suggests that Maine did l i t t l e more 
than organise Burke's ideas. 
No consistent philosopher. Burke l e f t the system^ 
at i z i n g of his ideas t o disciples of more t a l e n t , 
less genius, notably Sir'Henry Maine, Maine's 
Popular Grovernment, 1885, systematized the Burkean 
approach i n t o a'consistent philosophy, gave i t a 
scholarly basis, and applied i t t o the post-Burkean 
problems of modern industrialism.! 
i^^ithout being quite as precise as Viereck, Kirk places Maine f i r m l y 
i n the centre stream of conservative thought, by including him i n his 
work The ConsH-rvat.iv^ ^JinA^which he said was . .an analysis of 
thinkers i n the l i n e of Burke. 
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Kirk intended to keep w i t h i n the t i g h t confines of t h i s 
f i e l d by refusing t o deal vdth Arnold, Morley and Bryce; f o r , a l -
though they were disciples of Burke, they were not what he called 
"regular conservatiyes". Maine's place i n the f i e l d was safely se-
cured, hovrever, by his "intensely conservatiye"^ book Popular Govern-
ment. 
Assuming on these authorities that Maine vras a Burkean con-
servative, i t i s necessary that the character of t h i s style of thought 
be i d e n t i f i e d . At the very outset, however, conservatism must be d i f -
ferentiated from a quite d i f f e r e n t s,fcyle,.but one with which i t has 
often been confused, namely, the doctrine of reaction or counter revol-
u t i o n . A f a i l u r e t o draw t h i s contrast clea r l y enough led Viereck to 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n unnecessary 'ducks and drakes' ivith p o l i t i c a l teiminology. 
He recognised the vast difference betvreen the constitutional, evolution-
ary thought of Burke and the authoritarian, counter-revolutionary theories 
of de Maistre and his followers. But instead of leaving them as two sep-
arate systems, conservative and reactionary, he brought them together 
under the single l a b e l of conservatism. To distinguish the two wings novf 
encompassed by the general term, i t was necessary to substitute f o r the 
former t i t l e s of conservative and reactionary, the words "Burkean" and 
" O t t a n t o t t i s t . " ^ This strange procedure xvould clearly have been j u s t i f i e d 
had i t enabled a clearer understanding of p o l i t i c s , but i t has created 
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confusion where ordinary usage would have been perfectly s t r a i g h t -
forward. Furthermore, by c a l l i n g a l l true conservatives "Burkeans", 
Viereck has used a labe l which rests uneasily upon many. Conser-
vatism was not simply a series of 'grandiose compositions' inspired 
by Burke's fi n e c o l l e c t i o n of f o l k melodies, i t also contained many 
tunes f o r which he had no musical ear. 
The f a i l u r e t o understand the difference between the con-
servative and the reactionary, then, leads t o confusion. But what 
the r e a l difference i s has yet t o be stated e x p l i c i t l y : i t l i e s i n 
t h e i r respective attitudes t o p o l i t i c a l change. The conservative 
notion of change, however, not only distinguishes him from the reaction-
ary, but from men of every other p o l i t i c a l hue. I t i s one of the two 
basic characteristics of the conservative s t y l e . 
Unlike the reactionary, the conservative has come to terms 
w i t h inevitable change i n society. Change i s seen as the A r i s t o t e l i a n 
actualization of immanent p o t e n t i a l i t y . I t i s the idea of an unfolding, 
the r e a l i z a t i o n of the intimated. There can be no arrest of such a 
process, and even less a return to a l o s t golden age i n the r e a l or im-
aginary past. I t i s not a particular form of social origanisation that 
the conservative wishes to r e t a i n , i t i s continuity w i t h i n social devel-
opment he seeks t o preserve. 
I n normal circumstances attending the needs of society results 
i n a very slov/ process of change, but i n conditions of emergency, a 
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conservative may wel l seize the i n i t i a t i v e and act quite ra d i c a l l y to 
preserve the social f a b r i c . This a c t i v i t y i s quite i n harmony with 
the notion that change i s not introduced on p r i n c i p l e , but i n response 
t o concrete situations. The a b i l i t y to determine when t o act i s i n -
communicable, i t can only be discerned by one intimately familiar with 
the t r a d i t i o n and customs of the comiminity. This idea underscores the 
second conservative characteristic, namely, the defence of an a r i s t o -
cracy s k i l l e d i n the ar t of r u l i n g . 
The essential requirement f o r governing society, even i n 
normal circurnstances, was not a s c i e n t i f i c technique or plan, but p o l i t i c a l 
wisdom. P o l i t i c s i s an a r t , not a science, and those capable of p a r t i c -
i p a t i o n form a remarkably small proportion of the population. To pre-
serve the influence of the genuine.politician i n 19th century mass society, 
i t was necessary to maintain the Parliamentary system of government, i n -
cluding the v i t a l l y important House of Lords. 
The support of aristocracy i s fundamental to conservatism. As 
Dr. Gertrude Himmelfarb has pointed out; 
I f there i s any one point, one single empirical 
t e s t , by which conservatism can be distinguished 
from l i b e r a l i s m , i t i s a respect f o r aristocracy 
and a r i s t o c r a t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s . Every tenet of 
libe r a l i s m repudiates the idea of a fixed a r i s t o -
cracy; every tenet of conservatism affirms i t . 5 
Although t h i s ignores the importance of the atti t u d e toviards 
p o l i t i c a l change, i t does highlight the regard f o r an ari s t o c r a t i c group. 
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The form which t h i s takes varies w i t h i n the conservative t r a d i t i o n 
from the support of the existing power structure t o recommending some-
thing l i k e an aristocracy of the talents. I t was an i n c l i n a t i o n t o 
remove the actual exercise of sovereign poorer from the hands of the 
people t o those i n possession of p o l i t i c a l wisdom - men mindful of the 
human predicament and the l i m i t e d u t i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l action. 
The concepts of A r i s t o t e l i a n change and support of aristocracy, 
two i n e x t r i c a b l y linked ideas, are thus the two salient features which 
characterise the patchwork of conservative thought. Conservatism i s , 
however, as R.J. White suggests, 
. . . less a p o l i t i c a l doctrine than a habit 
of mind, a mode of f e e l i n g , a way of l i v i n g , 
and that the force holding the whole structure together i s , 
. . . not so much a body of i n t e l l e c t u a l l y form-
ulated principles as a number of i n s t i n c t s , and 
the governing i n s t i n c t i s the i n s t i n c t of enjoy-
ment, o 
The importance of t h i s i n s t i n c t f o r the p o l i t i c a l aspect of conservatism 
i s t h a t i t relegates p o l i t i c s to a secondary le v e l of p r i o r i t i e s . 
Numerous examples of what has been called "natural conservatism" 
are capable of being given. A l l are distinguished by a dis t r u s t of the 
unknown f o r fear of losing one's own i d e n t i t y , and a decided preference f o r 
that.to'which..one i s accustomed and has worn int o a comfortable f i t t i n g . 
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This disp o s i t i o n , as one might expect, i s claimed as the foundation of 
orthodox p o l i t i c a l conservatism. As Lord Cecil said: 
The Conservatism of the Conservative Party, 
modern Conservatism, as we may say, i s of 
course largely recruited from and dependent 
on the natural conservatism that i s found i n 
almost every human mind.' 
Although no r i g i d dogma has been formulated from these d i s -
positions, conservative theory has remained remarkably consistent. Actual 
circumstances and the nature of t h e i r assailants have determined the form 
of the conservatives' defences, but \inderlying them has been a constant 
a t t i t u d e , an adherence t o a r t i c l e s of b e l i e f y/ith a consistency rare i n 
the history of p o l i t i c a l thought. 
QRTHQDQX CONSERVATISM 
I t w i l l be remembered that the characteristic style of con-
servative thought has already been described as Aris t o t e l i a n and a r i s t o -
c r a t i c . This i s true of conservatism, whether orthodox or sceptical. 
However, certain of the 'principles' now to be discussed, may or may not 
be held by a l l conservatives; but the neglect of the concepts of hier-
archy and continuity i n change invalidates the use of the conservative 
l a b e l altogether. This must be borne i n mind i n the following analysis 
of orthodox conservatism. 
That both Kirk and White begin t h e i r examination of Burkean 
principles w i t h the concern f o r r e l i g i o n i s not without significance. 
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For the orthodox conservative society i s governed by a divine Provi-
dence 'forging an eternal chain of r i g h t and duty which l i n k s great 
and obscure, l i v i n g and dead.'^ Maftis seen pr i j n a r i l y as a religious 
creature; p o l i t i c s , rather than being seen as an end s u f f i c i e n t i n i t -
s e l f , i s reduced merely to being a necessary means to a higher s p i r i t u a l 
end. I n t h i s way, p o l i t i c a l and religious-moral problems become, in d i s -
tinguishable i n essence. The theocratic implications of t h i s thinking, 
however, are checked, not only by a certain scepticism towards the ef-
ficacy of p o l i t i c a l or economic solutions t o man's predicament, but by 
a p a r t i c u l a r concept of morality. Morality was purely a condition of 
the soul, stemming from the moral free agency of the individual - a 
s p i r i t u a l voluntarism. This idea rests on a belief i n i n t r i n s i c value 
which can be contrasted with the extrinsic value defined by, say, J.S. 
M i l l i n his essay on Bentham. Here M i l l opposes the classical conser-
vative argument formulated by Coleridge,,claiming that morality has more 
to do wit h the calculation of the consequences of an action than with 
the motive of the agent. 
I n effect the l a t e 18th and 19th century conservative revived 
a Thomist concept of society. Government had a limited but v a l i d function 
i n society; man's r e a l goal, however, lay i n a higher cosmopological de-
sign. The benefits which government could provide were t o be enjoyed. 
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Choices i n government policy, however, lay not between good and bad, 
but between the least pernicious of the selection of e v i l alternatives. 
Caution, not ambition,must be man's keynote. To seek to create the City 
of God i n t h i s world would be to endanger that Providential heritage of 
law and order which alone could make earthly existence tolerable. A 
p r i o r i programmes of reform not only usurped the function of the Church 
i n the search f o r salvation, but by imposing r i g i d doctrines destroyed 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of ind i v i d u a l morality. Government was thus but a small 
l i n k i n the 'Great Chain of Being', a mere fragment of a properly ordered 
universe. 
The r e s t r i c t i o n of governmental competence to present the en-
croachment upon the moral free agency of the individual leads on t o a 
second 'princ i p l e ' , the organic concept of society. Society i s seen as 
something more than an aggregate of atomistic individuals, each merely a 
u n i t capable of experiencing pleasure and pain, whose only t i e was sub-
j e c t i o n to a common sovereign. Society was greater than the mere sum-
mation of i t s parts; i t was " . . . the product of a system of real re-
lationships between individuals, classes, groups and interests."9 I n 
such a society the function of governfflant was limited to maintaining 
social cohesion. The main orthodox position, although certain tendencies 
i n Burke's personality led him beyond these l i m i t s , was a nomocratic 
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standpoint. Providence was the proper instrument of change, statesmen 
had to perceive the re a l tendency of Providential social forces rather 
than to fabricate a r t i f i c i a l systems. 
This notion of perceiving the dire c t i o n of divine forces i n 
society suggests what might be considered as the t h i r d characteristic of 
conservatism, namely, the r e j e c t i o n of " w i l l " as the legi t i m i z a t i o n of 
law. Burke considered that Prudence was the proper soufce of inspiration 
f o r applying the general principles of Natural Law.^^ His was not a 
u t i l i t a r i a n idea, but the notion that the general principles of Natural 
Law must be i n sympathy with the divinely inspired laws and customs of 
the Constitution. I n the actual process of l e g i s l a t i o n , the conservative 
rarely makes e x p l i c i t appeals to the Natural Law, but by appealing t o 
custom and precedent he claims to be evoking the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d author-
i t y of previous deductions from those divine principles, and the older the 
precedent, the greater the certainty of i t s divine character. 
But, perhaps i t i s wrong t o isolate the giain points of Burkean 
conservatism. I t i s a 'wholeness' and can only be understood as such. 
"To put up Conservatism i n a b o t t l e with a label i s l i k e t r y i n g t o l i q u i f y 
the atmosphere. . ."^ I t may be ;possible, but i t loses a l l i t s true 
characteristics and " f e e l " . Thus, the dry skeleton of orthodox conser-
vative thought presented here, can only become meaningful i f the intan-
gible a t t i t u d e s , dispositions and feelings are borne i n mind. At the 
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same time, however, the orthodox conservatives concern with Divine 
Providence, Christian morality and organic order clearly distinguishes 
him from his sceptic and pragmatic brother vihose position i s outlined 
below. 
THE BACKGROUND OP MAINE'S POPULAR GOVERNMENT 
The,breadth and scope of Maine's work was, as FrederickPollock 
said, encyclopaedic. He dealt with history, jurisprudence, anthropology, 
sociology and even economics. And whilst his professional a c t i v i t y , 
apart from a b r i e f period i n the Indian Administration, was primarily 
concerned with academic study, i n his 'leisure' time Maine pursued his 
inte r e s t i n p o l i t i c s . This resulted i n a clandestine j o u r n a l i s t i c career 
wi t h his submitting, at various periods, a r t i c l e s t o a number of reviews. 
They included the "St. James Gazette", "The Saturday Review", and the 
"Quarterly Review". The four essays comprising Popular Governinent. Maine's 
only p o l i t i c a l t r e a t i s e , sprang from t h i s spare time preoccupation, t h e i r 
being published i n the "Quarterly Review" between A p r i l 1883 and A p r i l 
1885. 
The importance of t h i s information i s that i t helps to explain 
the l i m i t e d objectives of Popular Government and i t s somewhat polemical 
nature. To f e e l , l i k e Russell K i r k , disappointment that "Maine sometimes 
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seems more concerned with the p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s of democracy than 
with the roots of society,"-'^ i s to misconceive the nature of the 
work.**^ - Since the essays were o r i g i n a l l y revievf a r t i c l e s , they 
were concerned with immediate issues, not xvith any attanupt t o re-
state fundamentals. I t i s equally unwise t o build too much on t h i s 
j o u r n a l i s t i c a c t i v i t y of Maine. To claim, as G.A. Feaver does, that 
such a c t i v i t i e s are symptomatic of Maine's p o l i t i c a l alienation, of 
his "undemocratic", "dogmatic authoritarianism"!3 i s to read too much 
in t o them. 
Now although the general circumstances of 19th century-
p o l i t i c s have been outlined, t o understand Popular Government i t i s 
necessary to examine the immediate circumstances of the early 1880's. 
A number of events at t h i s time must have been rather alarming to a 
man of conservative tempersunent, not least of which v/as the a c t i v i t y 
of the new trade unions. G.D.H. Cole has said "The years from 1871 
onwards were f u l l e r of strikes than any period since the collapse of 
the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union of 1834."U 
* K i r k , i n t e r p r e t i n g Maine as ah orthodox Burkean, vrould probably 
have f e l t that Pojjular Government vias a disappointment even i f 
i t had not been the co l l e c t i o n of limited review a r t i c l e s that 
i t was. This i s because Maine did not derive his p o l i t i c a l ideas 
from the system of Burkean metaphysics that Kirk imagined. 
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No doubt the depression of 1879 aggravated the situation, 
but what perturbed Maine most was not economic dislocation, but the 
deeper ' p o l i t i c a l ' implications of trade unionism. The unions stim-
ulated the p o l i t i c a l aspirations of the masses, encouraged extra-par-
liamentaiy associations, and gave a lead to the organisation of working 
men. A number of such bodies had been established; the most dangerous 
of which, from Maine's point of view, had d i s t i n c t s o c i a l i s t leanings. 
/Imongst these organisations were the London Working Men's Association, 
founded i n 1866j the Parliamentary Committee of the T.U.C., founded i n 
1869; and the Labour Representative League, founded i n 1870. I f sach 
bodies were to exert a co n t r o l l i n g influence, then, Maine foresaw, not 
only the destruction of the t r a d i t i o n a l pattern of B r i t i s h Government, 
but of the English way of l i f e i t s e l f . 
The period 1868-1885 was d e f i n i t e l y one of t r a n s i t i o n i n 
B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s , a change from an era of "laissez-faire p o l i t i c s " t o 
one of "joint-stock p o l i t i c s " or, i n Beer's terminology, a move from 
"individualism" towards "collectivism,"-'-^ I t saw the dawn of the i l l u s i o n 
of mass pa r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c s , and the t w i l i g h t era of the individual 
and the aristocracy. 
The organisation of the masses was not the only disruptive 
element on the Victorian p o l i t i c a l scene. As Maine saw, the forces 
of nationalism and imperialism contained the seeds of future 
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convulsion. Already the dangers of these movements had been demon-
strated. The national aspirations of Ireland constituted a basic 
p o l i t i c a l problem, no less so, the expansionist policies of the Eur-
opean powers. 
Radicalism was another force of a destructive character. 
I t was t r u e , however, that i t s extreme wing, Republicanism, had been 
v i r t u a l l y eliminated by the disapprobation i n t o which i t f e l l a f t e r 
the attempted assassination of Queen Vi c t o r i a i n 1871. But, i n i t s 
less extreme but equally destructive form, i t was i n f i l t r a t i n g the 
Lib e r a l Party, and i n the figure of Joseph Chamberlain, had a feprer 
sentative at Cabinet l e v e l . Clearly, such a man with his p o l i t i c a l 
"rationalisms", his caucas system and welfarism was symptomatic of the 
threat t o the t r a d i t i o n a l Constitution. 
Even worse, socialism was not merely active i n vrorking men's 
associations, i t had an influence upon Gladstone hijnself.^^ The con-
sequent move of the Liberal Party leadership towards greater social 
intervention resulted i n a s i g n i f i c a n t loss of support to the Conser-
vatives. According to Kirk , Henry Maine was one of these dissenting 
Liberals. But t h i s i s a d i f f i c u l t point t o establish as Maine always 
had sympathies w i t h the Conservatives although he was never a party 
man. 
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I n Maine's eyes, even the Conservative Party had i n i t -
s e l f f a i l e d to withstand the 'evils' of the period. The Conser-
vatives had not only been most active i n respect of social l e g i s -
l a t i o n i n the 19th century, but were becoming increasingly democratic 
i n t h e i r party structure. The main stimulus for t h i s came from a 
small ginger group knovm as the 'Fourth Party', established i n the 
Conservative ranks i n 1880. Despite the fact that i t was based on rad-
i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , quite incompatible with the Conservative tenets, the 
party exercised considerable influence u n t i l i t s leader. Lord Randolph 
Churchil l , f e l l from power i n 1886. 
Maiiie's fears f o r the established order r e f l e c t each of the 
disruptive forces underlying the surface t r a n q u i l i t y of Victorian l i f e . 
The dangers of nationalism, imperialism, radicalism, socialism and 
collec t i v i s m , are a l l noted i n Popular Govara'tient. Each i s shown either 
as indicative of the di r e c t i o n i n which society was moving or as the 
most l i k e l y consequence of that movement. These dangers had, of course, 
been i m p l i c i t i n society f o r some time. The actual incident which seems 
t o have prompted Maine t o return to Tsrriting on p o l i t i c a l issues was 
probably the defeat of the Conservative Government i n 1880. The Liberal 
Government seemed to represent a l l the dangers which Maine feared. As 
Feaver has shown, the essays i n Popular Government not only reproduced 
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a r t i c l e s w r i t t e n f o r the "Quarterly Review.", but reflected certain 
ideas expressed, again anonymously, i n the "St. James Gazette" i n 
1880. Feaver compares passages i n the highly polemical a r t i c l e s 
with passages from Popular Government and concludes t h a t , rather than 
being an academic c r i t i q u e of democracy. Popular Government was a 
disguised-attack on the Gladstonian Administration.^''' This i s certainly 
an exaggeration, but i t i s . t r u e that Maine's p o l i t i c a l thinking, l i k e 
t h a t of Burke, was occasioned by contemporary events and that, i t i s 
coloured by his personal p o l i t i c a l convictions. 
TOTAUTARIANISII 
The predominant theme of Popular Government i s not stated 
e x p l i c i t l y , but i t vinderlies a l l Maine's attacks on democracy. I t i s 
his fear of the t o t a l i t a r i a n state. I n contemporary B r i t a i n , he believed 
that the threat i n question lay i n the tendency towards mass democracy, 
although he acknowledged the presence of-the same danger i n 19th century 
e l i t i s t theory. The danger of to t a l i t a r i a n i s m was that i t would destroy, 
not only progress, that i s the continual production of new ideas, but 
c i v i l i s a t i o n i t s e l f . The fabric of modern society was of a delicate 
nature. I t required freedom, variety and the security of property t o 
sustain i t s e l f . Their a b o l i t i o n would res u l t i n a system of control 
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simply to maintain a stagnant order, i n e f f e c t , Maine was defending 
a nomocratic view of society with i t s concept of p o l i t i c s as a l i m i t e d 
a c t i v i t y , against the antithesis of a l l i t s values - t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . 
Perhaps he best expresses t h i s fear of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m when assei*ting 
his abhorrence of Rousseau's democratic state. 
A vastly more formidable conception bequeathed 
to us by Rousseau i s t h a t of the omnipotent demo-
cr a t i c State rooted i n natural r i g h t j the State 
which has at its'disposal everything which i n d i -
vidual men value, t h e i r property, t h e i r persons, 
and t h e i r independence; the State which i s bound 
to respect neither precedent nor prescription; 
the State which may make laws f o r i t s subjects or-
daining what they s h a l l drink or eat, and i n what 
way they s h a l l spend t h e i r earnings; the State 
which can confiscate a l l the land of the community, 
and which, i f the effect'on human motives i s what 
i t may be expected to be, may force us to labour 
on i t when the older incentives t o t o i l have d i s -
appeared. 18 
Having considered the basic theme of Maine's p o l i t i c a l thought, 
i t remains to elucidate the factors which engendered i t . According t o 
Maine, t h e o r e t i c a l analysis suggests and observation confirms that the 
widening of the franchise would enable the emergence of the p o l i t i c a l 
organiser - the "wire-puller". To r e t a i n popular support the manipulator 
would be committed both t o an extension of the franchise, u n t i l universal 
suffrage was achieved, and t o r e f l e c t i n g popular opinion. He believed 
that contemporary p o l i t i c i a n s were already ". . .listening nervously at 
-137-
one end of a speaking-tube which receives at i t s other end the sug-
gestions of a lower intelligence."19 I n i t i a l l y ^ p o p u l a r government 
might be expected t o be very active i n reforming the social order, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n destroying every vestige of pr i v i l e g e which remained. 
This had been the nature of the increasing l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i v i t y since 
1832. But now, not content with J ) o l i t i c a l representation the elec-
torate were demanding greater control of t h e i r Members of Parliament. 
As Maine wrote: 
. . . a movement appears to have very d i s t i n c t l y 
set i n towards unmodified democracy, the govern-
ment of a great multitude of men s t r i v i n g t o take 
the bulk of t h e i r own public a f f a i r s i n t o t h e i r 
orni hands.20 
As a result i n response to, the pursuit of the ideal of equality, 
the area of state intervention gradually extends u n t i l a l l those enter-
prises formerly l e f t t o private individuals are directed by c i v i l ser-
vants. For Maine t h i s dualism of increasing democratic control within 
the party structure and the ever,-groiVing volume of controlling l e g i s -
l a t i o n , both blatant facts of the contemporary p o l i t i c a l scene, consti-
tuted the f i r s t stages en route to disaster. I t represented a mis-
understanding of the very nature of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , engendered by 
the ' s c i e n t i f i c a i r ' of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . But perhaps more than t h i s , i t 
was a res u l t of the grcwing interest of a populous ill-educated i n public 
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a f f a i r s , vrho were gaining an unwarranted confidence i n t h e i r capacity 
to govern. Unfortunately t h i s interest might be overindulged since 
there was a l i m i t e d amount of l e g i s l a t i o n which could benefit society. 
Neither experience nor pr o b a b i l i t y affords any 
ground f o r thinking that there may be an i n f i n i t y 
of l e g i s l a t i v e innovation, at once safe and bene-
f i c e n t . On the contrary, i t would be a safer con-
jecture that the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of reform are s t r i c t l y 
l i m i t e d ; The p o s s i b i l i t i e s of heat, i t i s said, 
reach 2,000 degrees of the Centigrade thermometer; 
the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of cold extend to about 300 degrees 
below zero; but a l l organic l i f e i n the world i s only 
possible through the accident that temperature i n i t 
ranges between a maximum of 120 degrees and a'minimum 
of a few degrees below zero of the Centigrade. For 
a l l we know, a s i m i l a r l y narrow l i m i t a t i o n may hold? of 
l e g i s l a t i v e changes i n the structure of human society. 
We can no more argue t h a t , because some past reforms 
have succeeded, a l l reforms w i l l succeed, than we can 
argue that because the human body can bear a certain 
amoxint of heat, i t can bear an i n d e f i n i t e amount.^ 
Clearly t h i s i s the nomocratic theme. Maine explains that i t i s not the 
function of government to take over control of society by l e g i s l a t i v e 
confiscation and direction. The area of government a c t i v i t y should be 
l i m i t e d t o that of trusteeship - the maintenance of law and order. To 
so increase the power of government that i t might attempt to put i n t o 
e f f e c t a t e l e o l o g i c a l blue-print, such as the i n s t i g a t i o n of absolute 
equality, would surely result i n disaster. 
I n his f i r s t essay, Maine examined the nature of t h i s destruc-
t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n and the l i k e l y effect of overthrowing existing i n s t i t u -
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tions. The underlying assumption of the reformer was that 
. . . the stock of good things i n the world i s 
p r a c t i c a l l y unlimited i n quantity, that i t i s 
(so to speak) contained i n a vast store house 
or granary, and that out of t h i s i t i s now .doled i n 
unequal shares and unfair proportions. I t i s un-
fairness and inequality that democratic law w i l l 
some day correct.22 
This mistaken assumption, the f a i l u r e to realize that the 
economic process i s 'everywhere complex and delicate' could have the 
most serious of consequences. A portion of the labour force would be 
tempted i n t o idleness by the promise of a share i n the f i c t i c i o u s hoard 
of goods, whilst those w i l l i n g t o t o i l would eventually be disheartened 
by the confiscation of t h e i r rewards by taxation. I f such a society i s 
t o avoid penury and starvation, then the incentives to t o i l which have 
been destroyed by the state must be replaced by i t s only alternative, 
the allotment of d a i l y tasks enforced by the scourge. Although a t ' t h i s 
point Maine concludes that slavery vrauld be the result of omnipotent 
state c o n t r o l , i n other parts of his work the argument i s not e x p l i c i t l y 
developed to t h i s extent, rather the danger he cites i s that of stag-
nation. After the short l e g i s l a t i v e period, when the prejudices of the 
masses hold sway i n society, i t i s not u n l i k e l y that there w i l l follow 
a period of reaction. I n t h i s event, even i f new ideas were generated, 
i t i s u n l i k e l y that any use would be made of them, as Maine said i n d i s -
cussing average opiniont 
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The principles of l e g i s l a t i o n at vihich they point 
would probably put an end t o a l l social and p o l i t -
i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , and arrest eveiything which has 
been associated with Liberalism. A moment's"re-
f l e c t i o n vri.ll s a t i s f y any competently instructed 
person that t h i s i s not too broad a proposition. 
Let him turn over i n his mind the great epochs of 
s c i e n t i f i c invention and social change during the 
l a s t two centuries, and consider v/hat would have oc-
curred i f universal suffrage had been established 
at any one of them. Universal suffrage, which today 
excludes'Free Trade from the United States, would 
Certainly have prohibited the spinning-jenny and the 
povfer-loom. I t would certainly have forbidden the 
threshing-machine. I t wb-ald have prevented the 
adoption"of the" Gregorian"Calendar; and i t would 
have restored the Stuarts. I t would have proscribed 
the'Roman Catholics M t h the mob which burned Lord 
Mansfieild's house and l i b r a r y i n 1780, and i t would 
have jproscribed the Dissenters v/ith the mob which 
burned Dr. Priestley's house and l i b r a i y i n 1791. 
23 
I t i s Maine's contention that i t i s the ignorance of the masses, the 
fact that they do not knovf what i s t h e i r ovm best int e r e s t , which f u r -
nishes the principle argument against Bentham's logic. This f a i l u r e , on 
the part of the majority, could produce a society which differed l i t t l e 
from the stationary character of India and China, 
The prejudices of the multitude against s c i e n t i f i c 
inventions " are dismissed by the historian "ivith 'a' 
sarcasm; but, when the multitude i s a l l powerful, 
t h i s prejudice may afford material f o r history,24 
The basis of Maine's fears regarding the emergence, of a t o t a l -
i t a r i a n state have been intimated: the dangers are there i n the increasing 
volume of l e g i s l a t i o n ; the gcowbh of democratic control, the quest 
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f o r equality; and the prejudices, p a r t i c u l a r l y the a n t i - s c i e n t i f i c 
prejudices of the masses. And, although he attempts a reasoned attack 
on democratic theory on. specific issues, the t i p s of these underlying 
fears repeatedly break through the surface of his argument. 
I n each of Maine's essays then, although the analyses are 
made from d i f f e r e n t standpoints, the particular style of argument i n -
volved provides but a t h i n veneer f o r his detestation of majoritarian 
tyranny. To suggest, hov/ever, that t h i s negative theme was the only 
factor l i n k i n g the essays together would be quite mistaken, since a 
pov/erful positive s t r a i n i s also evident. I t takes the form of an active 
support of the t r a d i t i o n a l constitution. 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Following an A r i s t o t e l i a n analysis, Maine was made aware of 
the in^ortance of the popular element i n the constitution and had no 
int e n t i o n of advocating a return t o a purely aristocratic form of govern-
ment. S t i l l less had he any desire t o recommend the p o s i t i v i s t notion 
of a co n t r o l l i n g meritocracy grounded i n social science. Vfliat Maine was 
doing was to support the t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h form of government against 
any disturbance of 'that nice balance pf attractions' and avoid the danger, 
tha t i t 'may yet be launched i n t o space and f i n d i t s l a s t a f f i n i t i e s i n 
silence and cold'. The hope of free i n s t i t u t i o n s l a y , i n t h i s 'unique 
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and remarkable' instrument which had successfully reconciled s a t i s -
f a c t i o n and impatience, and achieved a suitable compromise between 
the popular and a r i s t o c r a t i c elements i n society. Unfortunately, the 
ancient notion of a balanced constitution was under attack.from reformers 
armed with arguments provided by Rousseau and Bentham. Their thesis was 
that Second Chambers were superfluous since the Popular Chamber reflected 
the opinions of the entire community, that Vox Populi was Vox Dei. Seeing 
that such an argument would be f a t a l t o the House of Lords, Maine ques-
tioned i t s fundamental proposition that the voice of the people was the 
voice of God. His thesis was not that the members of the Popular Chamber 
are always mistaken, or even generally wrong. He was merely of the opin-
ion that 
. . . i t i s impossible to be sure that they are 
r i g h t . And the more the d i f f i c u l t i e s of m u l t i -
tudinous government are probed, and the more care-
f u l l y the influences acting upon i t are "examined, 
the stronger grows the doubt of the i n f a l l i b i l i t y 
of popularly elected legislatures. What, then, i s 
expected from a well-constituted Siecond Chamber i s 
not a r i v a l i n f a l l i b i l i t y , but an additional security. 
I t i s hardly too much to say t h a t , i n t h i s view, a l -
most any Second Chamber i s better than none.25 
The Second Chamber argument was based on the desire f o r restraint and 
consideration, the security of an additional body to give a f u l l examin-
ation of the various measures proposed by the Popular Assembly, 
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Maine's support of the B r i t i s h constitution, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
f o r the House of Lords, was a r e f l e c t i o n of his general attitude t o -
wards p o l i t i c s . He believed that the balance of the t r a d i t i o n a l Con-
s t i t u t i o n provided a suitable 'mean', a reconciliation between the 
absolutist extremes of monarchy and democracy. P o l i t i c s was a prac-
t i c a l concern dealing with the harmonization of interests, the avoid- . 
ance of extreme action, the maintenance of i n d i v i d u a l i t y and freedom, 
an a c t i v i t y w i t h i n a given t r a d i t i o n of custom and precedent. The 
requisite virtues f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n were p o l i t i c a l wisdom and the a t -
t r i b u t e s of a 'gentleman'. 
I n Maine's view, the House of Commons would s t i l l be the 
more important body, of course, but vdth the assistance of the a r i s t o -
cracy, the very d i f f i c u l t process of change could be more safely accom-
plished. His idea of l i m i t i n g the sphere of state a c t i v i t y i s intimately 
linked with the notion of change and i t was i n t h i s sphere that the 
aristocracy had an important part to play. I n the general discussion of 
Second Chambers, Maine's major argument had been that they provided an 
additional check on the p o l i t i c a l process. He believed that the House of 
Lords was p a r t i c u l a r l y suited t o such a restraining r o l e . I t was an 
anfeient part of tHe B r i t i s h Constitution, the repository of the p o l i t i c a l 
wisdom of long experience, and imbued with the notion of change within-the 
framework of t r a d i t i o n . With such a safeguard on the Popular Assembly, 
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the t o t a l i t a r i a n threat i n universal suffrage might be averted. 
More than t h i s must be said about Maine's ideas r e l a t i n g 
t o change, however, since they are fundamental both to his fears and 
prescriptions. His position i s made e x p l i c i t i n his t h i r d essay and 
the.following three quotations from the text outline the propositions 
from which the whole of his thesis i s l o g i c a l l y derived. He argued 
tha t : 
The natural condition of mankind ( i f that word 
'natural' i s used) i s not the progressive con-
d i t i o n . I t i s a condition hot of changeableness 
but of unchangeablieness, The immobility of so-
ciety i s the rule i t s mobility i s the exception,26 
Consequently, 
I f modern society be not essentially and normally 
changeable, the attempt t o conduct i t safely 
- through the"unusual and exceptional process'of 
change i s not easy, but extremely d i f f i c u l t . What 
i s easy to a man i s that which has come to him 
through a long inherited experience, l i k e walking 
or using his fingers; \*at iis d i f f i c u l t i s that i n 
which such experience gives him l i t t l e guidance or 
none at a l l , l i k e r i d i n g or skating. I t i s extremely 
probable that the Darwinian rule "small changes bene-
f i t the organism", holds good of coranamities of men, 
but sudden sweeping p o l i t i c a l reform constantly 
places the community i n the position of an individual 
who should mount a horse solely on the strength of 
his studies i n a work on horsemanship,27 
Given t h i s l i m i t e d capacity of human nature t o adjust t o new conditions, 
then, 
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The utmost i t can do i s t o select parts of i t s 
experience and apply them t e n t a t i v e l y to these 
conditions; and t h i s process i s always awkward 
and often dangerous.2° 
Maine's position i s derived from these three propositions: one, change 
i s not man's natural condition; two, adjustment to new circumstances i s 
d i f f i c u l t ; and three, the safest method of change i s withi n the compre-
hensible framework of experience. I m p l i c i t i n the second quotation i s 
perhaps a f o u r t h fundamental p r i n c i p l e , namely, the incommunicability of 
experience and s k i l l , which he uses to j u s t i f y aristocracy. 
His fear of the dangers of democratic rule was grounded i n the 
fact that not only was p o l i t i c a l power being given to a class of persons 
unacquainted with the nature of p o l i t i c s and i t s essential s k i l l s , but 
that t h i s new leadership f a i l e d t o understand the fundamental nature of 
change. Pursuing a p r i o r i p o l i t i c a l theories, the reformers were able t o 
appeal t o the passions and prejudices of the masses, believing that society 
could be moulded i n t o t h e i r own particular image of Utopia once power had 
been won. Yet the outcome of such p o l i t i c a l naivety, such a travesty of 
the fundamental axioms of p o l i t i c a l experience, was quite obvious t o Maine. 
A community with a new a p r i o r i p o l i t i c a l con-
s t i t u t i o n i s at best i n the disagreeable position 
of a B r i t i s h t r a v e l l e r whom; a hospitable Chinese 
entertainer has constrained to eat a dinner vdth 
chopsticks. Let the new i n s t i t u t i o n s be extra-
o r d i n a r i l y vTide of experience and inconvenience 
becomes imminent p e r i l . The body-politic i s i n 
that case l i k e the body-natural transported to a 
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nevr climate, unaccustomed food, and strange, 
surroundings. Sometimes i t perishes a l t o -
gether. Sometimes the most unexpected parts 
of i t s organisation develop themselves at the 
e^^ense of others; and when the ingeneous leg-
i s l a t o r had counted on producing a nation of 
self-denying and somewhat sentimental p a t r i o t s , 
he finds that he has created a people of Jacob-
ins or a people of slaves,^9 
Now since Popular Government involves a defence of the tr a d -
i t i o n a l order of society, i t may be characterised as i n some way con-
servative. Most commentators on Maine's vrork have indeed, as noted 
above, placed him roundly i n the modern system of conservative orthodoxy 
deriving from Burke, Yet the analysis of Popular Goverament alone sug-
gests that such a categorization i s quite mistaken. Even allowing f o r the 
fact t h a t Maine was responding to an immediate p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , and 
was not attempting t o analyse the foundations of society, the work f a i l s 
t o reveal even the tones or textures which might have been expected from 
a disciple of Burke. Two important commentators on Maine's thought i n 
the 1930's have also noted his divergence from the orthodox stream, 
namely Crane Brinton and B,E, Lippincott, Brinton claims that Maine 
can be seen as a turning point i n English conservatism, i n the same way 
that Green marks a turning point i n English liberalism. This i s because 
"Just as Green i s a l i b e r a l who, i n spite of certain q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , 
t r u s t s the State, , . , so Maine i s a conservative vdio distrusts the 
State,"^^ I t i s a "concluaion", he continues, "that vrould have profo\mdly 
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shocked Burke."^l Lippincott, on the other hand, sees the break 
i n respect of the religious basis of conservatism which Maine did 
not employ. He said, ", , , Maine represents the best attempt i n 
the 19th century t o j u s t i f y conservatism to a new age. Following 
the r a t i o n a l i s t movement of his era, he broke with the conservative 
t r a d i t i o n of Burke, Coleridge, and Stephen, and rejected r e l i g i o n 
either as a basis upon vrtiich t o construct conservative philosophy, 
or as a factor essential to i t s building." Instead, Lippincott saw 
Maine as ". , . the f i r s t but also the l a s t ' s c i e n t i f i c conservative' 
i n English p o l i t i c a l thought. . ."^^ But although these two writers 
noted that Maine was not an orthodox conservative, they f a i l e d t o see 
him as part of any main stream of ideas i n English p o l i t i c a l thought. 
The attempt to establish Maine i n a d i s t i n c t t r a d i t i o n of conservatism 
constitutes the object of the remainder of t h i s chapter. 
Both the style and the content of Popular Government can be 
i d e n t i f i e d with that brand of conservatism expressed i n the work of 
David Hume and recently continued i n the writings of Michael Oakeshott. 
On many issues there i s an apparent agreement between the two t r a d i t i o n s , 
as S,R. Letwin says, "The difference between Hume and Burke i s one of 
atmosphere and emphasis. , ," But even where agreament existed, the under-
l y i n g assu(6ption from which t h e i r positions derived were quite d i f f e r e n t , 
as they had , , a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t view of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , "33 
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The orthodox position has already been discussed. I t i s now neces-
sary t o examine the alternative conservative t r a d i t i o n i n order t o 
demonstrate that Maine has greater a f f i n i t i e s vdth i t than vdth the 
Burkean position. 
ANALTTICAL CONSEHVATISM 
To determine the nature of "analytical conservatism", as 
Sheldon S. Wolin has called i t , i t might be useful to note i t s funda-
mental difference from the Burkean t r a d i t i o n . This i s the absence of 
any metaphysical system supporting the conservative disposition. Hume's 
conservatism was eminently en?)irical, rooted i n arguments devoid of 
transcendental notions. His f a i t h was i n the concept of u t i l i t y embodied 
i n concrete i n s t i t u t i o n s and t r a d i t i o n s . The moderate temper of his 
thought reflected the 'peace of Augustans' - the rel a t i v e t r a n q u i l i t y of 
the English p o l i t i c a l scene i n the 18th century. 
I n contrast, modern conservatism was essentially a reaction t o 
the c r i s i s of revolution. I t was considered necessary to protect the.. 
conservative disposition by formulating an ' i n t e l l e c t u a l system', a gen-
era l schema from v/hich p o l i t i c a l action could be both j u s t i f i e d and de-
termined. The conservative reaction to the French Revolution thus en-
gulfed Hume's style of p o l i t i c s . Conservatism 
, . * turned t o transcendental norms i n order t o 
combat the revolutionary appeal to reason; t o 
weave from the diverse elements of irr a t i o n a l i s m . 
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romanticism, f e l i g i o n , and history a ne\T v i s i o n 
of an older order; to replace an analytical con-
servatism by a metaphysical n a t u r a l i s t i c approach 
and substituted i n i t s stead a philosophy of h i s -
t o r y , the idea that history had a "course" whose 
main outlines were determined by a divine hand 
operatirig from outside the confines of human t i m e . ^ 
This, then, constitutes the real difference; one system i s permeated by 
a religious-metaphysical philosophy, the other, secular, sceptical and 
pragmatic, regarding a system of b e l i e f as quite unnecessary to the con-
servative disposition i n p o l i t i c s . Oakeshott considers the confusion 
generated by Burke's 'selection of long-current and w e l l - t r i e d notions' 
which has given 'substance and colour' to a l l subsequent writers to have 
been unfortunate. He has said that 
. . . on account of his speculative moderation 
and his clear recognition of p o l i t i c s as a spe-
c i f i c a c t i v i t y i t would perhaps have been more 
fortunate i f the modern conservative had paid • 
more attention to Htime and less t o Burlce.35 
However, t h i s d i f f e r e n t approach to the nature of p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y , the lower plaine upon which analytical conservatives had placed 
p o l i t i c s , has had certain prabtical consequences. Hume's scepticism re-
sulted i n a cautious view of the extent and character of government control, 
Tirtiereas Burke's religious v i s i o n and his recognition of the need f o r author-
i t y , enabled him t o place much greater importance on the a c t i v i t y of the 
state. This axtravagence to be found throughout Burke's work was sympto-
matic, not only of contemporary upheavals and his religious b e l i e f , but 
-150-
of a change i n the actual practice of 18th century government. P o l i t i c s 
was becoming less concerned with mere trusteeship, the protection of 
property, and privacy and the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n g interests, 
than w i t h the pursuit of national glory and dignity. I n short, i n trans-
l a t i n g p o l i t i c a l issues i n t o moral crusades, a disposition that "Hume 
called fanaticism and feared above a l l i n politics,"36 Burke made p o l i t i c s 
a much more important a c t i v i t y than Hume had been prepared t o acknowledge. 
I t went beyond pol i c i n g a c t i v i t i e s to sanction a certain paternalism. The 
State, together with the Church, became the guardian of the 'Temple of 
God'. 
I t would seem^- then, that the analytical conservatives' ap-
proach towards p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y was essentially empirical, rejecting 
both rationalism and Burkean 'metaphysics'. I t revived Aristotelianism 
i n a purer form than the Burkeans, who blurred i t s methods with t h e i r 
Thomist ideas. The importance of secular t r a d i t i o n to those who followed 
Hume was paramount and coloured a l l aspects of t h e i r thought - t h e i r ad^ 
miration of the B r i t i s h Constitution, t h e i r concept of change, t h e i r idea 
of the legitimate area of governmental competence and of p o l i t i c a l edu-
cation. For the sceptic, the particular t r a d i t i o n i n t o which one was 
born determined the appropriate nature of one's a c t i v i t y i n every aspect 
of l i f e . Certain standards of behaviour were expected, a specific way of 
'doing things' was followed, determined by the precedents and ciistoras of 
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the community. This manner of a c t i v i t y extends also t o the p o l i t i c a l 
sphere. I t was-^fruitless t o wish that circumstances had been other 
than they were: one had t o make the most of a given s i t u a t i o n by fam-
i l i a r i z i n g and adjusting oneself t o t h i s real world. The relevant 
p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n f o r analytical conservatism, then, was that i n s t i -
t u t i o n a l i z e d i n the B r i t i s h Constitution. 
The admiration f o r t h i s 'remarkable and unique' i n s t i t u t i o n 
i s evident i n the work of Hume, Maine and Oakeshott., although none of 
them regard i t as i n any way the work of a divine Providence i n the way 
that Burke did. Rather i t i s seen as the product of contingent circum-
stances - a series of fortuitous changes. Letwin says of Hume: 
Even the excellence of the B r i t i s h Constitution, he 
often pointed out, was mainly the work of fortune; 
history teaches us what a "great misture of accident 
. . . commonly concurs with a small ingredient of 
wisdom and foresight i n erecting the complicated fab-
r i c of the most perfect government". ^7 
At the end of his f i r s t essay, Maine makes a similar suggestion, claiming 
that the B r i t i s h Constitution had become the 'envy of the world' by 'a 
series of undesigned changes'. And Oakeshott also refutes any idea that 
parliamentary government sprang from r a t i o n a l principles, maintaining that 
i t 'emerged' from the p o l i t i c a l circumstances of the Middle Ages. Indeed, 
they have a l l argued that the rights and freedoms denaanded by refomers 
i n so many countries were not some abstract ideal realized i n England by 
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the bloody revolution: they were the long established Common Law 
rights of Englishmen. The p a r a l l e l between Oakeshott and Maine on 
t h i s , as on so many issues, i s remarkable. Speaking of Natural 
Rights Oakeshott has said t h a t : 
For many years now, these children of our own 
flesh have been returning to us, disguised i n 
foreign dress, the outline blurred by false 
theoiy and the d e t a i l f ixed with uncharacter-
i s t i c precision. What went abroad as the con-
crete r i g h t s of an Englishman have'returned 
home as the abstract Rights of Man, and they 
have returned to confound our p o l i t i c s and cor-
rupt our mind.38 
S i m i l a r l y , Maine wrote: 
The English p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , so envied 
and panegyrised on the Continent, could not be ' 
copied without sweeping l e g i s l a t i v e innovations, 
but the grounds and principles'on which these ' 
innovations were demanded were, as we shall see, 
wholly unlike anything known to any class of En-
g l i s h p o l i t i c i a n s . Nevertheless, i n t h e i r f i n a l 
e f f e c t s , these French ideas have deeply leavened 
English p o l i t i c a l thought, mixing with another 
stream of opinion which i s of recent but s t i l l ' of 
English origin.39 
I n England, then, the security of the individual was . guaranteed by the 
fact that government proceeded w i t h i n the given framework of custom and 
law, thus enabling a l l to know the l i m i t s of government action i n given 
circumstances. 
Of equal importance to the admiration- of-the balanced consti-
t u t i o n i n the kind of conservative thought we are considering i s the beli e f 
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that the balance of p o l i t i c a l machinery can easily be destroyed. I t 
has been indicated that Maine feared that the growth of popular repre-
sentation threatened the balance of forces. This theme i s again taken 
up by Oakeshott when he analyses the danger of mass society i n his 
essay 'The Masses i n Representative Democracy'. Here he argues that 
Parliamentary Government, which reached i t maturity i n the l a t e 18th 
and early 19th centuries, ^ iras a d i r e c t response to the emergence of the 
i n d i v i d u a l from ascriptive t i e s i n the 14th and 15th centuries.- i n 
Maine's terras the movement from status to contract. The function of 
government was t o protect the individual and secure his r i g h t s . 
I n t h i s condition every subject was secured of 
the r i g h t t o pursue his chosen directions of 
a c t i v i t y as l i t t l e hindered as might be by his 
fellows or by the exactions of government i t -
s e l f , and as l i t t l e distracted by communal pres-
sures. Freedom of movement, of i n i t i a t i v e , of 
speech, of b e l i e f and religious observance, of 
association and dissociation, of bequest and i n -
heritance; security of person and property; the 
r i g h t to choose one's own occupation and dispose 
of one's labour and goods; and over a l l the "rule 
of law": the r i g h t to be ruled by known law, ap-
plicable to a l l subjects a l i k e . And these r i g h t s , 
appropriate to i n d i v i d u a l i t y , were not the p r i v -
ileges of a single class; they were the property 
of every subject a l i k e . Each s i g n i f i e d the abro-
gation of some feudal p r i v i l e g e . 
Oakeshott saw that the j u l e of law was threatened by the emergence of 
the " a n t i - i n d i v i d u a l " and lids accompanying philosophy, the demand f o r 
numerical democracy. The responsibility of self-determination proved 
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more than many people could bear, since i t emphasized t h e i r own 
inner inadequacies. Consequently, these men have united i n a 
demand f o r equality, not to augment individualism, but to obtain 
security against i t . The omnipotence of the state had to be im-
posed on a l l . For t o aHovr the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of some to continue 
would, by demonstrating the t o t a l inadequacy of others, threaten 
t h e i r emotional security and consequently the security of the 
"social protectorate", I n t h i s way the state received an i n v i t a -
t i o n t o become the complete manager of the community, destroying 
a l l the values obtained by the rule of law under parliamentary 
government.: Support has been given t o leaders on a l l issues t o 
save the individual from the necessity of reaching his ovm decisions. 
The mandate and representation have become meaningless, the populace 
simply being 'used' to sanction the policy decisions of t h e i r rulers. 
Thus, Oakeshott, l i k e Maine, f e l t that democratic government 
was a threat to the parliamentary system of rul e . The various l i b -
e r t ies i m p l i c i t i n the p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n , freedoms which appeared 
before the advent of democracy, were now being threatened by the de-
mands of the a n t i - i n d i v i d u a l . Both appealed to the t r a d i t i o n of the 
balanced constitution and i t s rule of law i n an attempt t o re t a i n 
l i b e r t y and i n d i v i d u a l i t y against the omnipotent state. 
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Some ind i c a t i o n has been given above of the character of 
the a n a l y t i c a l conservatives' approach to p o l i t i c a l change. I t was 
essentially empirical. P o l i t i c s was concerned with the r e a l i s a t i o n 
of the immanent potential of circumstance and the reconciliation of 
the inconsistencies Which changing conditions created. P o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y was seen s t r i c t l y as a process of repair. Now l y i n g behind 
t h i s extremely cautious approach to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s an intense 
awareness of the kind of knowledge which i s appropriate t o the p o l i t - , 
i c a l a r t . And i t i s only by giving due attention to t h i s that a re a l 
appreciation of the an a l y t i c a l conservatives' position can be secured. 
Once again i t i s t o Oakeshott that we must turn f o r the most developed 
expression of the theme. I n his essay on " P o l i t i c a l Education", he 
makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between ideological and t r a d i t i o n a l manners of 
p o l i t i c a l behaviour, a d i s t i n c t i o n which can be compared with his d i -
v i s i o n between technical and pra c t i c a l knowledge i n his more general 
discussion. Technical knowledge, l i k e p o l i t i c a l ideology, i s an 
abridgement, the d i s t i l l a t i o n of what i s considered to be significant 
data. I t i s communicable i n precise terras to the rela t i v e novice. I n 
contrast, p r a c t i c a l knowledge i s the vAiole body of an a c t i v i t y , i n ^ r e -
cise, and i s incommunicable except among the i n i t i a t e d . Both technical 
and p r a c t i c a l knovrledge are useful to the p o l i t i c i a n , but because of the 
complexity of his a c t i v i t y , he must rel y primarily on his pra c t i c a l ex-
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perience. His i n s p i r a t i o n stems from t r a d i t i o n a l patterns of behaviour 
and from the manifold intimations of concrete circumstances. I n t h i s 
opinion Maine and Oakeshott are again i n remarkably close agreement. 
Indeed, Maine's analogy of the dangers involved i n attempting t o rule 
society from the basis of an a p r i o r i constitution being similar t o 
those confronting anyone t r y i n g t o ride a horse simply from the under-
standing of a manual on horsemanship, might, from the nature of i t s com-
po s i t i o n , be mistaken f o r one of Oakeshott's own comparisons. 
Unfortunately, the b e l i e f that p o l i t i c a l wisdom i s not a tech-
nique, some very specialised branch of Icnowledge, but a f a m i l i a r i t y with 
the t r a d i t i o n s of society and an a b i l i t y t o f e e l where the shoe pinches, 
has produced a great amount of confusion and even misrepresentation. The 
major stumbling block appears to l i s with the interpretation of the "trad-
i t i o n a l i s t s ' " understanding and use of principles. Some of the issues 
raised by t h i s discussion might be pr o f i t a b l y dealt with at t h i s point 
since i t w i l l help t o c l a r i f y t o a g reater degree the particular beliefs 
of the t r a d i t i o n of thought t o which Maine belonged, 
PRINCIFLBS AND C0NSEH7ATISM 
The rej e c t i o n of what Barker has called ' f i r s t principles' i n 
p o l i t i c s does not mean that conservatives rejected a l l principles. To 
c l a r i f y the overall conservative position i n t h i s respect, the analysis 
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given recently by Brian Barry i n his book P o l i t i c a l Argument might be 
employed. He describes two major groups: the f i r s t he call s A n t i -
P o l i t i c a l Conservatism; the second, Anti-Rationalist Conservatism, 
The f i r s t group believes that although principles have t h e i r 
use, they have proved t o be dangerous i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Even i f 
one dismissed the assertion that a state attempting to realize "ideal 
regarding" principles of social justicei-mast be ". . . torn apart or 
b r u t a l l y u n i f i e d by a t o t a l i t a r i a n government based on t e r r o r , " i t 
might s t i l l be argued t h a t , " . . . although there may be particular 
times when competing principles are not so wide apart that attempts 
to implement them lead to unmanageable s t r i f e , nevertheless, i t i s 
dangerous f o r the idea to get around that principles have a legitimate 
place i n p o l i t i c s because you can never be sure when d i f f e r e n t people's 
principles won't be disastrously incompatible."*^ As Barry goes on t o 
say, t h i s argument i s unacceptable. I n t h i s case a d i s t i n c t i o n can be 
made between principles which are permissible and those which are not. 
I t i s thus not an argument against principles as such. The point might 
be l e f t by noting that the ' A n t i - P o l i t i c a l Conservative' regards principles 
as a v a l i d part of man's mental apparatus, but fraught with dangers when 
employed i n the realm of p o l i t i c s . 
The*Anti-Rationalist Conservative', on the other hand, rejects 
the use of prin c i p l e i n any sphere. He believes that instead of relying 
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on discursive reasoning, men should put t h e i r t r u s t i n i n t u i t i v e 
judgement. I t would seem, t o put the d i s t i n c t i o n at i t s crudest 
l e v e l , that one t r a d i t i o n merely questions the wisdom of using 
principles i n p o l i t i c s , w h i l s t the other rejects a l l principles. 
I t has been indicated above that Maine, although a t r a d -
i t i o n a l i s t , did r e t a i n a b e l i e f i n the efficacy of principles. He 
recognised that the major developments i n society.were often inspired 
by some great and fundamental beli e f such as that of Natural Law or 
u t i l i t y . Given then, t h i s b e l i e f i n abstraction, which had been of 
great importance i n the realm of law, i t might appear that Maine and his 
t r a d i t i o n can f i t snugly i n t o that group yihich Barry has called the 'Anti-
E o l i t i c a l Conservatives'. But before reaching any premature conclusions 
on t h i s question, i t i s essential that the actual nature of the principles 
we are discussing should be made clear. So far we have used the word 
'principle' to s i g n i f y a highly abstract generalisation, a construction 
of an ideal from the materials of experience. But there are also p r i n -
ciples of a much more modest character, not high level abstractions, but 
simply guides "extracted from expertise." These are relevant maxims, 
reasons or considerations which might arise i n any serious discussion. 
I t i s not claimed that they form a complete account of conduct however 
f u l l y they msy be developed. Nor are these principles, when once expressed, 
held t o be i n any vfay self-evident and absolute; each derives i t s r e l e -
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vance from the context i n which i t i s used. 
Clearly t h i s p a r t i c u l a r understanding of principles places 
a rather d i f f e r e n t complexion on Bariy's analysis. Failing to recog-
nise the two d i f f e r e n t levels of discussion, the principles which he 
ascribes t o the ' A n t i - P o l i t i c a l Conservatives' are of the abstract 
variety. And indeed, c e r t a i n conservative thinkers, such as Hayek, 
do hold such principles not only i n a p o l i t i c a l realms, however, as 
Barry suggests, but also iv i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l sphere i t s e l f . Note, 
f o r example Hayek's suggestion that.an ideology of freedom i s neces-
sary i f vfe are to successfully defend our possession of that freedom. 
Barry's second group of conservatives, the 'Anti-Rationalists', 
those whom he believeis held no be l i e f i h principles whatever, might 
now be seen as adherents of the l i m i t e d kind of principles which have 
been described above. By ignoring these and concentrating exclusively 
on the usual abstract character of g eneralisation, then the appear-
ance would be given of a t o t a l rejection of a l l principles. 
The question as t o which category Maine belongs can now be 
answered. His b e l i e f i n principles, even i n those of Natural Law and 
u t i l i t y , was s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d . Major principles, he believed, should 
be used t o point our energies i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n , not to control 
the application of those energies. This was the reason fo r his admir-
ation of the Roman use of Natural Lav^, which gave a general directive 
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t o achieve harmony and uniformity without giving specific instructions. 
I t was also the reason for his depreciation of i t s l a t e r manifestation 
i n the hands of Rousseau who shaped i t into an a l l embracing doctrine. 
No, l i k e Oakeshott, Maine believed that European p o l i t i c s could only be 
conducted i n safety i f the principles employed were those f o r a l i m i t e d 
and not f o r a universal application. I t i s apparent, then, that Maine 
belongs to the group of conservatives designated the 'Anti-Rationalists', 
once t h i s term has been understood to apply to those people-who-make a 
l i m i t e d use of principles. And t h i s seems t o be yet a further facet of 
Maine's alienation from the orthodox conservative t r a d i t i o n , since i t 
appears that the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the •An t i - P o l i t i c a l Conservative' with 
the Burkeans and the 'Anti-Rationalists' T,vith the analytical conservatives, 
would, i n broad terms, be acceptable. I t must be pointed out, however, 
that the association of Burke and his followers with the ' A n t i - P o l i t i c a l ' 
group i s not a conclusion reached by Barry himself. Indeed, Barry vrould 
group Burke and Oakeshott together as belonging to the main conservative 
t r a d i t i o n . But i t has been made clear above that such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
i s quite-meaningless. 
The conclusion here reached, then, i s that i n a period faced 
with the dangers i m p l i c i t i n the emergence of mass society, Maine brought 
to bear the soothing voice of an old t r a d i t i o n of English conservative 
thought. His was not, as some writers have suggested, the response of 
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a frightened reactionary, a man refusing to come to terms with the 
social facts of the time. He claimed no metaphysical support for 
his recommendations, support v^hich Burke facing similar dangers had 
found indispensable. He rose above the kind of dogmatism which per-
meated so much Victorian thought and which he was attempting t o com-
bat. I n these respects, Maine's v/ork appears as an outstanding con-
t r i b u t i o n t o p o l i t i c a l thought. Unfortunately, l i k e the other writers 
of his kind, his ideas have been misrepresented by commentators a t -
tempting to present him as a more orthodox thinker than he was. I f 
t h i s d i s t o r t i o n i s ignored. Popular Government appears as the most 
outstanding vrork of analytical conservatism w r i t t e n i n the 19th cen-
t u r y . 
R E F E R E N C E S 
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C H A P T E R F I V E 
CHAPTER FIVE 
H I S T O R Y AMD P O L I T I C S 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mow that both Maine's h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l positions 
have been examined, i t w i l l be helpful t o consider the relatdsonship 
existing between the two. The f i r s t part of t h i s chapter w i l l , there-
fore, be concentrated on Maine'sovm understanding of t h i s r e l a t i o n -
ship; the second part w i l l be concerned t o c l a r i f y Maine's position 
and t o expose the foundations of his argument; the t h i r d , t o discuss 
the various interpretations of his work as a whole; and the l a s t to 
give some account of the major criticisms vjhich have been directed 
against Maine's method of analysis. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETHTEEN HISTORf AM) POLITICS 
The basic postulate upon vAiich the vrhole structure of Maine's 
thought rests i s that there i s some i d e n t i f i a b l e continuity t o be 
traced from the ea r l i e s t ideas of mankind to t h e i r very latest emanation 
He believed that i n order t o secure a complete understanding of the 
contemporary vrorld, i t i s appropriate t o elucidate the origins of ideas 
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and i n s t i t u t i o n s . Maine was f a r from being unique i n t h i s leaning 
towards h i s t o r i c a l e:?)lanation; Hegelians, P o s i t i v i s t s and Social-
i s t s were a l l concerned with history i n the 19th century. The par-
t i c u l a r demands made on history d i f f e r e d widely among the various 
t h e o r i s t s : some demanded a knowledge of society's future develop-
ments; others, a guide t o p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y ; and the less ambitious, 
an understanding of the here and now. A l l were unanimous, however, 
i n believing that history provided an invaluable source of material 
f o r generalisation and prediction. Although t h i s particular appre-
c i a t i o n of history i s now questioned, i t did represent a considerable 
advance over previous interpretations i n which the past had often been 
regarded as l i t t l e more than a record of man's mistakes or, at best, 
as a means of supporting a p o l i t i c a l purpose. 
The most ambitious of these new investigations were the 
philsophies of history inhich were concerned w i t h events on a world 
scale. Mot content with empirical research i n t o a lim i t e d aspect of 
man's past, i t was believed that the laws of h i s t o r i c a l change, and 
even human destiny i t s e l f , oould be discerned through an examination 
of world history. Under the impact of s c i e n t i f i c achievements, h i s -
torians and philosophers, such as St. Simon, Comte and Marx, atten^ted 
t o c reate a science of society - to r educe the vast m u l t i p l i c i t y and 
di v e r s i t y of h i s t o r i c a l material t o some kind of causal order. I n each 
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case, the product of t h e i r labours was a vast synthesis, a universal, 
i r r e s i s t i b l e theory of development: a general law or explanation 
under which a l l the "facts" of history might be subsumed and a l l o t t e d 
t h e i r special place. The nature of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , i t was be-
li e v e d , was s t r i c t l y determined by h i s t o r i c a l forces. I n the 20th 
century, similar analyses have been undertaken i n the work of Spengler, 
Toynbee and^on a d i f f e r e n t plane, by Karl Jaspers. 
Maine's own scheme of analysis was, however, much less am-
b i t i o u s . His concern, as he said, was to understand the nature of 
contemporary progressive society by r e f e r r i n g t o those less fortunate 
c i v i l i s a t i o n s which had remained i n a stationary condition. But t h i s 
i n i t s e l f would not necessarily exclude him from the f o l d of universal 
historians. Ranke, fo r example, was amongst those who believed "World 
h i s t o r y was the history of the West,"-'- vThat does exclude Maine i s that 
he was only interested i n a l i m i t e d aspect of that h i s t o i y , namely, i n 
the character of man's earliest social ideas and i n s t i t u t i o n s . That he 
was not prepared to develop a complete history of man's evolution must 
not, as i t has been indicated above, be misconstrued. He clearly f e l t 
that a detailed analysis of the whole of western society's evolution 
could be of great value, as there had been important periods since the 
breakdown of ancient society which had been i n f l u e n t i a l i n contributing 
to the make up of contemporary culture. (Witness, f o r example, the 
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p e c u l i a r i t i e s of modern land law attributable to the feudal period.) 
Faced w i t h an overwhelming amount of material, Maine dealt with the 
area he considered of greatest importance. Once the germs of a l l the 
important concepts had been delineated i n t h e i r primeval form, then the -
tracing of t h e i r l a t e r manifestation would not only be much easier, 
i t . ; would be much more productive of significant information; .In short, the 
f u l l implications of a concept's l a t e r developments could only be 
appreciated i f i t s o r i g i n a l function was also borne i n mind. S i r 
Frederick Pollock admirably sums up the role which Maine played i n 
laying down t h i s foundation of h i s t o r i c a l research. 
Nowadays i t may be said that " a l l have got the seed," 
but t h i s i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' f o r forgetting who f i r s t 
cleared and sowed the ground. V/e may t i l l the f i e l d s 
the master l e f t untouched, and one man w i l l bring'a 
better ox t o yoke the plough, and another a worse, 
but i t i s the master's plough a t i l l . 2 
Although an inquiry i n t o early c i v i l i s a t i o n as a prelude to 
an understanding of the present or future, or even as the basis of p o l i t -
i c a l a c t i v i t y , i s now regarded as either unnecessary or inappropriate, 
such inquiries are not unknown. Indeed, the highly regarded German t h i n -
ker Karl Jaspers, i n his work The Origin and Goal of History, uses a 
method similar t o that of Maine as a basis f o r his speculations. A com-
parison of some of the points of contact might be useful i n understanding 
Maine's position. 
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Neither Jaspers nor Maine attempts t o define the nature of 
man i n prehistory. Unquestionably, Maine woip-d "syjnpathize with Jaspers' 
view that "Prehistory i s that section of the past which, although i t 
i s i n fact the foundation of a l l that comes a f t e r . * i s i t s e l f un-
known . . , /"and yet_7. . , The evolution of man i n prehistory i s 
the development of the basic elements constituting humanity. His evol-
utio n i n h i s t o i y i s an unfolding of inherited contents of a s p i r i t u a l 
and technical nature. The basic constitution took animmeasiirable per-
iod of time i n which to develop; by contrast, h i s t o r i c a l evolution has 
the appearance of something taking temporary shape i n works, notions, 
thoughts and s p i r i t u a l configurations on the broad and deep foundations 
of humanity, which was evolved i n prehistory and i s s t i l l real today. 
. . . H i s t o r i c a l consciousness i s now confronted by the major question 
of man's basic stock as inherited from the ages before history, of t h i s 
universal fundament of humanity. Man i s alive with subterranean forces 
from the ages during which t h i s human nature came into being. I f we 
could know prehistory we should gain an insight into one of the funda-
mental substances of humanity, by watching i t come into existence, by 
seeing the conditions and situations that made i t what i t is."3 
Jaspers continued that by securing a knowledge of prehistory, 
the primary motives underlying man's a c t i v i t i e s , which were shaped i n 
* my i t a l i c s 
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t h i s unrecorded era and yet remained beneath the veneer of c i v i l i s a t i o n , 
might be better understood and even moulded i n such a fashion as t o 
avoid stumbling i n t o the abyss of a new Stone Age. Maine, too, regretted 
the non-availability of r e l i a b l e evidence regarding the earliest stages 
of c i v i l i s a t i o n since such material that was accessible confirmed his 
b e l i e f that the understanding of society i n i t s simpler, primeval forms, 
could prove an invaluable instrument fo r appreciating the contemporary 
vforld. He believed that the evidence showed t h a t , 
. . . the differences which, after ages of change, 
separate the c i v i l i s e d man from the savage or bar-
barian, are not so great as the vulgar opinion would 
have them.' Man has changed much i n Western Europe, 
but i t i s singular how much of the savage there s t i l l 
i s i n him . . 
I t i s hardly surprising that with such sympathies these two wr i t e r s , f r u s -
t r a t e d i n t h e i r knowledge of prehistory, should, nevertheless, f e e l that 
to construct a detailed framework of man's early s o c i a l organisation would 
s t i l l be of great importance i n understanding man's evolution. 
Maine f e l t that the most sig n i f i c a n t area of investigation was 
the era i n which man's social organisation was structured around the pat-
r i a r c h a l family. I t was i n the ideas i m p l i c i t i n t h i s primordial asso-
c i a t i o n that the fundamental concepts regarding man's social l i f e had been 
germinated. I t was true that l a t e r periods had often been decisive i n 
shaping the character of futxure development. Consider f o r example the 
era of c o d i f i c a t i o n through which a l l societies passed, or that i n which 
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the b e l i e f i n Natural Law held sway i n the western world; but 
these influences had either to f r u s t r a t e or encourage the o r i g i n a l 
ideas produced by the patriardhal society. For Jaspers, however, 
the decisive age i n man's development, v/hich he calls the 'axial 
period', i s that point i n human h i s t o i y which " . . . gave b i r t h to 
everything which, since then, man has been able t o be, the point 
most overwhelmingly f r u i t f u l i n fashioning humanity . . . / " i t ia_J 
. . . t o be found i n the period around 500 B.C., i n the s p i r i t u a l 
process that occurred between 800 and 200 B.C. I t i s there that we 
meet w i t h the most deep cut dividing l i n e i n hi s t o i y . Man as we know 
him today came i n t o being."5 Thus, although the actual periods vihich 
Maine and Jaspers selected as crucial f o r the history of mankind were 
not the same, they did agree on the more fundamental question of method-
ology: i t was only by reference to an epoch of history i n which man.'s 
contemporary heritage had been given i t s i n i t i a l form that a correct 
perspective of the present, and for Jaspers, the future also, could be 
secured. 
Maine was content t o I L i i i t his studies to a detailed analysis 
of ancient society and i n t h i s essentially conservative approach he i s 
set apart from many of his contemporaries. He was resolved to produce 
a f u l l and detailed account of the past based on the available evidence, 
eschewing a l l methods which vrent beyond the'facts' to defend some grandoise 
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and inevitable pattern of development. We may agree vdth Diamond who 
points out that Maine's own analysis r e a l l y rests upon very limited 
h i s t o r i c a l material. But even allowing t h i s , the whole atmosphere of 
his work i s of a much more moderate kind than that of many 19th cen-
tu r y historians. 
Unfortunately, Maine made l i t t l e comment on the various exam-
ples of historicism so prevalent among his peers, but perhaps some 
ind i c a t i o n of his attitude might be gleaned from a reference made to var-
ious sjrsteraatizers when recommending the virtues of Austin's approach 
to jurisprudence: 
Now nothing could be more unfortunate for the 
philosophy of law than the "Province of J u r i s -
prudence Determined" should come to be regarded 
simply as Austin's system - as standing by the 
side of Blackstone's or Hegel's or any other sys-
tem - as interchangeable with i t or equivalent to 
i t . 6 
Thus despite certain comparisons which have been made between Maine and 
Hegel, Maine himself seems to have had l i t t l e regard f o r the system 
builders. We may agree with the a r t i c l e on Maine i n the 1902 edition of 
the Encyclopedia Britannica ^ vhich states t h a t : "Foreign readers of Maine 
have perhaps understood even better than English ones that he i s not the 
propounder of a system but the pioneer of a method."' Pollock made much 
the same point i n his introduction to Ancient Law when he rejected the 
c r i t i c i s m made by continental scholars, namely that Maine's work f a i l e d 
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t o present a complete systematic construction, a finished whole. I t 
was simply not his i n t e n t i o n to produce such a work, his aims were 
modest, merely to make some contribution to legal history and i t s method-
ology. 
The nature of t h i s methodology has been alluded t o , i t was 
the application of the c r i t i c a l techniques of the great German school 
of history to legal studies. Maine believed that thought could only 
be understood completely when the society which had produced i t had also 
been comprehended, and vice-versa. Consequently, he aimed at a thor-
oughly detached and objective analysis of the past, l i f t i n g history out 
of the realm of retrospective p o l i t i c s and romantic interpretations, 
which i n the works of Carlyle and Macaulay were s t i l l prevalent i n the 
19th century. He vfished to v-rrite a more s c i e n t i f i c kind of history, 
an appraisal of events and ideas as objective as any of the treatises 
to be found i n natural science. 
Assuming for the moment that such a history i s possible, what 
would be the r esult? Would generalisations regarding the past be the 
l i m i t s of such a s c i e n t i f i c method? Or, would Maine j o i n the ranks of 
those 19th century historians who claimed Elijah's mantle and insisted 
that because of t h e i r knowledge of the laws of history, the future con-
d i t i o n of mankind had been revealed t o them? With regard t o the l a t t e r , 
c l e a r l y not; f o r although Maine did make frequent use of s c i e n t i f i c 
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analpgies, claimed to be u t i l i s i n g s c i e n t i f i c methodology, and hoped 
t o secure s c i e n t i f i c generalisations, his actual work offers l i t t l e 
t o support such claims. He was a h i s t o r i a n , not a historiographer, 
and his admiration f o r science, fortunately, had l i t t l e impact on 
his work which continued t o be careful, moderate and h i s t o r i c a l . I n 
his f l i r t a t i o n w i t h the language of science, however, and the l i m i t e d 
use t o which he a c t u a l l y put i t s methods, Maine might be coiqiared w i t h 
another great 19th centviry anthropologist, E.B. T y l o r , As I r v i n g Gold-
man i n his a r t i c l e "Evolution and Anthropology" maintained, ". , o ' l y l o r 
was d i f f i d e n t about o f f e r i n g grand evolutionary concepts, although l i k e 
his contemporaries, he spoke f r e e l y of 'laws' and of 'uniform stages' 
of development. Maine v/as concerned simply with generalising the pro-
cess of change from the past to the present. Regarding the future, he 
TrTOuld probably, because of his great f a i t h i n the efficacy of ideas i n 
producing radical change, be i n synqjathy with those views expressed by 
Karl Popper i n The Poverty of Historicism. Here Popper argued that the 
predic t i o n of a future order of society was impossible simply because 
man's future state of knowledge could not be known i n the present. 
But often the u t i l i s a t i o n of history was not taken t o such 
extreme lengths: without postulating any future Utopia, i t covild be 
used, so i t was thought, as a guide t o p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y - a useful 
source of precedents f o r determining r a t i o n a l conduct. This essentially 
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p r a c t i c a l and moderate approach was much more popular among the English 
historians than the more ambitious continental philosophers of history. 
I t was exemplified i n the works of such men as Seely, who according to 
E.E. K:ellett, refused to c a l l anyone a true historian vAio f a i l e d to 
draw v a l i d p o l i t i c a l conclusions from t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l i n q u i r i e s , ^ and 
one of Maine's own students, the Comtist Frederic. Harrison. I n his 
book The Meaning of History. Harrison, not follovdng his master Comte 
too closely at t h i s point, presents a very clear statement of t h i s second, 
p r a c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the past. The work may be used as a focal 
point i n the examination of t h i s view point. 
The broad outline of Harrison's position i s that the v/hole of 
our present world i s the product of the past: our i n s t i t u t i o n s , customs, 
t r a d i t i o n s , forms of ar t and science, language and manner of thought - a l l 
of man's consciousness, i n f a c t , i s the product of his past development. 
Without a knowledge of the world's heritage, irrespective of the i n t e l l i -
gence of man, ". . . i t would be impossible to think, for the world would 
present one vast chaos. . ."^^ Indeed, without a knowledge of what has 
passed away the very process of thought i t s e l f would be unattainable. 
The c i v i l i s a t i o n i n t o which one i s born provides both the form and the 
content of communication, without which man would be reduced to the lev e l 
of the animal. Harrison continues: 
Now, i f t h i s be tru e , i f we are so deeply indebted 
• and so indissolubly bound to preceding ages, i f a l l 
our hopes of the future depend ort a sound understand-
-176-
Ing of the past, we cannot fancy any 
Ifligwledge ^'mpret :,importantttKan-,the" knbwl-"-
edge..of' the way i n which c i v i l i s a t i o n has 
been b u i l t u p . l l 
Soci@ty i s an organism'.with i t s own laws of growth and consequently 
change must be i n accordance with natural processes unless some mon-
strous deformed creature i s to be born. "Nothing but a thorough knowledge 
•of the social system based upon a regular study of i t s growth, can 
give us the power we require to affect i t . For t h i s end we need one 
thing above a l l - we need history."12 The position i s thus clear, every 
account must be taken of history i f p o l i t i c a l action i s to be meaningful. 
But t h i s l a t e 19th century application of history t o p o l i t i c s i s much 
more sophisticated that some of the crude practices of the 18th and 19th 
centuries; Harrison himself made d i r e c t reference to the use of history 
as a mere store of p o l i t i c a l maxims and suggested that i t ". . . might 
do more harm than good. You may j u s t i f y anything by a pointed example 
i n history."13 Harrison might agree with Sidgwick t h a t , regarding the 
evolution of society, "history i s past p o l i t i c s , p o l i t i c s present h i s -
t o r y , "^^ but t h i s did not reduce t h e i r discussion to the l e v e l of sup-
porting \ p r i o r i doctrines by an appropriate selection.of h i s t o r i c a l 
evidence, 
Maine had sympathy with the p r a c t i c a l employment of history 
as advocated by the p o s i t i v i s t s . His'whole scheme of inquiry had been 
to correlate ancient and modern thought ivith the view of making the l a t t e r 
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more i n t e l l i g i b l e . But the major question of his i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with 
Harrison's style of history i s t o determine his attitude t o the role 
which he saw history performing i n bringing about r a t i o n a l change. Both 
Maine's concept of h i s t o r i c a l growth and his position on p o l i t i c a l change 
have been discussed. Vfhat i s required novf i s t o elucidate the nature of 
t h e i r relationship. Some d i f f i c u l t y i s apparent at t h i s point as Maine's 
position i s unclear. He seems to hold two views of a contradictory nature: 
one, indicative of a b e l i e f i n h i s t o r i c a l i n e v i t a b i l i t y ; the other, sug-
gestive of a b e l i e f i n change according to man's resolution of inconsis-
tencies w i t h i n the existing social structure. To make clear the r e l a t i o n -
ship existing between his h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l work, i t i s necessary 
that these positions be analysed i n t h e i r most extreme manifestations. 
The f i r s t standpoint would seem to indicate that Maine f e l t 
c e r tain generalisations could be made regarding the laws of social change, 
and that once these had been discovered and understood, then, as i n 
science, the future course of certain events could be forecast w i t h i n the 
l i m i t s imposed by the possible impact of new ideas. Various references 
implying such assumptions occur throughout Maine's works, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
w i t h regard to the growth of law. For example, i n discussing the i n t r o -
duction of the Benthamite notion of sanction i n t o Indian Law, he suggested 
that t h i s minor innovation had necessitated the modification of Hindu 
Law to a much greater degree than had ever been anticipated. But, he 
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continued, "No hatter proof could be given that, though i t be improper 
to employ these terms sovereign, subject, command, obligation, right, 
sanction, of law i n certain stages of human thought, they nevertheless 
correspond to a stage to which law is steadily tending and which i t is 
sure ultimately to reach. "•'•^  Or again, i n his early lecture on Roman 
Law he maintained, " I t is not because our own jurisprudence and that of 
Rome were once alike that they ought to be studied together - i t i s be-
cause they w i l l be alike. I t i s because a l l laws, hovrever dissimilar . 
i n their infancy, tend to resemble each other i n their maturity. "-^^ And 
later i n the same essay, he stressed t h i s point again by claiming that 
one of the attractions of Roman Law is i t s power. ". . . o f enabling us, 
by the observation of i t s own progress, to learn something of the course 
of development which everybody of legal rules i s destined to follow."17 
These examples have been drawn from Maine's reflections on law, but he 
indicated i n his article "Mr. Godkin on Popular Government" that his own 
belief i n i n e v i t a b i l i t y might be extended to cover a wider f i e l d . The 
point which he v/as making was that societies rested upon factors inde-
pendent of human nature. This, he believed, certain deductive thinkers, 
including J.S. M i l l , had failed to realize. Societies should be seen as 
"... organisms with a development and laws of their own."-'-^  Unfortun-
ately, Maine refused to discuss this thesis at any length since i t lay 
beyond his immediate purposes, but i t is a concept which seemed to lend 
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support to the argument that he held some belief i n autonomous laws of 
society. 
For the moment, then, i t would seem that one could confidently 
identifjr Maine's position with that of Harrison and suggest that he 
believed history to be the key to politics which unlocked the mysteries 
of the future by presenting an incontrovertible process of change. Pol-
i t i c a l activity was concerned merely to realize the dictates of history. 
Indeed, our confidence i n such a conclusion is heightened when we find 
Maine stating that, ". . . i f not the only function, the chief function 
of Comparative Jurisprudence i s to f a c i l i t a t e legislation and the prac-
20 
t i c a l improvement of law. . ." He continues that, ". . .by the exam-
ination and comparisonv.of.'ilaws, the most valuable materials are obtained 
for legal improvement. There is no branch of judicial enquiry more im-
portant than t h i s , and none from which I expect that the laws of our 
cotmtry vri.ll derive more advantage, when i t has thoroughly engrafted 
i t s e l f upon our legal education."^l I t must be remembered that Maine 
identified the Comparative with the Historical Method, and so his argu-
ment at this point is equally applicable to what has been termed his 
historical analysis. But, before asserting conclusively that he does 
belong to the same positivist t radition as Harrison and his colleagues, 
the negative aspect of the case must be discussed. 
In his essay, "The Effects of the Observation of India on Mod-
ern European Thought", the Rede Lecture for>1875, Maine rejected the thesis 
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that, because several property had been found to be of more recent origin 
than property i n common, those agents attacking private property and de-
manding a return to the natural condition of communism, gained the advan-
tage of historical support on the basis of communism's historical primacy. 
His position was, and i t constitutes the foundation of this particular 
interpretation: " I t i s not the business of the scientific historical en-
quirer to assert good or e v i l of any particular institution. He deals 
with i t s existence and development, not with i t s expediency."22 por Maine 
then, scientific history was non-prescriptive^ i n essence, i t simply en-
abled man's knowledge of his present world to become more meaningful. His-
tory was valuable because i t was "true", "a portion of the truth which i t 
is the object of a l l study to attain."23 i t provided man aith the heri-
tage of his ancestors. Certainly, at this point, he did not feel that his-
tory revealed any particular policy lines to be realized i n the p o l i t i c a l 
sphere. Maine definitely rejected any idea of an elite of social scien-
t i s t s directing society on principles derived from "history" i n the manner 
advocated by Comte and Ernest Renan. Rather, i n man's p o l i t i c a l affairs, 
Maine favoured the continuisd dominance of a traditional aristocracy i n the 
perfoimance of what i s an 'extremely practical kind of business'. They 
alone possessed the necessaiy wisdom - the inherited feeling for the i n s t i -
tutions, customs and ethos of a country - an i n t u i t i v e , rather than rat-
ional p o l i t i c a l knowledge. 
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The two positions have thus been outlined. On the one hand, 
Maine seems to assert that history reveals certain paths along which i t 
seems inevitable that all"societies must pass. Political action i n this 
case i s simply concerned with preparing the ground for the unfolding of 
a necessary development. On the other hand, i t is.suggested that his-
tory i s simply a body of knowledge which could explain, but not pre-
scribe. P o l i t i c a l action is creative i n i t s own right. However, al-. 
though these two approaches may individually form the basis £or inter- . 
pretating Maine's writings, a third approaeh, and i t ' is suggested a 
case more representative of his true position, remains to be delineated. 
I t i s a position which lies between the two extreme cases which have been 
outlined above and i t can, therefore, best be described by presenting 
these i n their more moderate forms, by moving towards the centre of the 
continuum. 
Taking the positive interpretation of history f i r s t , i t might 
be argued that Maine f e l t no r i g i d policy directives could be deduced 
from the past since the laws of development were of a much too general 
nature to be of any practical benefit. In any case, the p o l i t i c a l 
decision whether or not to attempt to guide society along new paths had 
to be made by using other than h i s t o r i c a l considerations. History was 
v i t a l , however, i n providing the essential knowledge of the framework 
within which one was acting J i t provided the evidence or material on Tiihich 
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-the"- value-judgements of politics could be made with some degree of 
confidence. But the actual p o l i t i c a l decision i t s e l f was quite separ-
ate from the historical world. I t 'existed' i n the realm of values; 
i t was concerned with what was considered 'ought to be'. 
Politics, for Maine, was continually a response to circum-
stance.', and i t was history which gave the fullest account of whatever 
circumstances existed at any time. But the two worlds of history and 
politics could not be equated or identified i n Maine's schema: though 
closely integrated, the two disciplines remained logically independent. 
For Maine, then, continuity with the past was a necessity and not a duty; 
i t was, however, not the blind acquiescence i n the here and novf or some 
immutable law of progress. This point might be illustrated f rora Maine's 
Village Communities. After insisting that history was not concerned with 
expediency, Maine continued; "But one conclusion he may properly draw from 
the facts bearing on the subject before us. Nobody i s at liberty to at-
tack several property and to say at the same time that he values c i v i l i -
sation. The history of the two cannot be disentangled."24 I n i t i a l l y , 
this might appear a rather dubious point to quote i n favour of the pro-
position that Maine believed history offers contemporary man no specific 
p o l i t i c a l directives. Indeed, i t has been chosen especially because i t 
i s a point which, though i n i t s e l f offering no grounds for such an inter-
pretation, has been misconstrued i n this way by certain writers. For 
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instance, Craine Brinton i n his work English Pol i t i c a l Thought i n the 
19th Century ridiculed Maine by claiming "Histoiy may not be philosophy 
teaching by example, but she does not refuse to teach truths convenient 
for an English gentleman with a dislike for socialism."25 But, i f Maine's 
statement i s examined more cldsely, i t can be seen that he was not sup-
porting the p o l i t i c a l disposition which Brinton obviously thought him to 
be. He w&s simply presenting a generalisation regarding the nature of 
western progressive society. By comparing primitive and modern society, 
i t was clear that modern civ i l i s a t i o n vras characterised by the phenomenon 
of the individual and the necessities requisite to his survival, the chief 
one of which Maine saw as private property. Clearly, i f private property 
were abolished, then an important foundation of individuality would have 
been destroyed, and the whole character of western society as i t then 
existed would have been changed. I t was obvious that Maine f e l t that 
p o l i t i c a l l y such a change would be for the worse, since he believed that 
progress and also happiness are dependent on individualism. But, as a 
point of fact, his original assertion i s p o l i t i c a l l y neutral. He had 
presented vrhat he considered w ould b e the result of a certain line of 
action, but whether such action was to be taken was a'decision which the 
scientific historian, qua historian, vias not competent to make. Thus 
there can be no question of Maine's having committed the naturalistic 
fallacy: he did hot attempt to derive p o l i t i c a l ideology from his 'status 
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to contract' theory. But because he supported the virtues of a modern 
contract society p o l i t i c a l l y , com^nentators have been led to argue that 
his p o l i t i c s were derived from his historical position. As Smellie 
said, his historical theory was used as "a text for naive individualism,"26 
suggesting that his p o l i t i c a l ideas had been logically deduced from his 
historical thesis i n the same manner that Marx had derived his. But, 
such an interpretation of Maine's position has been shown to be quite 
false: his historical theory and his p o l i t i c a l sympathies were perfectly 
compatible, but the l a t t e r were not dependent on, or s t r i c t l y deduced 
from, the former. 
I f Maine's historicism i s not as thorough going as i t might 
have appeared at f i r s t sight, i t can also be demonstrated that his f a i t h 
i n a traditional ruling e l i t e does not exclude the util i s a t i o n of histor-
i c a l knowledge. I t has been argued that this key group i n aociety owes 
i t s position to i t s 'wisdom', i t s practical knovfledge: a knowledge which 
is based on an intimate familiarity with the customs and traditions of 
society - a fundamental awareness of the basic cultural heritage. To f u l l y 
appreciate the character of society, i t is essential that some understand-
ing of the development or origin of various practices be grasped. Cer-
tainly, this need not be a very profound view of the process of history, 
but i t i s an understanding essential to effective p o l i t i c a l action. 
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Without i t , p olitics would appear to be based on the kind of a p r i o r i 
reasoning advocated by Rousseau, a view which Maine believed ridicu-
lous. For Maine, then, the practice of politics was a limited activ-
i t y which took place i n the light cast by history, although he did not 
believe either i n an irresistable movement of society or i n attempting 
to deduce p o l i t i c a l maxims from the past. 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF MAINE'S POSITION 
Having thus established the ^ relationship existing between 
the p o l i t i c a l and historical orientations of Maine's work, i t w i l l be 
of some interest to take note of the assumptions upon which the whole 
rests. By comparing ancient and modern civilisations, Maine had no-
ticed that there had been a fundamental change i n the organisation and 
character of the world: i t was the change he described as the movement 
from status to contract. But what was the nature of this change? How 
was i t related to the idea of progress vthlch dominated 19th century 
thought? ?Jhat was i t s relationship to the concept of evolution, and 
how did Maine feel about possible future change? To determine the dynamic 
character of Maine's thought, i t is necessary that i t be seen i n relation 
to these questions which constituted the major preoccupations of 19th cen-
tury social theory. 
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Under the impact of Darwin's Origin of Species i n the 1860's, 
. the concept of Progress entered i t s third stage: by the 'seventies 
and 'eighties, i t had become a general article of fait h . Although, as 
R.G. Collingwood pointed out, the idea of evolution i n nature, a cer-
tain orderly sequence of change, and the idea of historical process i n 
human history were two distinct ideas, together they underlay the 19th 
century concept of Progress. To base progress on evolution. Bury sug-
gests that two assumptions must be made: f i r s t l y , that 'social l i f e 
obeys the same general laws of evolution as nature'; and secondly, that 
'the process involves an increase i n happiness'.^"^ Both of these assump-
tions Maine apparently adopted. 
The most popular and optimistic interpretation of this theory 
of Progress was given by Herbert Spencer. For him, progress was not an 
accident, a matter of lucky chance, i t was necessary: "The ultimate 
development of the ideal man is logically certain - as certain as any 
conclusion i n which we place the most implicit f a i t h ; for instance that 
a l l men w i l l die."28 The object at t h i s point is not to cri t i c i s e the 
various weaknesses i n the concept of progress, but simply to indicate 
the atmosphere of social thought at t he t ime Maine was writing. 
Maine, as we shall see, usually restricted his use of the 
term 'progress' to mean the continual production of new ideas. Neverthe-
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less, he seems to have shared i n the general belief that man was 
happier than he was as l i t t l e as one hundred years ago. Maine made 
this point expressly i n an address t o the students of the University 
of Calcutta i n 1866 when he said: 
Although there i s much i n common between the Present 
and the Past, there i s never so much i n common as to 
make l i f e tolerable to men of the Present, i f they 
could step back into the Past. ' There is no one i n 
this room to whom t he l i f e of a hundred years since 
would not be acute suffering, i f i t could be lived 
over again.29 
This seems a rather uncharacteristic remark from this normally 'mel-
ancholic conservative', who recognised so clearly the r e l a t i v i t y of 
history.* Yet i t does seem to be i n harmony with his t heory of social 
change. Not only vrere men happier than their ancestors had been during 
the childhood of c i v i l i s a t i o n , they experienced, though many refused to 
recognise the fact, higher moral standards. The greater volume of legal 
control i n modern society was not a symptom of the depravity and decline 
of moral standards, i t was an exhibition of a greater social awareness. 
The limited amount of criminal law i n Roman society does not suggest that 
they we2?e governed by a higher morality than our own; "We should rather 
* As Maine often cites India as a 'stationary society' this remark 
might seem contradictory,- but he f e l t that India was changing rap-
idl y under the influence of British rule. 
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say that, i n the interval between their day and ours, morality has 
advanced from a very rude to a highly refined conception. . ."^ ^ 
Underlying Maine's understanding of society's gradual im-
provement i n material and moral terms were certain assumptions which 
must be taken into consideration. Basic to his \<«hole system of thought 
is the notion that Eastern, stationary societies exhibit "... rather 
the infancy of the human mind prolonged than a different maturity from 
that faiSiiilar to us. . ."^ ^ Upon this belief rests the value of his 
comparative-historical method of social investigation and the notion 
common i n the 19th century, that there has been a single, unilinear 
process of evolution. Had he not assumed that progressive societies 
had once been i n the condition of existing 'stationary societies', 
then there would have been l i t t l e point i n examining Hindu society i n 
order t o determine the origins of progressive societies. Once any 
movement was underway, Maine claimed that because of the in?)ortance of 
imitation, a l l societies would tend to move along the same path. An 
example of such a process, he would suggest, is the phenomenon of "west-
ernisation", the increasing similitude of the yftiole world resulting from 
the breakdown of traditional structures through contact with industrial 
peoples. I f there was any movement i n society at a l l i t did appear to 
be along the status-contract axis. But that there should be such a move-
ment was certainly not inevitable, nor was i t giiaranteed that once 
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achieved, the virtues of a contract society could be maintained against 
the dangers of retrogression. I n primitive society, then, a l l the ideas 
of the modem world could be examined i n their earliest form, their 
.original significance being heightened by the con?)arative simplicity of 
ideas i n arrested cultures. 
Implicit i n Maine's theory of social evolution are ideas 
symptomatic of a certain ftmdamentalism characteristic of 19th century 
thought. Indeed, without i t , the whole reason for studying ancient 
society would have been undermined. Certain aspects of this fundamental-
ism have already been indicated, for example, that ancient concepts are 
the "germs" out of which a l l modern ideas have grown, or that there i s , 
i f nothing else, a certain order i n which the various stages i n the growth 
of modern society must occur. The actual extent of this type of belief 
i n Maine's work must now be examined. 
Some assessment of the great role which Maine assigned to 
ideas i n determining events may be gained from the following: 
I f anybody seriously thinks that a great movement 
can neither be started nor arrested by a booK 
written by a thinker i n his closet. he should study 
Mr. Bonar's Malthus and his Work.3* 
This opinion i s maintained throughout Maine's writing. I n Ancient Law 
he isolated certain concepts which he considered to have been absolutely 
crucial for the development of sibciety. Such was the Greek concept of 
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'nature' with i t s notion of simplicity and harmony enabling the Roman's 
to aim at a particular goal i n legal reform and avoid the dangers of 
being ensnared i n religion and superstition. Others were the ideas of 
contract and testamentary succession, ideas vMch Maine regarded as 
essential for the release of the individual from the bondage of the 
Patriarchal Family. Failure to achieve this i n the East contributed to 
i t s stationary character. Following in. the.- t r a i n of these principles 
was the adaptation and adjustment of legal, p o l i t i c a l and social i n s t i -
tutions , but i t was thought vMch was t he pathfinder to the new world 
of greater individuality and progress. Clearly this is a fundamentalist 
theme: i t distinguishes between major and minor causation and insists 
that the above ideas were decisive i n determining the nature of the con-
temporary world. I n this modem world Maine perceived that progress was 
intimately connected with a number of considerations. These were the 
interrelated ideas of individualism, private property and contract. Re-
garding contract Maine f e l t that, "... a l l the modern progress of soc-
iety seemed to be intimately connected with the completest freedom of 
contract, and i n some way eiLmost mysteriously dependent on i t . ..."^ ^ 
Given then the particular ideas which Maine found to have been of such 
great importance i n the modern world, contract, private property, etc., 
i t is hardly surprising that,, even allowing for the fact that his politics 
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were not logically deduced from his wider social generalisations, 
these views should have been reflected i n his p o l i t i c a l opinions. 
Now i n the same way i n v/hich i t was found useful to com-
pare the framework of Maine's historical method with those of his 
contemporaries, so i t v d l l be of some value to see the assumptions 
underlying this approach i n relation to those of other systems. The 
bases of 19th century social theory might be seen as exhibiting a 
number of mythologies, and although these were of a multifarious na-
ture, i n essence they can perhaps be reduced to three main types.' 
The f i r s t and most widespread was the myth that man was subject to 
historical lav/s of development which he could not control - that an 
unseen hauid controlled the d estiny of mankind. The second, ;'rtiich 
was of great importance i n English thought, was the opinion that man 
himself \vas i n a sense divine. He could determine the character of 
societyJ he alone was responsible for the great technological c i v i l -
isation and had perfectability within his grasp. Finally, there was 
the concept that man was neither God nor automaton, but a creature 
capable of greatness or self-destruction. 
The f i r s t of these ideas has been discussed i n '.'Jerner Stark's 
book Social Theory and Christian Thought : A Study of Some Points of 
Contaet -.vhere he demonstrated t hat certain of the assumptions under-
lying 19th century social theory held implications which the social 
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prophets had failed to realize. He held that the association of social 
theory with myth or religion was f i r s t developed by St. Augustine, who 
insisted that everjrbhing i n t he universe had i t s divinely ordained sta-
tion and function - that even e v i l had a specific purpose in God's Divine 
Plan. Stark continued that, " I t is a far cry from these sentiments, 
characterised as they are by the deepest faith i n a personal God. . . to 
such deistical or atheistical writers as Adam Smith and Kant, or Hegel 
and Marx. Nevertheless, the structure of their thought is very tclose, not 
to say identical with, that of Augustine. A l l four, together with the 
whole host of their followers, were convinced that there operates i n his-
tory and society a hidden law which co-ordinates and combines the dis-
jointed and selfish actions of individuals into a great s ocial order or 
process which achieves other, and indeed, better, in the sense of more 
moral, effects than they have ever contemplated or desired. The theo-
logical meaning has dropped out, but the doctrine of the 'het^erogony of 
purposes' has remained - remained at the Very heart of sociological think-
ing. . ."34 I n each of the positions adopted by this group of thinkers, 
the basic idea was that despite a l l the selfish attitudes of individual 
man, the movement i n society would alv;ays be towards a position of social 
integration, whether this meant the increasing social benefits of laissea-
faire capitalist society or the classless state prophesized by Marx. 
The world was. goveraeddby an unknown force, a Will which realized i t s pur-
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poses, through, or i n spite of, the conflicting wills of the members 
of society. None of these writers acknowledged this mythical char-
acter of their thought; often they were violent c r i t i c s of the drama-
tised version of the human condition provided by Christianity. Bufe-
whether they called the superhuman force vriiich governed events his-
tory, science, or a world s p i r i t , that force, i n a l l i t s essential as-
pects, may be identified with Augustine's V/ill of God, with the concept 
of the ' heterogony of purposes'. Even Danvinianism, usually regarded 
as the great opponent of metaphysical assumption, actually helped to 
establish this "sub-theological" tradition more firmly than ever i n the 
social sciences. The theory of Natural Selection i n i t s e l f , according 
to Wundt, could not account for the useful variations which developed 
i n various gjecies. The possibilities of sufficient numbers achieving 
the same variations and being a ble to establish and propagate i t s e l f 
were infinitesraal. To account for variations, therefore, Wundt f e l l 
back on " w i l l " and the idea that the subjective w i l l issues i n objective 
consequences which correspond, not to" the v^ills which initiated them, 
but to a purpose beyond them. I t was thus a restatement of the heterogony 
of purposes. This can -perhaps be considered the major myth of the 19th 
century, but the alternatives held their attractions for others. 
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The second myth i s i n many respects similar to the t e l e -
o l o g i c a l north discussed above. I n i t the notion of a transcendental 
power i s replaced by a human agency. The power to change the world 
i s the power of human knowledge, p a r t i c u l a r l y s c i e n t i f i c knov/ledge. 
This i s the belief which underlay the great radical movements of the 
modern world. Beginning i n the Enlightenment philosophies of the 18th 
century, the b e l i e f was conveyed to the 19th century by the u t i l i t a r i a n s 
w i t h i n t h e i r schema based on the p r i n c i p l e of the Greatest Happiness of 
the Greatest Number. I t was passed: on to the 20th century by the Fabian 
Socialists through t h e i r t r u s t i n the power of organised administration. 
There was no need t o via.it f o r some unseen hand t o create the new millen-
nium, man had the knowledge and s k i l l w ith wiiich t o bu i l d i t , step by 
step, here and now. 
Mow where does Maine stand i n respect of these two traditions? 
The fact that he rarely mentioned Christian thought i n his work, or that 
his religious convictionswere not s u f f i c i e n t l y powerful to enable him 
to secure a fellowship at T r i n i t y i n 1845 by taking Holy Orders, are re a l l y 
of l i t t l e use i n assessing the assumptions which:'.formed the basis of his 
theories. I t would seem, however, that his confidence i n the efficacy of 
private property and the freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l i n producing progress 
indicates some leanings towards Augustinianism. Indeed, his sympathies 
with Adam Smith appear to have been of some import. With him, Maine would 
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certa i n l y agree that man i s essentially a contract-making animal, and 
that through the selfishness of economic competition, a form of natural 
selection, men increased the s o c i a l b e n e f i t , or as Spencer cared t o put 
i t , d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n goes hand i n hand w i t h integration. Like a l l the 
classical economists, Maine was ready bo lend support t o the thesis that 
the i n i t i a t i v e of the ind i v i d u a l was the springboard of a l l progress. I t 
i s also true t h a t , l i k e so many 19th century social thinkers, he had i n -
dicated t h a t he believed society was to some extent governed by laws which 
were i n some way independent of the a c t i v i t i e s of individuals vfithin soc-
i e t y . This implies that he saw the great law of evolution as i n some way 
independent of man's conscious design, a position which would t i e i n with 
the concept of some external force determining events. Maine, i t has been 
suggested, did not see f i t to develop t h i s point and consequently, i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t to draw any r i g i d conclusion. Certainly the i?est of his work 
f a i l s t o reveal any great sympathies wi t h t h i s particular strand of myth-
ology. He was of a much less optimistic disposition than either Spencer 
or Smith. He could not see any evidence which seemed t o support a grand 
design thesis, and t h i s alone one would imagine i s s u f f i c i e n t t o disso-
ciate him from the band of Augustinians. But f a i l u r e t o qualify as a 
participant i n t h i s sub-theological t r a d i t i o n does not necessarily e n t a i l 
any guaranteed fellovrship with his more 'profane' contemporaries. I n 
f a c t , i t was against t h i s t r a d i t i o n of thought p a r t i c u l a r l y and i t s ex-
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treme u t i l i t a r i a n manifestations that Maine had directed a l i f e - l o n g 
attack. Their f a i t h i n a part i c u l a r organisation of society applicable 
anywhere and at anytime was an anathema to Maine. The crude and clumsy 
instruments of reform advocated by these thinkers were t o t a l l y inappro-
p r i a t e , being the product of a grossly si m p l i f i e d view of the real 
nature of social change. The fundamental error involved i n t h i s par-
t i c u l a r niyth was the substitution of technical knowledge for the h i s -
t o r i c a l understanding of society. Society was not a s t a t i c organisation, 
but a l i v i n g thing - the product of a history from which i t could not 
be separated. To dismiss the past as a record of human f a i l u r e , as 
Rousseau and the u t i l i t a r i a n s had done, was t o remove the root of present 
society from i t s source of l i f e . 
The two myths have underpinned the various alternative, ^ teach-
ings which have been contrastedwith Maine's position i n history and 
p o l i t i c s throughout t h i s essay. They are, however, but two, alb e i t 
major ones, of many themes interwoven with 19th century p o l i t i c a l thought. 
Maine's own mythological in s p i r a t i o n i s primarily Greek, to be more, exact, 
A r i s t o t e l i a n . A r i s t o t l e contended that although man was not the mere 
plaything of a transcendental deity, neither was he capable of coherent 
action without taking cognisance of the circumstances i n which he found 
himself. I n a world of change, i t i s the t a s k of the statesman to 
secure ordered development by cultivab ing the inner potential of favourable 
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circumstance. I n t h i s process, careless husbandry would bli n d men 
to dangers, and lead them to iuprudent adventvires. Maine's position 
i s c l e a r l y very similar t o t h i s . He would seem t o belong to the Greek 
t r a d i t i o n of considering man ailmost semi-divine i n his greatest achieve-
ments, but at one with the lowest creatures i n his subjection to the 
fundamental laws of nature. R. Huyghe gave expression to t h i s particular 
myth vriien he daid, " . . . They a l l suffer from man's dua l i t y ; man hanging 
t o r n , between two poles: one i s s t i l l i n contact w i t h the ^ east, the 
other already reaching up to God. This i s man's unsolvable paradox."35 
I n p o l i t i c s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , the r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by the material with 
which one must work are most apparent. Man must be a craftsman i f he i s 
to succeed i n r e a l i z i n g the good society. 
CCmmPGRAm INTERPRETATIONS OF MAINE'S THOaGHT 
Modem interpretations of Maine's system of thought now recog-
nise the close connection between his h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l studies, 
but the exact nature of the association i s s t i l l a matter of contention. 
On the one hand are interpretations l i k e those of Brian Smith and K.B. 
Smellie, who regard Popular Government as a caricafeure of Ancient Law. 
They see both as essentially concerned t o show the uniqueness of c i v i l -
i s a t i o n and to give warning of the threat t o i t from the advocates of 
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irresponsible \ p r i o r i doctrines. On the other hand i s the analysis 
offered by G.A. Feaver, who, using new materials - anonymous revievj-
a r t i c l e s which have recently come to l i g h t - suggests that although 
Ancient Law and Popular Government'"are connected, the l a t t e r i s more 
a reaction t o , than an implementation of, the themes expressed i n the 
former. 
B.C. Smith i n his a r t i c l e , "Maine'sConcept of Progress", 
develops • the idea that Maine thought that freedom of contract, several 
property and i n d i v i d u a l i t y were not simply manifestations of c i v i l i s a t i o n , 
but constituted i t s very basis. At one point. Smith commits the fa l l a c y 
of i d e n t i t y * suggesting that Maine "defines c i v i l i s a t i o n i n terms of 
several property. . 9"^^ when he was ^mply claiming that several pro-
perty had been the most powerful of a 'vast variety of solvent influences' 
i n creating modern c i v i l i s a t i o n . Smith continues: 
An analysis of the defence of contract and private 
property, together vfith some consideration of Maine's 
d e f i n i t i o n of i n t e l l e c t u a l progress, f a c i l i t a t e an 
understanding of the motive behind Popular Govern-
ment . 37 
* See "The Proof of U t i l i t y i n Bentham and M i l l " ; E.W. H a l l j Ethics, 
1949-50 f o r a discussion bf t h i s f a l l a c y . But a very crude exaiaple 
t o indicate the idea would be to say smoke i s f i r e , when, i n f a c t , 
they simply occur at the same time. 
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This argues that Maine was defending the virtues of 19th century 
l i b e r a l i s m , or. t o be more precise, the "Old Liberal" view of p o l i t i c s , 
a p o s i t i o n which moved increasingly t o the right i n defiance of the 
threat of democratic mediocrity. I t was a more masculine liberalism 
than t h a t expounded by J.S. M i l l , and claiming such scholars as F i t z -
James Stephen, Maine and Sidgwick, found i t s most able representative 
i n the Commons i n the figure of Robert Lowe.; 
Feaver, however, argues that such a laissez-faire interpre-
t a t i o n of Maine's, work i s unsatisfactory. Even allowing that past 
progress had resulted from the:release of the individual from ascriptive 
l e g a l t i e s , he continues: 
I t by no means follows that Maine would welcome the 
uncontrolled continuation of that process. V/hat was 
t o concern Maine " i n his mature p o l i t i c a l "studies was 
the e x p l i c i t regognition of (indeed, alarm at) what 
he had implied elsewhere i n fcis volume on "Ancient Law'.' 
Along with the general tendency towards the removal of 
formalized l e g a l restraints ( s t a t u s ) , he surmized, went 
an increased degree of social and p o l i t i c a l freedom t o , 
a freedom he hinted most people were incapable of han-
dli n g . 38 
Feaver maintains t h a t , even i n Ancient Law, Maine had recognised the 
dangers of his social theory and had suggested that . .'the movement 
of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement of status to con-
t r a c t ' (underline added),"39 the inference being that Maine thought that 
t h i s process had gone quite f a r enough already. The p o l i t i c a l implication, 
Feaver argues, was that Maine did not consider the mass of society capable 
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of meeting a l l the demands of legal freedom, and that the creative 
aristocracy which had previously been free from mob control would be 
" . . . sacrificed before the a l t a r of l e v e l l i n g democracy."^ Fur-
thermore, following on the achievement of p o l i t i c a l power by the masses 
we might expect that there would be a new demand for order. The ' a n t i -
i n d i v i d u a l ' would bring about a new era of t o t a l i t a r i a n barbarity; a 
nm period of status i n which the i n d i v i d u a l was submerged. Attempting 
t o f i n d support f o r t h i s thesis i n Maine's j o u r n a l i s t i c w r i t i n g s , Feaver 
claims t h a t , 
A cursory reading of Maine's p o l i t i c a l v/ritings leave 
no doubt that he feared ary democratizing repurcussions 
from the continued removal of t r a d i t i o n a l legal irestraints. 
Progress consisted rather i n a f i n e balance,"a partership 
i n society vdiich joined the r a t i o n a l few capable of legal' 
freedom^ and those less fortunate who needed t r a d i t i o n a l 
authority.41 
Maine's f a i t h i n future progress, then, on Feaver's interpretation, de-
pended on the continued freedom of the creative e l i t e and the legal bond-
age of the masses. The whole movement of h i s t o r i c a l development had to be 
stopped by p o l i t i c a l action i f c i v i l i s a t i o n was to be preserved. 
The basic difference betvreen the two interpretations seems t o 
be that Feaver thought that the previously beneficial process of breaking 
dovm ascriptive t i e s had been continued as f a r as possible, and'that t o 
pursue such a c t i v i t i e s further would simply destroy the character of modern 
c i v i l i s a t i o n . Smith, on the other hand, f e l t that Maine was advocating 
* "my i t a l i c s 
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an essentially laissea-faire society, attempting t o preserve the legal 
and p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s extant i n the 1860;'s wh i l s t blocking further reform 
since t h i s would lead t o socialism. Thus we have a contrast between 
Maine's ^vork seen as escpressing a l i b e r a l doctrine and seen as a defence 
of a t r a d i t i o n a l society. I n both cases, the outcome i s an interpretation 
of Maine's h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n terms of a reaction, 
showing him as attempting to preserve a par t i c u l a r order i n society. 
There i s much t o be said i n favour of both these positions des-
p i t e the inadequacies of the siimmaries presented here. But there seems 
to be a number of shortcomings i n each which, when made good^lead t o a 
t h i r d position. Agreeing w i t h Smith, i t may be affirmed that Maine was 
v i t a l l y aware of the great importance of the freedom of the individual 
as the source of progress. Even so, i t would be quite wr6ng t o suggest 
that the status t o contract theory was i n any way a p o l i t i c a l doctrine. 
I t was not. I t was concerned purely with the history of le g a l . r e l a t i o n -
ships. Despite Maine's own careful warning about extending the compet-
ence of his h i s t o r i c a l thesis, many w r i t e r s , including both Smith and 
Feaver, have f a l l e n i n t o the error of applying i t to the p o l i t i c a l and 
economic spheres. As G. Sawer remarked i n Law i n Society, most of the 
criticisms of the status to contract thesis have been inappropriate be-
cause Maine and his c r i t i c s were t a l k i n g about different things. I t i s 
irrelevant t o t a l k about trade \inions r e s t r i c t i n g freedom of contract 
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and so on, when, " I t was the wide extiansion of f u l l legal capacity to 
sane adults which Maine emphasized, and i n t h i s he was qu i t e correct."* 
As i t has been demonstrated above, Maine d i d think that freedom and i n -
d i v i d u a l i t y were v i t a l factors i n progress, but his defence of these 
positions has nothing t o do with his status to contract thieory. His po l -
i t i c a l views were not determined by his h i s t o r i c a l investigations. He 
simply said that a comparison of ancient and modern society shoired that 
the modern world exhibited a highly complex legal structure based not on 
the family but bn the individual. This i s the quintessence of his thesis. 
However, along with t h i s change had occurred corresponding changes i n the 
nature of ownership, the relationship of man with his fellows, the char-
acter of exchange and so on. Private property, f o r example, was one of 
the r e s u l t s of t h i s change i n society, but Maine did not claim that he 
had found any law which suggested t hat private property must be preserved, 
or that i t was merely a stage i n the development of communal ownership. He 
simply observed i t s growth as a h i s t o r i c a l fact and noted i t s important 
role i n the nature of contemporary society. To accept the status t o con-
t r a c t thesis, even i f one extended i t s meaning beyond the l i m i t s of pure l e -
g a l i t y , as a p o l i t i c a l doctrine demonstrating the ' h i s t o r i c a l i n e v i t a b i l i t y ' 
of l a i s s e z - f a i r e , as Smith urges us to do, vrould be to completely misunder-
stand the nature of Maine's vrork. 
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I t would seem, then, that i f Smith erred i n over-emphasizing 
t h e " l i b e r a l aspect of Maine's work, Feaver gave too great.an importance 
to certain reservations which Maine f e l t regarding the freedom of the 
i n d i v i d u a l , ^y attenpting to construct a picture of Maine's personality 
as t h a t of a "dogmatic authoritarian", he seems to have distorted the 
message which Maine presented to the 19th century. I n his analysis of 
Maine's work, Feaver does not draw any d i s t i n c t i o n between legal and po l -
i t i c a l r i g h t s . I t istrue that p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s are leg a l l y enforceable, 
and as such, i n a general discussion might be cl a s s i f i e d under the voider 
l a b e l of l e g a l r i g h t s . But i n more specialiaed analysis, p o l i t i c a l 
r i g h t s must be distinguished from t h e i r near relations. P o l i t i c a l rights 
are those which enable a man to participate i n the p o l i t i c a l or public 
arena. I n contrast to t h i s , l e g a l rights refer t.o every form of private 
relationship i n t o which man ean enter with his fellows and which m.11 be 
enforced by the sovereign authority. Given t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , Feaver's 
position i s t o t a l l y undermined. To maintain that Maine considered the 
movement from status t o contract t o have reached i t s l i m i t s and t h a t the 
further breakdown of t r a d i t i o n a l legal restraints v/ould endanger society, 
i s completely erroneous. Nowhere i n his academic work does Maine assert 
any such claim^and certainly Feaver has not produced any evidence from 
Maine's j o u r n a l i s t i c vomitings or correspondence with which to support t h i s 
iKiew. Rather, Maine saw the continual removal of unnecessary legal 
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r e s t r a i n t s as the only means of attaining a r a t i o n a l system of social 
relationships. The movement towards greater freedom under law lay at 
the very basis of progress and, consequently, must not be frustrated 
by reactionaries or by revolutionaries. I t was not the breakdown of 
certain legal barriers which disturbed Maine. VJhat he was worried by 
was the removal of a p o l i t i c a l b arrier. The enfranchisement of the masses 
appeared as a retrogressive step t o him because, as we have s een, he be-
lieved that t h e i r ignorance of the a r t of p o l i t i c s could have disastrous 
consequences. Feaver's mistake, then, i s i n extending Maine's fears r e -
garding p o l i t i c a l rights t o cover every legal r i g h t , of magnifying one 
apprehension - the fear of universal suffrage - to the extent that i t 
overwhelms his whole theory of society's development. 
Leading on from t h i s point i s a second: in. Stressing the im-
portance of a creative e l i t e , Feaver seenis t o confuse the d i s t i n c t i o n be-
tween a p o l i t i c a l e l i t e and a creative minority. He speaks about a "cre-
ative aristocracy who had been free from the restraints of the vulgar,"*^ 
and of Progress as "a partnership i n society which joined the r a t i o n a l 
few capable of l e g a l freedom* and those less fortunate who needed t r a d -
i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y . " ^ This obscures the point which Maine v;as making. 
Maine did not suggest that the p o l i t i c a l aristocracy was i n any sense more 
i n t e l l i g e n t or creative than any other members of society. He defended a 
r u l i n g class because i t s members alone knew the character of p o l i t i c s . 
* ray i t a l i c s 
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They alone could guarantee the freedom without which the creative 
minority i n whichever class of society they found themselves could 
not continue t h e i r work. Maine feared that t o grant universal suf-
frage would simply be the f i r s t step i n the direction of the t o t a l -
i t a r i a n state v/herein the freedom and legal r i g h t s of a l l men would 
be crushed. As we have seen, Maine agreed with Oakeshott that the 
conditions of freedom had been gained i n the early 19th century. Men 
were free i f not equal. I n his defence of the aristocracy, then, Maine 
was not defending the rights of a. pa r t i c u l a r class, he was attempting 
t o protect the r i g h t s of a l l men. His opposition to direct democracy 
did not involve a rejection of his f a i t h i n individualism, i t wqs an 
attempt t o enable its.expansion to continue unhindered. As a f i n a l 
p o i n t , i t must be remembered that although Maine had resisted universal 
suffrage i n his j o u r n a l i s t i c v^ritings, i n Popular Government, l i k e the 
the true conservative that he was, he accepted i t as a f a i t accompli. 
I t was quite wrong f o r Feaver t o argue at t h i s point that: "For Maine 
rec o n c i l i a t i o n i s no longer possible. . ."*5 Maine did accept the new 
s i t u a t i o n . Thereafter, he concentrated on emphasizing the v i t a l role 
which the aristocracy could play i n checking the dangers inherent i n 
i t . 
CRITICISM OF MAINE'S METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
The point has nov^  been reached where an indication of the 
major cri t i c i s m s l e v e l l e d against Maine's work as a whole v / i l l be of 
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value i n making a f i n a l assessment of his achievements. One of Maine's 
major axioms was that Eastern societies exhibited the characteristics of 
the Aryan race i n i t s childhood. Consequently, such material that existed 
i n these areas was invaluable i n understanding the charactier of the early 
stages of progressive c i v i l i s a t i o n s . This assumption has now been chal-
lenged. Karl Jaspers, for example, claims that the s t a b i l i t y which the 
East exhibited i n the 18th century occurred because India and China 
" . . . had both reached an advanced stage i n t h e i r downward path."46 
U n t i l the 17th century, these c i v i l i s a t i o n s , both of which had achieved 
the breakthrough of the a x i a l period, had flourished and developed. 
Here then, were no lessons to be dravm about the origins of •western c i v i l -
i s a t i o n . Eastern society should be seen as the " . . . great symbol of 
what may happen t o the whole of mankind. . 5"^''' and not as a l i v i n g past. 
Further objections might also be made i n respect of Maine's 
study of ancient societies. He did not define his understanding of a 
stationary society very c l e a r l y , and even had he done so, and i t had been 
accepted as reasonable, i t might s t i l l have been objected t h a t t h i s study 
was s t i l l of no consequence i n explaining the nature of the modern world. 
Well might we ask 'of what significance i s the fact that western society 
has evolved i n a d i f f e r e n t way from that of the East?* Rather than assert-
ing that eastern societies wera of a stationary and unhappy character, as 
Maine does, i t could be argued, v/ith equal p l a u s i b i l i t y , that these areas 
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had achieved a happy s t a b i l i t y v;hich had eluded the west. Their dur-
a b i l i t y could s i g n i f y a condition of t r a n q u i l contentment and c u l t u r a l 
maturity. Maine gives no specific reason why eastern societies should 
be considered as immature compared with those of the west, rather than 
as exhibiting a d i f f e r e n t development. But without t h i s assumption, his 
concept of unilinear h i s t o r i c a l development would be undermined. Certainly 
a more detailed defence of such a fundamental point might have been a n t i -
cipated. 
But even i f these objections can be met, Maine, i n his attempt 
to establish a ". . . continuous and uninterrupted l i n e of development, 
. . . a unilinear direction of movement . . . "*^ in'i h i s t o r j ^ has a s t i l l 
more rigorous c r i t i c to answer. A major attack on his style of thinking 
appears t o have been delivered by Professor Oakeshott i n Experience and 
I t s Modes. Oakeshott s p e c i f i c a l l y rejects the view which asserts that 
". . . i n order t o understand things we must understand t h e i r history, 
and that when we have understood t h e i r history vra have understood the things 
themselves."*9 This clearly affects Maine's opinion that an understanding 
of the past i s instrumental i n understanding the present, even though he 
did not consider i t to provide a complete explanation. 
The separation of modes of thought i s the purpose behind Oake-
shott 's work. History i s treated simply as one of the exclusive abstract 
worlds which attempted to give a coherent account of a l l experience from 
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one point of view. I t i s d i s t i n c t from other modes of thought - science, 
poetry, philosophy and practice - and can have no dialogue with them. 
Ideas i n history, are accepted or believed to be true or false w i t h i n the 
h i s t o r i c a l world alone. This i s a world which exists i n the present, but 
one which i s subsumed under the category of the past. I t i s a conten?)orary 
mind i n a p a r t i c u l a r pose, a pose vMch understands temporal relationships 
not i n terms of cause and e f f e c t , but of contingency. 
Such a concept of history clearly casts a shadow over Maine's 
^position as a whole. Not only must his attempt to relate past and pre-
sent be seen as misdirected, but his attempt to base history on s c i e n t i f i c 
techniques must also appear as misplaced. Oakeshott's denial of the v a l -
i d i t y of laws i n history undermines the most important methodological as-
pects of Maine's work. Although the con^jarative method has been widely 
employed i n social anthropology, of which Maine was one of the founders, 
according to Oakeshott: 
The Comparative Method i s not a method which unites 
science and history; i t dismisses history and never 
achieves the f u l l condition of science. And since 
the s c i e n t i f i c character of anthropology i s an i l l u s i o n i 
i t s concepts and presuppositions being those of history, 
we must conclude that i t i s history or nothing.5^ 
I t would seem from t h i s that Maine's v/ork rested upon contra-
di c t o r y and insecure foundations. On the one hand, he claimed that he 
wanted to make history s c i e n t i f i c and arrive at comprehensive general-
isations j w h i l s t on the other, he f e l t that an appreciation of the past 
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i s important to a. s c i e n t i f i c understanding of the present. I n ef f e c t , 
he seems to have committed a l l the errors which Oakeshott has since 
warned against. However, we w i l l have been misled i f we believe that 
Maine's manifesto on h i s t o r i c a l method determined the character of his 
own h i s t o r i c a l w r i t i n g . His assertions regarding the s c i e n t i f i c na-
ture of history i n his addresses t o the University of Calcutta seem 
to have had l i t t l e impact on his ovm work beyond inspiring the general 
d i r e c t i o n of his interests. One feels that Professor Vinogradoff 
makes rather too much of Maine's 'scientism', p a r t i c u l a r l y when he a t -
tempts to relate him to the more ambitious doctrines of the p o s i t i v i s t 
school.51 Maine can be considered as having f a i l e d to achieve a scien-
t i f i c status f o r history,— even his professed attempts to base his gen-
eralisations on empirical evidence came to nothing. As A.S. Diamond 
said: 
. . . the early chapters of "Ancient Law" - that 
part of his work which, measured by i t s scope and 
influence, must be considered to be by fa r the most 
important - consists mainly of nothing more than 
courageous conjectures.52 
But Oakeshott's position must not be misconstrued at Maine's e:q)ense. 
Oakeshott's reje c t i o n of any relationship between past and present i s 
not as absolute as some of his assertions would seem to suggest. Since 
a l l experience, and t h i s necessarily includes h i s t o r i c a l experience, exists 
i n the present, then, the world of the here and now can be seen from the 
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stand-point of histo r y . Once t h i s i s done, the present, as something 
d i s t i n c t and separate from the past,.disappears. The 'present' simply 
becomes the l a s t frame i n the reel, of h i s t o r y , and so, t o gain some 
insight i n t o what i s happening at the end, i t would surely s eem helpful 
t o r e t u r n t o the beginning and see the f i l m as a whole. I t i s •'true 
that t h i s would only help explain the 'present' from a particular point 
of view. One would be f a m i l i a r with the origins of a specific set of 
circumstances and t h i s would not enable one t o determine what was going 
t o happen next. Neither could i t be said t o produce any s c i e n t i f i c ex-
planation of events, even less t o give directions as t o what ought t o be 
done about them. But t o be f amiliar vdth the development of a situation 
i s not without significance i n understanding the la t e s t position. I f t h i s 
i s a reasonable i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Oakeshott's work, then, f a r from being 
a c r i t i c of Maine's position, he turns out to be i n sympatl:qr with i t , Wit-
ness, f o r example, Oakeshott's use of " h i s t o r i c a l description", i n his essay 
on "The Masses i n Representative Democracy", As he says regarding the im-
pact of the mass man: 
I think we should recognize what our true position i s 
i n t h i s respect, what precisely we ovre to t h i s character, 
and the extent of his impact, i f we understood more clearly 
Yihd t h i s "mass man" i s and where he has come from.* And 
with a view t o answei?irig these questions, I propose to en-
gage i n a piece of h i s t o r i c a l description.* . . . You must 
bear wi t h me while I set the scene f o r the entry of the 
chau*acter we are to study, because we sha l l mistake him un-
less we prepare ourselves f o r his appearance.53 
7/hat Oakeshott vras r e a i l y denying was, not the p o s s i b i l i t y of understanding 
the 'present' as part of the h i s t o r i c a l universe, but the l i n k i n g together 
* ray i t a l i c s 
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of the h i s t o r i c a l and p r a c t i c a l worlds. This i s quite a separate pro-
po s i t i o n , since the world of practice i s not i n being, i t i s i n process 
of becojning and, consequently, i t i s beyond the reach of history. I t i s 
experience seen from the view of what ought to be and w i l l be, and not 
from the point of view of the past. 
The outcome of t h i s analysis, then, would seem to be that , pro-
vided one does not seek to explain the whole of the present i n terms of 
history or to use history to support p o l i t i c a l doctrines and policies -
none of which Maine himself attempted to do - then there i s s t i l l value 
i n his style of h i s t o r i c a l analysis, both as a purely academic study 
and as a means of providing the essential background for p o l i t i c a l action. 
R E F E R E N C E S 
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C H A P T E R S I X 
CHAPTER SIX 
C O N C L U S I O N 
CHARACTER OF MAINE'S WRITING 
The character of Maine's work has been revealed as essentially 
one of moderation. He sought the security of the middle way, the avoid-
ance of extreme positions i n any SGribusj discourse. A l l statements and 
generalisations, he believed, must be weighed and tested by the evidence 
before being accepted as i n any sense true. The more polemical statements 
made i n his j o u r n a l i s t i c writings do not deny t h i s interpretation. They 
were made i n p o l i t i c a l debate, not i n p o l i t i c a l philosophy. I t was propa-
ganda, proselytisms designed to sway opinion i n a particular direction: 
i t made n<o attempt t o deal with any topic i n a thoroughly objective ot ex-
haustive manner. I t would be inadvisable, then, t o rest too much weight 
on these review a r t i c l e s i n any assessment of the fundamental character of 
Maine's position. 
Permeating the whole of his thought was an acute h i s t o r i c a l sense; 
questions could only be answered f u l l y when seen i n the perspective of h i s -
t o r y . This was not, i t has been suggested, a crude historicism, but a 
i j i t a l awareness of the importance of history i n providing the context for 
-217-
any discussion. Often evidence from the past demonstrated serious 
l i m i t a t i o n s t o so-called universal theories i n both jurisprudence and 
p o l i t i c s . Awareness of the importance of h i s t o r i c a l setting i s thus 
a fundamental aspect of Jiaine's style of investigation.' On v/hatever 
question he was engaged, whether i t v;as the nature of contemporary 
p o l i t i c s , the character of sovereignty, or the assumptions underlying 
modern International Law, he dreiv on his great knowledge of the past 
t o bring a new c l a r i t y t o the issues at stake. 
The tvfo major forces giving direction t o Maine's inquiries 
were those of Natural Lavi and Benthamism. He believed each had proved 
inadequate as a system of jurisprudence or as the basis of a meaning-
f u l approach t o p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . I t has been indicated that whilst 
there was no necessary c o n f l i c t between the r a t i o n a l i s t mode of analysis 
adopted by the a n a l y t i c a l j u r i s t s and the h i s t o r i c a l method, Maine 
clashed v i o l e n t l y vdth the various pretensions of the Natur^, Law school. 
The subjects dealt viith by Maine and the analytical j u r i s t s rarely 
coincided. Even iiAiere there was a common topic of discussion, t h e i r pur-
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poses remained quite d i s t i n c t . The r a t i o n a l i s t s v/ere concerned with 
understanding the l o g i c a l presuppositions of various i n s t i t u t i o n s ; Maine 
wit h t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l antecedents. Frequently, however, evidence which 
the h i s t o r i c a l i n q u i r i e s revealed seriously undermined the authority of 
the a n a l y t i ^ d l theories of social i n s t i t u t i o n s . History provided material 
which had to be taken i n t o account i f a comprehensive, a l l embracing ex-
planation was t o be achieved. 
A p a r t i c u l a r l y i l l u m i n a t i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n of the impact of h i s -
t o r i c a l studies occurs i n Maine's examination of the concept of sovereignty. 
He began the discussion by carefully restating the classic d e f i n i t i o n of 
John Austin that i f r ' . ' i i iv sja&determinate human superior, receives habitual 
obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior i s 
sovereign i n that society, and the society, including the superior, i s a 
society p o l i t i c a l and independent.Maine then proceeded to subject i t t o 
h i s t o r i c a l observation, f o r as he said: 
The duty of enquiring i f not how Sover-
eignty arose, at a l l events through what 
stages i t has passed, i s i n my judgement 
indispensable. I t i s only thus that we 
can assure ourselves i n what degree the 
results of the Austinian analysis t a l l y 
w i th facts.2 
The theory of sovereignty, l i k e any other theory, must be tested by setting 
i t against a l l the available evidence i t v/as purporting to explain. I n 
t h i s case, the observation of early social organisation f a i l e d to reveal 
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any i n d i v i d u a l or group of individuals, which could be i d e n t i f i e d as 
the sovereign authority. Lavis vrere based on customary usage, not the 
l e g i s l a t i v e action of an a l l powerful body. The orders of even the 
most absolute ruler were not laws i n the Austinian sense, they were at 
the most single commands, devoid of the generality of true law; and 
despite ar^ implied sanction, law vias obeyed by virtue of habit, t r a d -
i t i o n and veneration. I n f a c t , Maine believed that the emergence of a 
sovereign society vras a modern phenomenon, coming int o being at the 
time of the Renaissance. With regard to Austinian sovereignty, then, 
history demonstrated that " . . . the assertion which we are considering 
would not so much be shown to be false as only verbally true, and there-
fore without the value which i t possesses i n society of the type to which 
our ovm belongs."^ 
The l i m i t e d a p p l i c a b i l i t y which Maine believed the Austinian 
theory of sovereignty displayed, resulted from the nature of the general-
i s a t i o n . Like a l l s c i e n t i f i c or philosophical explanations, i t was secured 
by the process of abstraction, by pruning away a l l material of a non-essen-
t i a l character. This Maine recognised as a legitimate procedure, but he s t i l 
maintained that the ultimate value of the theory was dependent on the s i g -
nificance of those considerations which had been excluded as irrelevant. 
By concentrating exclusiveiy^/on force as the basis of law, Austin had 
neglected the history of the community, and yet i t was the pas,t alone which 
determined where sovereignty should l i e and how i t srhould be exercised. 
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Although history could not c a l l i n t o question the i n t e r n a l consistency 
of the theory of sovereignty, i t did c a l l i n t o question i t s application 
as an a l l embracing explanation. 
I f Maine's discussion of the concept of sovereignty revealed a 
greater divergency from the Austinian position than was at f i r s t apparent, 
his discourse on Int e r n a t i o n a l Law demonstrated a greater sympathy with 
the doctrine of Natural Law, I n approaching the problems of modern I n t e r -
national Law, Maine perceived that there was a fundamental division over 
the question of i t s binding nature. On one side were those who believed 
that international relations could only be governed by positive i n s t i t u -
tions based either on customary usage or some form of t a c i t or formal 
consent. Bejrohd these recognised and approved systems of communication, 
a condition of anarchy prevailed. On the other side were those who be-
lieved that nation states, as autonomous sovereign bodies, could be r e -
garded as moral agents and as such were subjected solely to the obligations 
of Natural Law. Positive i n s t i t u t i o n s , i n such an understanding of 
int e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , appeared t o be superfluous. I n a t y p i c a l moderate 
fashion, Maine insisted that neither of these extreme views should be 
accepted; rather a compromise position offered a more satisfactory explan-
ation of the s i t u a t i o n . I t was undeniable that the most pr a c t i c a l aspects 
of Inte r n a t i o n a l Law lay with the system of positive i n s t i t u t i o n s , but 
Maine considered that these arrangements could not be separated from the 
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realiiis of natural j u s t i c e . Much of t h e i r force and dignity derived 
from the i*ale of r i g h t reason: from some view of the nature and con-
s t i t u t i o n of man, and the concept of a divine authority which consti-
tuted the basis of Natural Law morality. There was a natural and a 
positive law of Nations: the attempt t o separate public law and ethics 
was a mistake. Where there was an absence of formal rules of law i n any 
f i e l d , then decisions must be reached on the basis of the eternally bind-
ing precepts of Natural Law. 
?y reconciling these two divergent points of view withi n the 
system of International Law, Maine was able t o dismiss the attacks made 
on the whole system by the analytical j u r i s t s . He claimed that i t was 
meaningless t o deny the v a l i d i t y of these legal arrangements, simply 
because of the absence of any sanction which could be brought to bear. 
Inter n a t i o n a l Law had created not a sanction but a law-abiding sentiment 
based on the strong approval of a certain body of rules of conduct. I t 
was law founded on r i g h t order, a concept of law vrtiich had preceded the 
idea of law as a general command backed by force. To deny the existence 
of International Law was fraught with danger; anarchy among the nations 
would sanction the unrestrained ru l e of the strong t o a f a r greater degree 
than was already the case. Might would be the only measure of r i g h t . 
I n t h i s discussion, then, Maine can be seen i n c o n f l i c t with the 
an a l y t i c a l lawyers. But more si g n i f i c a n t i s his sympathy with what has 
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previously appeared as his bSte noire - the doctrine of Natural Law. 
I t should be noted, however, that the interpretation of Natural Law 
adopted as the basis of international relations i s fundamentally that 
employed by the Romans and bears l i t t l e r e l a t i o n to the ideological 
system of Rousseau. His defence of the extant system of the Law of 
Nations can, i n f a c t , be seen as a further facet of his essential con-
servatism. He accepted the existing structure of coramimications and 
attempted t o vrork f o r improvements within i t s framework. At the same 
tiiae, he was concerned to defend the system against ill-considered a t -
tacks bbasdd'^; ton abstract principles. I n national p o l i t i c s , the ideo-
l o g i c a l dogmas of Rousseau's interpretation of Natural Law threatened 
the existing social f a b r i c : i n the international f i e l d , the danger, 
lay i n the r i g i d application of the Benthamite concept of sovereignty. 
The roles played by Natural Lav/ andLBenthamism were thus reversed i n 
the two situations, but Maine's position remained constant. He was de-
termined to use a l l his energies to prevent the destruction of c i v i l i -
sation either by the inauguration of national or international anarchy. 
Only by a cautious, reasoned response to changing conditions could the 
virtues of a progressive world be retained. Rigid, ideological principles 
had no place i n a changing environment: p o l i t i c s was a process of f e e l -
ing one's way, of tes t i n g every step before i t vfas taken. Maine's dis-
position was thus the same i n both the national and international p o l i t i c a l 
arenas. 
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ASSESSMENT OF MAINE'S WORK 
Having established the outstanding characteristic of Maine's 
work as being one of moderation, i t w i l l novf be appropriate t o assess 
i t s value -r and i n par t i c u l a r the value of his p o l i t i c a l speculations. 
Maine v;as one of the l a s t great savants. He v;as a pioneer i n aiiwidedvar-
i e t y of subjects, and so i t i s hardly surprising that great strides have 
been made i n these f i e l d s since he made his inquiries. Specialisation i s 
the most outstanding feature of modern knov/ledge and t h i s has produced 
material and developed techniques of analysis which have superceded those 
of Maine. But as Kirk said, " . . . modern legal thought and sociology 
and p o l i t i c a l speculation, as w e l l as h i s t o r i c a l method, are indebted t o 
Maine. I n t h i s or that he has been corrected or amended.;- Maine himself 
expected nothing else; but the bulk of his writings looms s t i l l majestic 
i n accuracy and outlook."* Certainly the h i s t o r i c a l and comparative 
methods have proved invaluable methodological tools of analysis. And, i n 
an age i n v;hich man weilds such t o t a l povier, Maine's basic approaoh to 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y can be seen to retain a v i t a l relevance. 
Many of the predictions which Maine made regarding the structure 
of modern society have been realized. His social analysis reveals an a l -
most prophetic q u a l i t y . The f u l l extension of the franchise to universal 
adult suffrage has been achieved, though as yet, i n t h i s country at least, 
without the disastrous consequences which Maine expected to accompany i t , 
were his warnings ignored,' 
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There has, however, with the growth of the mass party system i n response 
to the enlarged electorate, been a corresponding decline i n bolhthe power 
of the individual Member of Parliament and the House of Lords. Power now 
seems to l i e i n the hierarchy of the party machine, the Cabinet, or, as 
some have argued, i n the hands of the Prime Minister himself. This is not 
to suggest that the pattern of modern British politics i s characterised 
by the 'wire-puller' or the 'secret.and a l l pov/erful Committee of Public 
Safety', only that there has been a significant centralisation of p o l i t -
i c a l power since the beginning of the Victorian era. I t vias against the 
danger of 'absolute corruption', implicit i n such highly concentrated 
power, that the Victorian cidtics of society had set their lances. 
I t i s within this European p o l i t i c a l theatre, hovrever, that Maine's 
forebodings regarding the inherent weaknesses of popular governmant have 
been most f u l l y realized. His recognition of the basic incompatibility of 
democracy and nationalism, and his forecast that "nationalism is f u l l of 
the seeds of future c i v i l convulsion"^ appear as perspicacious observations 
i n the aftennath of two World vVars.and the dictatorial nationalism vrtiich 
has been a feature of 20th century politics. European total i t a t i a n regimes, 
together with their African and Asian counterparts, have engaged i n many of 
the practices which Maine had indicated as essential features of irrespon-
sible e l i t e domination. The form of democratic gcfSBaaaament has been used 
to legitiMze the rule of the autocrat, whilst i n practice^most fundamental 
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huraan rights have been suspended and replaced by the rule of caisorship 
and the secret police. 
To appreciate why, i n relation to Maine's v;ork, such regimes 
were not produced i n England, i t i s necessary to examine his analysis of 
democratic tendencies and the various recoamendations \vhich he made tO' 
prevent any undesirable developments. As B.E. Lippincott has pointed 
out, Maine's object i n studying contemporary experiments i n democracy was 
not to c r i t i c i s e 'democratic philosophy' but to vreigh 'democratic beliefs' 
against the various attempts which had been made to realize these values 
i n practice.6 Again, i t was Maine's aim to demonstrate the inappropriate-
ness of a set of beliefs rather than their logical inconsistency. 
Using the comparative method of analysis, Maine attempted to 
display the fragile nature of popular government. The examination sug-
gested that unless there was a tradition of liberty and freedom vfithin 
a country, then, the prospects for popular government seemed destined to 
be very poor. Maine summed up this part of his analysis i n the follmiring 
way: 
I have thus shown that popular governments of the 
modern type have not. hitherto proved stable as com-
pared with other fomis of p o l i t i c a l rule, and that 
they include certain sources of weakness v/hich do 
not promise security for them i n the near or remote 
future. My chief conclusion can only be stated ne-
gatively. There is not at present sufficient evi-
dence to warrant the common belief that these gov-
ernments are li k e l y to be of indefinitely long dur-
ation.? 
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Maine had never claimed that democratic institutions were the 
only cause of social and p o l i t i c a l upheavals. V/hat he had argued was 
that popular governments were the least able to withstand the .tremendous 
pressures to which 19th century institutions T,TOre exposed. In particular 
they seemed the least able to resist the dangers from Imperialism, Radical-
ism and Nationalism. I n viev^ of the rapidly changing; circumstances and 
the increasing mul t i p l i c i t y and strength of extremist p o l i t i c a l movements, 
Maine f e l t that the major task of any government must be to maintain order, 
even i f need be, at the expense of some freedom. This, he considered, 
democratic government incapable of doing. 
Maine has been called "the most searching c r i t i c of democratic 
optimism i n the Victorian era."^ I t i s essential, hovraver, i f his position 
i s not to be distorted, that his understanding of the vrord democracy be 
made more explicit. Madne was quite consistent i n his use of the term; 
democracy was, he said, "... simply and solely a form of government. I t 
is the government of the State by the Many, as opposed, according to the 
Sid Greek analysis, to i t s government by the Few, and i t s government by 
One."9 He3usedithe term 'democracy' i n i t s Greek sense because i t empha-
sized the direct participation of the citizen body, as opposed to indirect 
representation. I n modern society, the only means by which the former 
kind of citizen a c t i v i t y could be secured would be by the use of the refer-
endum or plebescite system. I t was against such direct democracy that 
-227-
Maine focused his attack. Most commentators on his work, however, have 
attempted to refute this attack by defending representative democracy^^ -
the very system which, i n i t s English guise, Maine too vras defending. I t 
is here, i n the character of Maine's defense, that the lasting value of 
his prescriptive thought is to be found. 
Although Popular Government vras occasioned by a particular p o l i t -
i c a l situation, i t s t i l l remains a book which can be read vath profit. I t 
can be seen as an attempt to idemonstrate the dangers of rationalist thought 
i n p o l i t i c s , of basing p o l i t i c a l policy on a p r i o r i principles or ideo-
logical dogma. The dangers of such concepts of po l i t i c a l activity remain 
a threat,eand perhaps::(av:en more so, i n the contemporary vrorld. The essent-
i a l l y practical approach vthlch Maine presents offers a reasoned statament 
of the middle way. I n the vigorous debate over democratic government at 
the end of the 19th century many vAiO took part believed that direct demo-
cratic control by the people vrould soon be achieved. Among many of the 
propertied classes, this provoked an extremely reactionary response. TJhilst 
accepting the idea of universal suffrage and the other features of democracy 
secured earlier i n the century, Maine himself v/as anxious that the balance 
of society should not be upset by any conflict betvreen these two opposition 
groups. He wanted to deflate the highly charged atmosphere i n v^hich the 
f r i c t i o n betvreen p o l i t i c a l movements could prove explosive. 
Maine's p o l i t i c a l thought then, i t is true, has a lasting value, 
but i t is best seen i n terms of i t s general approach rather than i n the 
-228-
iramediacies of i t s content. I t is the natural, i f not logical, outgroirth 
of his studies into the history of civi l i s a t i o n and represents a sincere 
attempt to realize the potentials within a changing society. Popular 
Government must rank high i n the statements of conservative thought i n 
this period. I t stands as the major representative of the analytical 
conservative tradition i n the 19th century. 
R E F E R E N C E S 
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